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ABSTRACT 
Honduras has for almost two decades embraced economic integration as a way to achieve 
sustained economic growth. The DR-CAFTA agreement signed in 2004 represents 
another step towards economic openness. The agreement generated a heated debate about 
the benefits and costs to the Honduran economy. Previous assessments suggest that 
Honduras will have a marginal aggregate benefit from DR-CAFTA. The findings from 
this study suggest that the agreement might actually yield a marginal loss vis-à-vis the 
counterfactual.  
Previous studies also stress the potential for large losses resulting from the agreement, 
particularly for some traditional and sensitive agricultural sectors. The findings from this 
study suggest that, in aggregate, the welfare of basic grain households will decrease only 
marginally as a result of DR-CAFTA.   
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing a new assessment of the 
agreement on the Honduran economy, employing a new social accounting matrix and a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model particularly developed for this study. 
Furthermore, this study expands the previous literature, assessing the feasibility of 
alternative interventions, and developing a policy proposal that could serve as a road map 
for future public intervention aimed at easing the transition to more competitive domestic 
agricultural markets. The proposed intervention consists of three components, namely, 
(1) a technical assistance program, (2) a short-term agricultural financing program, and 
(3) a medium-term agricultural financing program.
 This dissertation is approved for  
Recommendation to the  
Graduate Council 
 
Dissertation Director: 
 
________________________________________ 
Dr. Eric J. Wailes 
 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
________________________________________ 
Dr. Jennie S. Popp 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Dr. Daniel V. Rainey 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Dr. Jeffrey J. Ryan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DISSERTATION DUPLICATION RELEASE 
I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this dissertation 
when needed for research and/or scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
Agreed      ________________________________________ 
                  Alvaro Durand-Morat 
 
 
 
Refused     ________________________________________ 
                  Alvaro Durand-Morat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
This achievement has been possible thanks to the support and guidance of numerous 
people. 
Special thanks go to Dr. Eric Wailes for his support throughout my doctoral studies. He 
has motivated me to always do my best, gave me the freedom to focus in the policy areas 
of my interest, and engaged me in relevant research projects that contributed greatly to 
my professional formation. I am sure that without his support, this achievement would 
not have been possible. 
 I want to thank my family for always being there for me. Thanks to Delmy, Paola, and 
Anabella for being so patient and supportive, for helping me greatly through difficult 
times, and for making the good times all the more enjoyable. Thanks to my parents 
Nestor and Norma, my sister Rosana, and my brother Mariano; from the distance, they 
always provided the support I much needed to persist all these years.  
Finally, I want to thank all my friends for their unconditional support. Without naming 
names, they all must know how proud and thankful I am for having them by my side. 
Finally and simply, I want to thank God for what I am and have.     
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
DEDICATION 
To my family and friends; they are the solid ground on which I sustain my achievements.  
A special thank to my grandfather; he taught me so much about valuing the simple things 
in life, and inspired me to always be humbled. I will always remember and admire him.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.    INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 The DR-CAFTA Agreement................................................................................ 5 
1.2 Competitiveness of Honduran Agriculture .......................................................... 9 
1.3 Adjustment Programs......................................................................................... 11 
1.4 Objectives .......................................................................................................... 21 
2.    BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................ 23 
2.1 The Honduran Agricultural Sector..................................................................... 26 
2.1.1 Traditional Agriculture ....................................................................... 27 
2.2 Limitations of Basic Grain Supply Chains ........................................................ 37 
2.3 Alternatives to Basic Grain Production ............................................................. 40 
2.4 The Political Context in Honduras ..................................................................... 42 
2.5 Agricultural Policy Framework ......................................................................... 45 
2.6 Public Programs for Basic Grains ...................................................................... 47 
2.6.1 Import Price Bands ............................................................................. 47 
2.6.2 Strategic Reserves ............................................................................... 48 
2.6.3 Purchase Agreements .......................................................................... 49 
2.6.4 National Plan for Basic Grains ........................................................... 50 
2.7 Estimation of Agricultural Support .................................................................... 54 
2.8 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 58 
3.    METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 60 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 60 
3.2 Social Accounting Matrices ............................................................................... 64 
3.2.1 Previous SAMs for Honduras .............................................................. 66 
3.2.2 The 2004 Macro SAM for Honduras ................................................... 68 
viii 
 
3.2.3 The 2004 Micro SAM for Honduras .................................................... 74 
3.3 Description of the CGE Model .......................................................................... 78 
3.3.1 Production Sector ................................................................................ 78 
3.3.2 Factor Supply ...................................................................................... 86 
3.3.3 Transaction Services ........................................................................... 88 
3.3.4 The Consumer Price Index .................................................................. 89 
3.3.5 Determination of Factor Income ......................................................... 89 
3.3.6 Distribution of Factor Income ............................................................. 89 
3.3.7 Institutions ........................................................................................... 90 
3.3.8 Price Linkages ..................................................................................... 96 
3.3.9 Endogenous Tax Rates ........................................................................ 97 
3.3.10 System Constraints ............................................................................. 98 
3.3.11 Dynamic Extension of the Model ...................................................... 102 
3.3.12 Other Features of the CGE Model ................................................... 102 
4.    ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF DR-CAFTA ................................................................... 104 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 104 
4.2 Previous Assessments of DR-CAFTA ............................................................. 105 
4.3 Methodology .................................................................................................... 113 
4.4 Analysis of Results .......................................................................................... 123 
4.4.1 Macroeconomic Impact of DR-CAFTA ............................................. 123 
4.4.2 Sectoral Impact of DR-CAFTA ......................................................... 133 
4.4.3 Impact of DR-CAFTA on Factor Markets ......................................... 138 
4.4.4 Impact of DR-CAFTA on Households ............................................... 142 
4.5 Assessing Other Dimensions of DR-CAFTA .................................................. 145 
4.5.1 Analysis of Results: Foreign Direct Investment Scenario ................. 148 
ix 
 
4.5.2 Analysis of Results: Total Factor Productivity Scenario .................. 153 
4.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 155 
5.    ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM DESIGN .............................................................................. 159 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 159 
5.2 Towards a New Agenda for Honduran Agriculture: The Political and Economic 
Context ............................................................................................................. 162 
5.2.1 Legislative Behavior and Implications for Agenda Setting ............... 168 
5.3 Towards a New Agenda for Honduran Agriculture: Main Features ................ 171 
5.4 Policy Process: Designing Adjustment Programs for the Basic Grain Sector . 181 
5.4.1 Problem Definition ............................................................................ 184 
5.4.2 Feasibility Analysis of Adjustment Programs ................................... 186 
5.4.3 Review of Adjustment Programs ....................................................... 188 
5.5 Development of the Proposal ........................................................................... 199 
5.5.1 Technical Assistance Program .......................................................... 203 
5.5.2 Short-Term Agricultural Financing Program ................................... 209 
5.5.3 Medium -Term Agricultural Financing Program ............................. 214 
5.5.4 Important Additional Features of the Proposal ................................ 218 
5.5.5 Limitations of the Proposal ............................................................... 221 
5.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 223 
6.   BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 228 
7.   APPENDICES ……………………………………..………………………………………………………… 238 
x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1.   Applied import tariffs in 2003a by WTO category   .......................................... 3
Table 1.2.   Tariff categories and specification of reduction schedules in DR-CAFTA   .... 6
Table 1.3.   Treatment of special product tariff lines for Honduras in DR-CAFTA   .......... 9
Table 1.4.   Price competitiveness of Honduran sensitive products relative to U.S. imports 
in 2002   ........................................................................................................... 10
Table 2.1.   Geographical distribution of commercial corn production, average size farm, 
and average yield.   .......................................................................................... 30
Table 2.2.   Geographical distribution of bean production, average size farm, and average 
yield   ............................................................................................................... 36
Table 2.3.   Most relevant problems affecting the different agents throughout the 
agricultural supply chains.  ............................................................................. 39
Table 2.4.   Elements in the new agricultural paradigm   ................................................... 46
Table 2.5.   Total support estimate for Honduras, the DR-CAFTA region, and the OECD 
region, disaggregated by components (USD million)   ................................... 55
Table 2.6.   Honduras: notification on domestic support to the World Trade Organization 
(USD 1,000)   .................................................................................................. 58
Table 4.1.   Rate of growth of selected macroeconomic variables under the two scenarios
  ..................................................................................................................... 124
Table 4.2.   Decomposition of GDP growth by groups of shocks applied in each scenario
  ..................................................................................................................... 125
Table 4.3.   Percentage changes in the savings by the relevant institutions in each 
scenario, year 2007.   ..................................................................................... 129
Table 4.4.   Composition of government revenues and estimated changes resulting from 
each of the two scenarios considered.   ......................................................... 129
Table 4.5.   Activity level for selected sectors under the two scenarios considered   ...... 136
Table 4.6.   Estimated impact of DR-CAFTA on factor markets   ................................... 141
Table 4.7.   Estimated average annual impact of both scenarios on selected household 
variables   ...................................................................................................... 144
Table 4.8.   Average annual rates of growth of selected macroeconomic variables for the 
two new scenarios and difference with respect to the counterfactual   ......... 149
xi 
 
Table 4.9.   Activity level for selected sectors under the two scenarios considered   ...... 150
Table 4.10. Estimated impact of DR-CAFTA+FDI and DR-CAFTA+TFP on factor 
markets   ........................................................................................................ 152
Table 4.11. Estimated average annual impact of DR-CAFTA+FDI and DR-CAFTA+TFP 
on selected household variables   .................................................................. 153
Table 5.1.   Relative measures of agricultural support granted to agriculture in Honduras 
and Latin America   ....................................................................................... 175
Table 5.2.   Most relevant problems affecting the different agents throughout the 
agricultural supply chains.  ........................................................................... 200
Table 5.3.   Financial assessment of the technical assistance program (L million)  ........ 209
Table 5.4.   Financial assessment of the short-term agricultural financing program.   .... 214
Table 5.5.   Financial assessment of the medium-term agricultural financing program.   218
xii 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix Table 1.   Number of producers by size of operation and their allocation of 
production, 2006-2007   ................................................................... 238
Appendix Table 2.   Main limitations cited by members of the basic grain supply chains
  ....................................................................................................... 240
Appendix Table 3.   Honduras: Competitiveness of agricultural and food exports to the 
U.S. (1990-2004)   ........................................................................... 242
Appendix Table 4.   Honduras: short-list of agricultural and food export products with 
revealed comparative advantages in other foreign markets but the 
U.S.   ................................................................................................ 243
Appendix Table 5.   Measures to transform the agricultural and food sectors of Honduras
  ....................................................................................................... 244
Appendix Table 6.   Description of the macro-SAM of Honduras for the year 2004   .... 247
Appendix Table 7.   The 2004 Macro-SAM for Honduras (million Lempiras)   ............. 249
Appendix Table 8.   Sets defined in the CGE model   ...................................................... 250
Appendix Table 9.   Parameters in the CGE model  ........................................................ 250
Appendix Table 10. List of equations included in the CGE model   ................................ 251
Appendix Table 11. Definition, estimation, and updates of the values used for the 
calibration of the model   ................................................................. 259
Appendix Table 12. List of shocks applied to assess the impact of DR-CAFTA   .......... 263
xiii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. Corn contribution to agricultural GDP   ........................................................... 29
Figure 2.2. Past trends in corn yields for Honduras and the Central American region.   ... 29
Figure 2.3. Trend in rice production, area harvested, and yields over the last 40 years.   . 33
Figure 2.4. Bean contribution to agricultural GDP   .......................................................... 34
Figure 3.1. Structure of primary production   ..................................................................... 80
Figure 3.2. Marketing of domestic goods, imports, and the production of a composite 
commodity   ..................................................................................................... 84
Figure 3.3. Specification of household consumption behavior   ........................................ 95
Figure 4.1. Evolution of GDP (billion Lempiras) under each of the two scenarios 
considered   .................................................................................................... 127
Figure 4.2. Difference in GDP generated in the DR-CAFTA scenario relative to that 
generated in the counterfactual scenario (USD million)   ............................. 127
Figure 4.3. Evolution of GDP (billion Lempiras) under each of the two scenarios 
considered   .................................................................................................... 150
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Honduran economy has gone through significant changes over the last fifteen years. 
The increasing contributions to the gross domestic product (GDP) by industries like 
manufactures, primarily textiles and apparels, and tourism contrasts with the decreasing 
role of traditional agriculture1
Despite its decreasing economic importance, agriculture still employs approximately 27 
percent of the Honduran labor force, and is the primary, and in many cases the only, 
source of employment in rural areas, where roughly half of the Honduran population 
lives. A further contraction of the agricultural sector would likely exacerbate the already 
high level of poverty seen in many rural areas, primarily in the South and Southwest
. The share of agriculture to GDP decreased from 20 
percent in 1990 to 11.5 percent in 2004, while at the same time the contribution of 
manufactures grew from 14.5 percent in 1990 to 18.1 percent in 2004. Moreover, the 
share of traditional agricultural exports decreased from 77 percent of total merchandise 
trade in 1990 to 33 percent in 2005; exports of non-traditional agricultural products 
increased significantly during this period.  
2, 
unless job creation in urban areas is sufficient to absorb the increase in labor supply 
resulting from rural-urban migration. Furthermore, a decrease in agricultural activity 
would most likely put pressure on illegal migration to other nations, primarily the U.S.3
                                                 
1 Traditional agriculture refers to those agricultural products that have historically accounted for most of 
Honduran agricultural GDP and/or agricultural exports, such as bananas, coffee, corn, and beans (Sanders, 
Ramirez and Morazan 2006). Non-traditional agriculture, on the other hand, refers to activities that have 
either been introduced recently or that have not historically contributed significantly to agricultural GDP, 
such as tropical fruits and Asian vegetables.   
2 For a detailed analysis of the geographical distribution of rural poverty, see Falk (2003). 
    
3 There are no estimates on rural-urban migration in Honduras; international migration rates were estimated 
at 6 and 4.6 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants for the 1995-00 and 2000-05 periods, respectively (Economic 
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Since the early 1990s, Honduran public officials have seen trade liberalization as one of 
the keys to economic growth and acted upon this belief. Accordingly, Honduras has 
become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and has been active 
in the regional arena as well, signing trade agreements with a large number of nations, 
such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile. As a result of this process of economic 
integration, Honduras went from having the highest average tariffs in Central America in 
1990 (42 percent) to the lowest in the region in 1995, estimated at 9.7 percent (Lederman, 
Perry and Suescun 2002). At the same time, trade openness, measured as the ratio of 
imports plus exports over GDP, increased from 77 percent in 1990 to 92 percent in 1995, 
well before the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-
CAFTA) was negotiated. The relevance of trade taxes as a source of government revenue 
decreased from 30 percent of total tax revenue in 1991 to 17 percent in 1998 and only 8 
percent since 2003 (Gomez-Sabaini 2003, Direccion Ejecutiva de Ingresos 2006). 
However, the tariff averages above hide relevant asymmetries in protection among 
sectors. Honduras maintains high import tariffs on a number of agricultural products 
while it imposes very low import tariffs on industrial products (Morley, Nakasone and 
Piñeiro 2008). However, for many agricultural products, there is a significant difference 
between the applied and bounded tariffs; this wedge undermines the predictability of 
conditions for access to the Honduran market. Table 1.1 below shows the average import 
tariffs applied in 2003.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Commission for Latin American and The Caribbean n.d.). Most of the estimated 250,000 Hondurans living 
in the U.S. come from rural areas, and send more than USD 1.1 billion dollars per year in remittances 
(Serna 2007). 
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Table 1.1. Applied import tariffs in 2003a by WTO category 
 NUMBER OF 
LINES 
AVERAGE TARIFF 
APPLIED (%) 
RANGE 
(%) 
SD     
(%) CV 
Total 6,259 6.1 0-55 6.7 1.1 
 Agricultural products 923 10.1 0-55 7.8 0.8 
Live animals and animal products 121 14.6 0-50 9.8 0.7 
Dairy products 31 12.6 0-15 4.6 0.4 
Coffee and tea, cocoa, sugar, etc. 165 10.9 0-40 5.7 0.5 
Cut flowers and plants 59 5.6 0-15 7.0 1.3 
Fruit and vegetables 201 13.1 0-15 4.5 0.3 
Cereals 23 13.9 0-45 16.8 1.2 
Beverages and spirits 54 13.5 0-30 5.4 0.4 
Tobacco 19 8.7 0-55 12.3 1.4 
 Non-agricultural products (excluding 
petroleum) 5,313 5.4 0-15 6.2 1.2 
Textiles and clothing 932 11.3 0-15 5.0 0.4 
Leather, rubber, footwear and travel 
goods 207 7.6 0-15 5.7 0.7 
Source: World Trade Organization (2003) 
a. In order to incorporate the products under the price band system into the Honduran MFN tariff 
calculation, the simple average tariff applied in 2002 was calculated for each of these products, on the 
basis of information provided by the Honduran authorities. 
 
Honduras maintains a price band system for corn and sorghum, and applies tariff 
escalation schedules for numerous industrial products as well as agricultural goods such 
as rice. It also administers purchase agreements for corn, sorghum, and rice, through 
which the processing industry and the primary production sectors negotiate the reference 
prices and volumes to be purchased every year. Associated with these purchase 
agreements, the government of Honduras also applies performance requirements, which 
make the right to import conditional on the purchases of domestic production (World 
Trade Organization 2003, Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico 2005). The significance of 
agricultural import tariffs, along with the fact that the U.S. is the largest trade partner for 
the most sensitive agricultural products, implies that DR-CAFTA would potentially bring 
about significant changes in many domestic agricultural markets, at least in the long run.  
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Another relevant fact that would affect the outcome of DR-CAFTA is the already low 
import tariffs that the U.S. applies on a large number of agricultural products coming 
from Honduras as a result of unilateral concessions that the U.S. has offered to the 
Central American region for over 20 years through agreements such as the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) (Unidad 
de Apoyo Tecnico 2005, Morley, Nakasone and Piñeiro 2008). The already free access 
granted by the U.S. to most Honduran agricultural products implies that most gains to 
Honduran producers and U.S. consumers from trade liberalization have already 
materialized. However, the assessment of the impact of DR-CAFTA should be compared 
not to the situation before DR-CAFTA, but to the scenario without the concessions 
granted by the CBI and the CBTPA, given that the continuation of these concessions was 
subject to the approval of DR-CAFTA and would have otherwise expired in 2008 
(Morley 2006). 
The situation depicted above leads us to infer that DR-CAFTA would likely impose great 
challenges to the Honduran agricultural sector. But would that likely be the case? We can 
infer which agricultural sectors would likely benefit and lose from DR-CAFTA; much 
less obvious is to infer the magnitudes of the changes, and the impacts of these changes 
throughout the whole economy. The assessment of these effects is one of the primary 
goals of this study. 
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1.1 THE DR-CAFTA AGREEMENT   
Signed in 2004 by the U.S., Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and ratified by all members4
Through tariff reductions, expansions of zero-tariff quotas, and a combination of both, 
DR-CAFTA commits parties to eliminate tariffs for most tariff lines. Negotiations on 
market access were done on a product and country-specific basis. Tariff elimination is 
, DR-CAFTA 
represents another step in the reform process undertaken by most Central American 
countries during the 1990s towards the outward orientation of their economies. While this 
region has benefited since 1983 from the unilateral concessions granted by the U.S. 
through the CBI and CBTPA, DR-CAFTA implies (1) a stronger institutional framework 
for these concessions (making them permanent and not subject to Congressional approval 
from time to time), (2) enhanced market access for a number of new products, including 
sensitive agricultural products such as corn and sugar, and (3) extended application of the 
rules of law into other areas such as intellectual property rights and trade in services 
(World Bank 2005).  
DR-CAFTA is a highly comprehensive agreement, encompassing areas such as market 
access in goods and services, investment protection, intellectual property rights, dispute 
settlements, labor, and environment. While acknowledging the relevance of all areas, the 
discussion in this section focuses primarily on market access of goods, primarily 
agricultural goods. 
                                                 
4 DR-CAFTA was signed in May of 2004 by all members except the Dominican Republic, which signed it 
in August of the same year. The ratification process was highly politicized in some countries such as Costa 
Rica, where the agreement was ratified through a referendum in 2007. Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala were the first countries to ratify the agreement in 2005.   
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done according to negotiated schedules: immediate, 5 years, 10 years, 12 years, 15 years, 
and 18-20 years for poultry parts, rice, and some dairy products (see Table 1.2 below).  
Table 1.2. Tariff categories and specification of reduction schedules in DR-CAFTA 
TARIFF CATEGORY SPECIFICATION APPLIES TO 
A Immediate reduction to zero All members 
B Linear reduction to zero in 5 years  All members 
C Linear reduction to zero in 10 years All members 
D Linear reduction to zero in 15 years All members 
E 6-year grace period; 33%-reduction over the 
next 4 years; reduction to zero from year 12 
to 15 
All members 
F 10-year grace period; linear reduction to zero 
over the next 10 years 
All members 
G Already enjoy zero tariffs All members 
H Excluded from reductions; tariff levels 
remain at the negotiated WTO level  
All members 
M Non-linear reduction to zero: 2% first year; 
8% annually from year 3 to 6; 16% annually 
from year 7 to 10 
All members 
N Reduction to zero in 12 equal annual 
installments 
All members 
O 6-year grace period; reduction in 9 non-
linear annual installments: 40% from year 7 
to 11; 60% from year 12 to 15 
El Salvador; Guatemala; 
Honduras; Nicaragua 
P 10-year grace period; reduction in the 
following 7 years: 33% from year 11 to 14; 
67% from year 15 to 18  
El Salvador; Guatemala; 
Honduras; Nicaragua 
Q Non-linear reduction in 15 years: 15% in the 
first year; 33% from year 4 to 8; 67% from 
year 9 to 15 
El Salvador; Nicaragua 
Source: DR-CAFTA Agreement 
 
While most tariffs will be reduced in equal annual installments, Central American nations 
were able to negotiate longer grace periods and back-loaded schemes for most of their 
sensitive products. Greater market access is also obtained through the creation and 
expansion of zero-duty quotas, which some Central American countries already had in 
place for sensitive products. Honduras has not included any products in its Uruguay 
Round schedule of concessions relating to TRQs for agricultural products (World Trade 
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Organization 2003); consequently, it currently administers only those TRQs introduced 
by DR-CAFTA. The agreement contemplates the gradual expansion of the quotas 
according to the annual economic growth rates estimated for the region, which vary from 
2 to 5 percent (World Bank 2005). 
The agreement contains agricultural safeguards for sensitive products; these safeguards 
activate automatically in the event that the quantity of imports expand beyond negotiated 
levels, thus allowing members to provide temporary protection to an industry. Countries 
are allowed to use agricultural safeguards in the event that the trigger level is reached, but 
just once during the phase-out period, and for no more than four consecutive years. 
Regarding sanitary and phytosanitary measures, DR-CAFTA adopts the standards and 
procedures followed by the WTO. As it did during the negotiation phase, the U.S. 
committed itself to continue providing technical assistance to Central American partners 
to help them overcome sanitary hurdles, primarily for non-traditional agricultural exports. 
Sugar received special attention during the negotiation of DR-CAFTA, given the political 
sensitivity of this commodity in the U.S., and the potential gains from trade that Central 
American countries could obtain. Although sugar was finally excluded from the tariff 
elimination schedules negotiated, the U.S. committed itself to double the zero-tariff quota 
granted to DR-CAFTA partners, of which roughly 70 percent occurred in the first year of 
DR-CAFTA, and the remaining 30 percent will be granted in the year 15 (Morley 2006). 
 Under the terms of DR-CAFTA, most Honduran products would enter the U.S. market 
free of duty; TRQs would remain in place for sugar and textiles and apparels, but DR-
CAFTA implies an expansion in their volumes. DR-CAFTA introduces less stringent 
rules of origin for textiles and apparels, which according to analysts might generate the 
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most benefits for Central American nations by allowing specialization in an activity that 
uses intensively their relatively abundant factor of production, namely, labor (Morley, 
Nakasone and Piñeiro 2008).  
Honduran exports to the U.S. enjoy a duty-free treatment in 97.8 percent of the tariff lines 
immediately after the implementation of the agreement; on the other hand, U.S. exports 
to Honduras have zero import duties in only 74.4 percent of the tariff lines. Honduras was 
able to negotiate better terms for its agricultural sector than its industrial sectors. For 
instance, imports under only 52 percent of the tariff lines considered to be agricultural 
products, which represent 53 percent of the value of agricultural imports from the U.S., 
would be subject to no import tariffs immediately after the implementation of DR-
CAFTA; 9.9 percent of tariff lines (2.9 percent in value) would be traded freely in 5 
years; 18.4 percent of tariff lines (7.3 percent in value) in 10 years; and 14.3 percent of 
tariff lines (7.9 percent in value) in 15 years. Only 7 tariff lines have a schedule of 20 
years, including products such as prime and choice beef and some types of cheeses. 
Thirty-three agricultural tariff lines, representing roughly 4 percent of agricultural 
imports, have TRQs, and with the exception of the TRQ for white corn, all of them will 
be removed after 20 years. Among the goods for which Honduras maintains TRQs are 
dairy products, white and yellow corn, paddy and milled rice, chicken thighs, and pork 
meat.  
Most of these commodities are considered sensitive either because (1) they represent a 
significant source of employment; (2) contribute significantly to the income of small 
farmers; or (3) because they are an important part of the diet, primarily among the poorest 
segments of the population. For most of the commodities subject to TRQs, the short and 
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medium-term effects of DR-CAFTA will be primarily through the expansion of the 
quota, given that the tariff schedules negotiated for them are back-loaded.  
Table 1.3. Treatment of special product tariff lines for Honduras in DR-CAFTA 
PRODUCT 
TARIFF 
CATEGORY 
INITIAL QUOTA 
(MT) 
ANNUAL 
INCREASE 
SAFEGUARD 
** (%) 
INITIAL MFN 
TARIFF (%) 
Dairy F 2202 5% 130% 15% 
Paddy rice P 91800 2% 110% 45% 
Milled rice P 8925 5% 110% 45% 
Yellow corn E 190509 5% --- 45% 
White corn H 23460 460 mt --- 45% 
Chicken thighs P 534 * 534 mt 130% 164.4% 
Pork meat O 2150 7% 130% 15% 
Black beans D --- --- --- 15% 
White beans B --- --- --- 15% 
Red beans D --- --- --- 15% 
Source: DR-CAFTA Agreement. 
* From year 3 and beyond. ** Trigger level. 
 
1.2 COMPETITIVENESS OF HONDURAN AGRICULTURE 
An assessment of the competitiveness of sensitive agricultural sectors relative to the U.S. 
shows the poor performance of Honduran agriculture. Using 2002 data on (1) wholesale 
prices for domestic goods in San Pedro Sula; (2) prices for U.S. goods in San Pedro Sula, 
inclusive of import tariffs and inland transportation costs; and (3) c.i.f. prices for U.S. 
goods in Puerto Cortez, exclusive of import tariffs, the Secretary of Industry and 
Commerce (Secretaria de Industria y Comercio 2003) estimates that only two sensitive 
products, namely beef and white corn, out of nine sensitive products analyzed would be 
able to compete freely with imports from the U.S. (see Table 1.4 below). The situation is 
highly worrisome for chicken thighs and pork meat, where the ratio of (3) to (1) is close 
to 0.5, and for rice and fluid milk, with ratios of roughly 0.75. When import tariffs and 
inland transaction costs are accounted for, then only six products, namely white and 
yellow corn, paddy and milled rice, beef, and chicken breasts, are competitive in the 
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domestic market. Chicken thighs, pork meat, and fluid milk all remain uncompetitive. An 
update of this analysis for corn, rice, and beans to 2005 data shows a loss of 
competitiveness for white and yellow corn, and rice, whose wholesale prices are higher 
than those for U.S. products (Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico 2005). The loss of 
competitiveness could be the result of a tight supply as a result of a severe draught that 
affected the main areas of production during 2005. Nevertheless, the analysis sheds light 
on the even larger potential trade impact of DR-CAFTA in situations of short supply, a 
common scenario observed in many Honduran agricultural sectors due to the low level of 
infrastructure, primarily irrigation, and outdated technology.  
These estimates highlight the potential impact of DR-CAFTA on highly protected 
agricultural sectors. Improving their competitiveness is a difficult task on which many 
governmental and non-governmental organizations are working.  
Table 1.4. Price competitiveness of Honduran sensitive products relative to U.S. imports in 2002 
 
WHOLESALE PRICE 
OF HONDURAN 
PRODUCT (1) 
PRICE OF U.S. IMPORTS 
(2) / (1) (3) / (1) PRODUCTS 
INCLUSIVE OF IMPORT 
TARIFFS AND 
TRANSACTION COSTS (2) 
EXCLUSIVE OF 
IMPORT TARIFFS 
(3) 
White corn 159.0 a 229.4 162.0 1.44 1.02 
Yellow corn 159.0 a 190.2 135.4 1.20 0.85 
Paddy rice 203.0 a 225.3 155.4 1.11 0.77 
Milled rice 417.0 a 442.3 305.0 1.06 0.73 
Beef 0.94 b 1.72 1.38 1.82 1.46 
Pork meat 0.92 b 0.53 0.46 0.58 0.50 
Chicken breasts 0.74 b 0.81 0.61 1.09 0.82 
Chicken thighs 0.74 b 0.46 0.32 0.62 0.43 
Fluid milk 0.43 c 0.37 0.32 0.86 0.74 
Source: Secretaria de Industria y Comercio (2003). 
a: USD / mt; b: USD / lb; c: USD / liter. 
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Previous studies identify a significant number of Honduran agricultural products, varying 
from 75 for the period 1998-2000 to 100 in 2000-035
1.3 ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS   
, with revealed comparative 
advantages in the world but not against the U.S. (Monge-González 2004, Unidad de 
Apoyo Tecnico 2005). Among these products we find a large number of tropical fruits, 
palm oil, and tomato juice. These agricultural products represent a promising alternative 
to traditional, low value-added agriculture; consequently, policy interventions aimed at 
improving the welfare of agricultural households must to the extent possible facilitate the 
reallocation of resources into these high-value activities.   
The fact that DR-CAFTA contains relatively long, back-loaded tariff reduction schedules 
and safeguard provisions implies that sensitive agricultural sectors would still receive a 
considerable level of protection in the short to medium term. Moreover, adjustment 
programs can be implemented with the goal of minimizing the potentially negative 
impacts that trade liberalization might generate and helping those agents in need to cope 
with these changes. While the continuing provision of protection to producers comes at a 
cost to consumers, since they would not perceive the gains associated with lower market 
prices, it is evident from the terms negotiated that policymakers prioritized the welfare of 
producers, most of which in the case of sensitive products are poor farmers with serious 
constraints on their abilities to adjust to new market conditions. 
A number of adjustment programs have been employed by other countries to help 
producers cope with the changes in market conditions, for instance, compensatory 
                                                 
5 Agricultural products were defined according to the Central American Tariff System (SAC for its initials 
in Spanish) at the 8-digit level, which results in a total of 870 agricultural products.  
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decoupled payments, conditional cash transfers, technical assistance programs, and 
provision of public goods such as infrastructure and education (Soto-Baquero, 
Rogriguez-Fazzone and Falcioni 2007, Arias 2007).  
An example of compensatory decoupled payments to producers is the Procampo program 
implemented by Mexico to cope with the changes introduced by the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico negotiated long and back-loaded tariff reduction 
schemes for 9 sensitive products including maize, rice, sorghum, beans, and soybeans. 
However, Mexico never invoked these provisions, opting instead for quick liberalization 
and temporary compensatory payments to those producers expected to be negatively 
affected. The Procampo program, initiated in 1994 and expected to end in 2008, provides 
fixed payments per hectare to farmers producing sensitive products prior to 1993. 
Payments go to the producer, regardless of whether he/she is the owner of the land or a 
tenant, and they are limited up to 100 hectares for irrigated and 200 hectares for rain-fed 
land, respectively (Yunez-Naude, Mexico: Politicas Compensatorias para la Agricultura 
Familiar frente a los Impactos de los TLC 2007, World Bank 2005).  Findings from 
different evaluations suggest that the Procampo program has had a number of desirable 
effects, namely: (1) positive impacts on the incomes of recipients (the main goal the 
program pursued when the program was implemented), (2) protection against negative 
income shocks; (3) higher consumption levels among recipients; and (4) contribution to 
the reduction of rural poverty (Sadoulet, de Janvry and Davis 2001, Davis, et al. 2002, 
World Bank 2003). On the other hand, the evidence suggests that the Procampo program 
did not fulfill other goals attached to it latter, namely, it neither improved the 
competitiveness of the farm sector, nor created the incentives for farmers to transition 
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into more profitable activities. Recipients have channeled the receipts from this program 
primarily into consumption. Furthermore, by being targeted to producers, decoupled 
payment programs do not contribute to the welfare of hired rural labor, which may also 
be negatively affected by the market changes. Implementing a decoupled payment 
program requires a record of land ownership and production activities in order to 
determine who is an eligible recipient; furthermore, it requires budgetary funds to be 
allocated for this purpose, thus competing with other relevant areas such as education and 
health.           
Several Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, and 
Honduras, have opted lately for conditional cash transfers6
                                                 
6 For more information on these particular programs see Soto-Baquero, Rodriguez-Fazzone, and Falcioni 
(2007). 
, namely, providing cash 
transfers to poor families living in selected areas conditional on these families making the 
necessary investment in their children’s human capital: sending them to school, 
maintaining regular health checkups, having their children vaccinated, etc. Conditional 
cash transfers have two main objectives: (1) reduce current poverty, and (2) promote 
accumulation of human capital, primarily of children. The rationale for these programs is 
that poor families, even if aware of the positive future implications of their children’s 
education and good health, cannot currently afford to provide them. Therefore, the cash 
transfer will help them achieve certain predetermined goals regarding their children’s 
human development, thus potentially breaking the pattern of inter-generational 
transmission of poverty (World Bank 2005). Conditional cash transfers are an interesting 
option particularly when the targeted sector hires significant labor and/or when land 
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keeping and production records do not exist. Although it is generally true that the 
mobility of hired labor allows them to relocate more easily to higher-wage sectors, when 
the affected sector is concentrated regionally, moving to a better job might imply 
relocating to a new region, which in itself might imply an unaffordable cost to hired 
workers. Evaluations of the Progresa program in Mexico and the Red de Proteccion 
Social in Nicaragua show the positive impact on the consumption of the targeted 
population, educational level, and the health of children (Rawlings and Rubio 2003).  
Like decoupled compensatory payments, the evidence suggests that farmers receiving 
conditional cash transfers use the cash flow primarily to improve the consumption profile 
of the household instead of making a productive investment (Rawlings and Rubio 2003, 
World Bank 2005). The use of receipts predominantly for consumption is expected given 
the high poverty level commonly observed among eligible households. However, the use 
of receipts for investment might be improved if recipients realize the temporary nature of 
these programs. Unquestionably, complementing conditional cash transfers with other 
programs such as technical assistance on production techniques and marketing, and 
investment in infrastructure, would likely improve the odds that households will wisely 
use the receipts for production purposes.           
The conditional cash transfer program Family Allowances Program (PRAF for its initials 
in Spanish) was initiated in 1990 with the goal of compensating the income of extremely 
poor Hondurans for the negative economic impact resulting from the structural 
adjustment programs implemented during the 1990s. The compensation was conditional 
on achieving certain obligations depending on the particular components of the program. 
PRAF is a nationwide program reaching an average of 233,000 people in average 
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between 1992 and 1997, and expanding to reach 318,000 in 1998 and remaining close to 
that level thereafter. The original PRAF (also known as PRAF-I) had 6 components, 
namely: (1) a School Voucher program; (2) a Maternal and Child Voucher program; (3) a 
Comprehensive Female Development program; (4) a School Materials program; (5) a 
Senior Citizens Voucher program; and finally (6) a Nutritional Voucher program. Hence, 
PRAF-I focused only on demand-side interventions, leaving interventions in the supply 
side in the hands of other institutions such as the Honduran Fund for Social Investment 
(FHIS for its initials in Spanish) and the Ministries of Health and Education (Moore, 
2008). 
A pilot project known as PRAF-II was launched in 1998 under the auspices of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB). Designed by the IADB and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) based on the strengths and shortcomings of PRAF-I, 
PRAF-II proposed an improved, more objective and transparent targeting mechanism, 
better oversight of beneficiaries’ compliance (PRAF-I did not enforced the conditionality 
of the program, thus becoming more a cash transfer program rather than a conditional 
cash transfer program) and, more importantly, addressed some supply-side variables such 
as school and health center infrastructure and formation of teachers and nurses. PRAF-II 
reached 70 municipalities and expanded to include 110,000 beneficiaries before its 
expiration in 2006. The design of PRAF-II included an evaluation scheme that would 
allow for a statistical assessment of both supply and demand interventions relative to a 
control group. In practice, though, this evaluation was never conducted due to a number 
of complications such as delays in the implementation of the interventions, and public 
interventions in control areas that changed the counterfactual (Inter-American 
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Development Bank, 2006). The results from an intermediate and a final evaluation (this 
last one from secondary data) suggest that PRAF-II transfers were too small to induce a 
significant change in the standards of living of the beneficiaries; PRAF-II transfers 
amounted to less than 4 percent of initial household expenditures on average, compared 
to 20 percent of Mexico’s Oportunidades program and 18 percent of Nicaragua’s Red de 
Proteccion Social program (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). Furthermore, the 
transfer was done in two annual installments, hindering beneficiaries from connecting co-
responsibility fulfillment and the receipt of payments (Moore, 2008). The most relevant 
recommendations for future improvements in the administration of PRAF were, at the 
institutional level, the need for depoliticizing this institution, and at the policy level, 
design feasible evaluation programs, avoiding complexities that hinder the assessment of 
program’s outcomes.  
A new pilot project known as PRAF-III was launched in 2007 with the goal of absorbing 
the best practices of PRAF-II within the existing PRAF-I program (PRAF-I continued 
concomitantly, although with some changes in form, throughout the duration of PRAF-
II). Financed primarily by the Inter-American Development Bank, this pilot project will 
benefit some 20,000 households for 4.5 years, providing conditional transfers in the order 
of 18 percent to 20 percent of the expenditures of extremely poor rural families in four 
annual installments. PRAF-III expands the benefits granted by PRAF-II to children 
attending from first to sixth grade in order to encourage primary school completion 
(Moore, 2008). 
The experiences in Honduras with the administration of PRAF have relevance in that 
they highlight the potential shortcomings that a new policy might face, and consequently 
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identify areas where careful design would be needed for a program to reach its intended 
goal/s. Furthermore, having a program like PRAF already working in Honduras could 
lower the cost of implementing a similar program targeted to those people or regions that 
are most likely to lose from the liberalization of the markets for sensitive products (World 
Bank 2007a). It also highlights geographical areas where agricultural adjustment 
programs might have a higher potential of success, benefiting from the efforts already 
being made by other public institutions as well as civil society organizations. 
Technical assistance programs are also an alternative to help uncompetitive farmers 
become more efficient or transition into other production activities. The productivity of 
traditional agriculture in Honduras is the lowest among all Central American countries; 
the insufficient supply of capital to the sector (due primarily to its high economic risk) 
and the low human capital endowment of the rural population constrain the adoption of 
more appropriate technologies, which together with the decreasing level of public 
investment in agriculture, lead to low productivity levels (Sanders, Ramirez and Morazan 
2006, Serna 2007). The low productivity of agriculture, which has remained practically 
unchanged for most basic grains over the past 15 years, has contributed to the reduction 
in the contribution of agriculture to GDP. Furthermore, along with the imperfect nature of 
input and output markets for most agricultural commodities, the low productivity of 
agriculture leads to low farm income levels, which increases the level of indebtedness 
and reduces the access to credit (Serna 2007).  
Several developing countries have implemented technical assistance programs with the 
goal of improving the productivity of agriculture. Unlike conditional cash transfers, 
technical assistance programs are more heterogeneous. Some of them are designed to 
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address the adoption of new technologies and information without a financial component; 
others are designed to address both issues, which in developing countries are usually 
associated with each other. For instance, Argentina implemented Cambio Rural in 1994 
with the goal of improving the competitiveness of small and medium-size farms through 
(1) the reorganization of their production activities, (2) the introduction of new 
technology, (3) the association among farms to improve their market leverage and 
increase their profits, and (4) the improved access to credit (Albanesi, et al. 2002). 
Financed by the Argentinean government, professionals, primarily agronomists and 
veterinarians, organize groups of eligible farmers, namely those whose net income was 
below a predetermined level. The most successful groups are those in which members 
have more homogeneous endowments of resources; numerous groups failed and were 
discontinued because of the limitations of working associatively with heterogeneous 
farmers. Although no comprehensive evaluation of the program has been done, a partial 
evaluation of the program, based on the information of a small number of groups, 
suggests that while the program fulfilled objectives (1) through (3) above, it failed to 
facilitate access to credit, despite the fact that members filled significantly more 
solicitations for credit than non-members (Albanesi, et al. 2002). All in all, Cambio Rural 
is still seen as a valuable and central program by producers, farm organizations, and the 
government. 
The Basic Grain National Plan (PNGB for its initials in Spanish) implemented in 
Honduras in 2006 is another example of a technical assistance program aimed at 
improving the productivity and sustainability of basic grain agriculture. The PNGB is a 
flexible program, employing different interventions depending on the characteristics of 
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the target population. For commercial farms, the plan contemplates improving access to 
capital through the capitalization of the state-own National Bank for Agricultural 
Development (BANADESA for its initials in Spanish), and facilitating access to technical 
assistance through agronomists hired to attend the demands of farmers. For small, 
primarily subsistence farms, the PNGB introduced the Technological Stamp program (BT 
for its initials in Spanish), through which eligible farmers have access to inputs, namely, 
seeds and fertilizer, at subsidized prices, which have to be repay at designated institutions 
after harvest. The funds collected from the program are kept for financing future 
production. Thus, the BT programs is expected to contribute to improving the use of 
inputs among small basic grain farms and facilitating their access to credit, and 
consequently improving the productivity of these farms and improving food security 
among basic grain households. 
No systematic assessments of either the PNGB or the BT program exist. Reports on 
particular experiences with regard to the BT program shed light on the main challenges 
faced when implementing the program, namely, ensuring the coordination among the 
public and private organization in charge of administering the program. Evidence from 
case studies also results in suggestions to improve the effectiveness of the program in 
achieving its target goals, namely, working towards better coordination among 
institutions involved with the administration of the program, making the program more 
flexible to account for differences among regions where the program is applied, and 
expanding the services that BT program offers to include technical assistance regarding 
production and financial management (Lainez et al 2007). 
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Another example of a technical assistance program operating in Honduras is the Farmer 
Training and Development program (EDA for its initials in Spanish). Financed by the 
Millennium Challenge Account, this program has the overarching goal of improving the 
income level and sustainability of some 8,000 target farmers (roughly 15,000 hectares, 
which indicates that participants are predominantly smallholders) by providing technical 
assistance in the sustainable production of high-value vegetables, promoting organization 
and cooperation among farmers, improving marketing strategies, and facilitating market 
access through business rounds with retailers and wholesalers. Eligibility to the program 
is conditional on a number of factors, such as willingness of farmers to adopt new 
technologies of production or to relocate resources into alternative products and to 
cooperate with program coordinators in the provision of crucial economic information for 
program assessment, and the availability of water resources (Farmer Training and 
Development Program n.d.). The large number of success stories reported by program 
administrators is the only evidence about the positive impact of the program, since no 
systematic assessment has been conducted to date. The information provided by 
administrators about the cost of the program leads us to infer that up scaling a program 
like this to reach a large share of basic grain farmers would be financially unfeasible in 
Honduras unless there is a significant increase in the funds that the government and donor 
organizations allocate into agriculture.                   
In conclusion, there are several alternatives to consider for adjustment programs, each 
having different goals, targets, and requirements for their implementation. Assuming a 
negative impact of DR-CAFTA on basic grain sectors, this study attempts to design and 
propose an adjustment program suitable for Honduras, taking into consideration both the 
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major limitations prevailing in this nation, and past as well as current experiences with 
programs aimed at improving the standards of living among the rural population in this 
nation. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES 
The overarching goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of DR-CAFTA on the basic 
grain sector of Honduras, that is, rice, corn (white and yellow), and beans, and to 
formulate policies that the government of Honduras could adopt in order to ease the 
potentially negative impacts that individuals involved in the production of basic grains 
might experience as a result of the increased competition resulting from DR-CAFTA.  
The main hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
While DR-CAFTA will have a positive impact on economic growth in Honduras, 
households depending on basic grains as a source of income will suffer a 
significant decrease in their economic welfare. 
Consequently, the null hypotheses to be tested can be defined as follows: 
1. DR-CAFTA will have a negative impact on economic growth in Honduras. 
2. Households depending on basic grains as a source of income will suffer a 
significant increase in their economic welfare. 
This study seeks to assess the economic, political, and administrative feasibility of 
alternative adjustment programs, and to advance in the proposal of the program(s) that 
could serve as roadmaps for serious policy discussion. 
The driving hypothesis will be tested using a dynamic computable general equilibrium 
model, arguably the most sophisticated method for the analysis of economy-wide policy 
changes such as those implied by DR-CAFTA. The model is developed for this study and 
adjusted to the extent possible to reflect the particular characteristics of the Honduran 
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economy. The dataset to which the model calibrates is also developed particularly for this 
study based on information obtained from numerous public offices such as the Central 
Bank of Honduras and the National Institute of Statistics. Both the model and the dataset 
will be facilitated to public officials and any other organization with interest in expanding 
their analytical capabilities, thus fulfilling another goal of this study, that is, to contribute 
to the innovation in research methods used for policy analysis in Honduras.      
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2. BACKGROUND 
Compared with the rest of the Latin American region, Honduras is a highly populated 
country, with roughly 7.2 million people in an area of 112,000 square kilometers (64 
inhabitants/ km2), and a population growth rate currently estimated at 2.5 percent 7
Despite the high rate of economic growth observed since 2000 and estimated at an 
average 5.6 percent annually, Honduras remains a relatively small economy compared 
with other Latin American nations, with an estimated GDP of USD 10.7 billion and an 
average per-capita annual income of USD 1,430 in 2006 (Banco Central de Honduras 
2007b). The most relevant economic sectors are manufactures (primarily textiles and 
apparel), agriculture
. 
Approximately 52 percent of the population is rural, and 80 percent of the rural 
population lives on the hillside. Its territory is dominated by hills, which occupy 
approximately 80 percent of the land. Only 15 percent of the total land, roughly 1.7 
million hectares, is suitable for agriculture.  
8
                                                 
7 However, when compared with the Central American and Caribbean nations, Honduras is among the less 
populated territories.   
8 When agriculture is combined with manufacturing of agricultural products, the share increases 
significantly to over 30 percent. 
, and financial services, each accounting in average for around 21 
percent, 14 percent, and 7.5 percent of the value-added in the period 2000-06. These 
sectors of the economy have experienced significant growth during the same period; for 
instance, the value of agricultural output grew over 25 percent from 2000 to 2006; for 
manufactures and financial services, the accumulated growth is much more significant, 
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reaching 39 percent and 190 percent, respectively9
                                                 
9 The incredibly large growth of financial services coincides with a rapid increase in the value of 
remittances sent primarily from the U.S. 
. The textile and apparel industry has 
grown significantly since the U.S. granted it new preferential treatment under the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).  
Despite its significant expansion, the percentage contribution of agriculture to GDP has 
decreased significantly over the last several years. In fact, agriculture is the only 
economic activity whose percentage contribution to GDP has decreased in the last 
decade. Nevertheless, it continues to employ roughly a third of the total labor force, and 
remains by far the largest employer in rural areas. Moreover, and despite the decrease in 
its relative contribution (accounting for more than 70 percent of total exports in 1990), 
exports of agricultural products represent around 30 percent of the total value of exports 
over the last 5 years (Serna 2007).  
The distribution of income in Honduras is highly unequal, with a Gini coefficient 
estimated at 0.53 in the early 2000s for Honduras as a whole, and 0.60 for rural areas 
only (De Ferranti, et al. 2003, Serna 2007). Income inequality is closely related with 
other basic needs such as access to health and education services. School drop-out and 
illiteracy rates increase significantly as income decreases. In the same way, demand for 
public health services also shows the same negative relationship with income; when this 
is contrasted with the poor conditions of the public health system, it is evident that the 
low income population faces severe constraints for accessing these services (United 
Nations Development Program 2006).  
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Economic growth in Honduras happens primarily in the so-called “development-T”, 
consisting of a central, north-south corridor from Puerto Cortez to Choluteca, and an east-
west corridor on the Atlantic coastline. Over 60 percent of the population lives in the 
development-T; it includes the most important cities, receives most of the investment in 
infrastructure (airports, ports, roads, telecommunications, electricity, and water) and 
encompasses the most fertile valleys, such as Sula, Aguan, Comayagua, and Choluteca. 
The development-T excludes most small, poor rural communities (Falk 2003). 
Poverty is, undoubtedly, the most urgent problem in Honduras. Over 75 percent of the 
population is poor, and roughly 55 percent lives in extreme poverty. The problem is even 
worse in rural areas, where poverty and extreme poverty affect 86 and 69 percent of the 
population, respectively (Serna 2007, World Bank 2005). Despite the relative 
macroeconomic stability attained during the 1990s, poverty and unemployment have 
grown. Governmental and non-governmental organizations designed and implemented 
numerous programs to help ameliorate the poverty problem. At the individual level, large 
migration, both domestically (rural-urban) and internationally (mainly to the U.S.) took 
place as a way to escape poverty. For instance, remittances amounted to USD 440 million 
in 2000 (6 percent of GDP), and the preliminary numbers estimated by the Central Bank 
of Honduras suggest they increased to USD 2.3 billion in 2006 (21 percent of GDP) 
(Banco Central de Honduras 2007a). Despite these efforts, poverty rates in Honduras 
continue on the rise. 
In a somewhat contradictory way, however, economic well-being or standard of living as 
measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) has increased in Honduras from 0.5 
in 1990 to 0.657 in 2003 and 0.664 in 2004. According to the United Nations 
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Development Program (2006), this improvement in the standard of living is the 
consequence of a more stable political environment, which enabled investment in health 
and education services. Nevertheless, in terms of standard of living as measured by the 
HDI, Honduras still ranks 115th among 175 nations worldwide and 30th
2.1 THE HONDURAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
 among 33 
Western Hemisphere nations, highlighting the still poor performance of this economy. 
Honduras is an agricultural country. Despite the growing importance of the textile and 
apparel industry, agriculture continues being the driving economic activity in most rural 
communities and, through its upward and to a less extent downward linkages, a relevant 
activity for urban areas as well. 
The Honduran agricultural sector has had an erratic growth pattern, with an aggregate 
marginal growth over the last 30 years. While population and the GDP of non-
agricultural sectors grew an average of 3.3 percent and 4.3 percent annually over the last 
10 years, respectively, agricultural GDP grew at only 2.3 percent. Associated with this 
slow growth of agriculture is the relative low income generated by this sector, and the 
increase in poverty in rural areas where agriculture is the main economic activity 
(Gobierno de Honduras 2004). 
The low average growth of agriculture hides important differences between agricultural 
sectors. For instance, sectors such as fruits and vegetables, oil palm, and shrimp have 
experienced extraordinary annual average growth rates, in some cases above 10 percent; 
on the other hand, traditional sectors such as bananas, cotton, or rice have decreased 3 
percent per year on average. Other important sectors such as maize, beans, and coffee 
have achieved marginal growth rates over the last 30 years (Gobierno de Honduras 2004).  
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The relevance of agricultural exports has decreased significantly over the last several 
years, from 70 percent of total Honduran exports in 1990 to 33 percent in 2005; 
nevertheless, agricultural exports still represent a significant source of foreign exchange. 
The composition of agricultural exports has also shifted from predominantly traditional 
products such as coffee and banana, to non-traditional products such as tropical fruits, 
oriental vegetables, and fish.  
2.1.1 TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE 
Traditional agriculture includes products such as banana, coffee, sugarcane, and basic 
grains, namely, beans, rice and maize. These activities have traditionally contributed to 
more than 70 percent of agricultural GDP, 50 percent of exports, and employed roughly 
25 percent of the total labor force. However, their relevance in recent years has 
diminished as a result of low commodity prices, primarily for coffee, and substitution by 
non-traditional products such as melons, watermelons, pineapple, palm oil, vegetables, 
and numerous tropical fruits.  
Following is a brief presentation of the basic grain sector, the focus of this study.  
2.1.1.1 Corn 
Corn, most of which is white, is the largest crop in term of area planted and volume of 
production, with an average of 335 thousand hectares and 492 thousand metric tons (tmt) 
between 2000 and 2006, respectively. The production in 2007 reached a historical record 
of 616 tmt, with a planted area of 395 thousand hectares, stimulated by the high prices, 
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the benefits of the Basic Grain National Plan10 implemented by the government in 2006, 
and good weather conditions. According to the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica 2007), there were around 328,000 farms producing corn in the 
2007-08 season 11. Comparing this figure with that obtained by the Escuela Agricola 
Panamericana (2004), which suggests that there were some 70,000 commercial corn 
farms 12 in Honduras in 2003, we can infer that only 20 percent of the farms reporting 
corn production are commercial, meaning they produce primarily for the market. The 
figures in Appendix Table 1 show that all segments (by size) of farmers report market 
sales, and that this share is not negligible even for small farmers, which still sell roughly 
25 percent of their aggregate production 13
                                                 
10 The Basic Grain National Plan was implemented in 2006 with the goal of increasing production of corn 
and beans and thus contributing to food security, particularly among poor rural households. More 
information about the plan is provided below in this chapter.  
11 The minimum acreage to qualify as a basic grain farm is very low, roughly 0.08 ha. The total number of 
corn producers might be biased upward, since some farms might produce corn twice in the same year. 
However, according to comments from INE, this is not a common practice among corn farms, thus 
suggesting that the upward bias might actually be marginal.   
12 Commercial corn farms are defined as those participating actively in the market. Thus, subsistence farms, 
with sporadic participation in the market, are excluded from the definition of commercial farms. 
13 This is in line with regional findings presented by Soto-Baquero, Rogriguez-Fazzone and Falcioni 
(2007), which suggest that even small subsistence family farms sell most of their production to the market. 
Hence, commercial farms as defined by the EAP must not be understood as commercial agriculture as 
defined by Soto-Baquero, Rogriguez-Fazzone and Falcioni.   
.  
Corn is the second largest contributor to agricultural GDP after coffee, accounting for an 
average 8.2 percent over the last decade. However, its importance vis-a-vis other 
agricultural activities has decreased significantly over the last two decades as shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. Corn contribution to agricultural GDP 
 
Overall, the average corn farm size in Honduras is small, roughly less than a hectare; at 
the same time, corn yields are very poor, even for regional standards, and have remained 
fairly stagnant at 1.5 mt/ha for the period 2000-07 (Figure 2.2 below). 
Figure 2.2. Past trends in corn yields for Honduras and the Central American region. 
 
The northeastern region (Department of Olancho) is the largest producer of corn with 
roughly 28 percent of the total volume of production and 26 percent of the corn land, 
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followed by the middle-east and northern regions. Corn farms in the northeastern region 
are characterized by their relative large size and high yield (an average of 13 hectares and 
4 mt/ha, respectively).  
Commercial production of corn is concentrated in the departments of Olancho, Colon, 
Yoro, and El Paraiso, where roughly 85 percent of the national production occurs (see 
Table 2.1 below). 
An important feature of the Honduran corn and bean sectors is the large number of 
subsistence farms (see Appendix Table 1). Subsistence farms tend to concentrate on the 
hillside, and are characterized by their small size and rudimentary production techniques 
(SICTA 2007).  
Table 2.1. Geographical distribution of commercial corn production, average size farm, and 
average yield. 
REGIONS 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE 
(HA) 
AVERAGE YIELD 
(MT/HA) 
PRODUCTION  
  (% OF TOTAL) 
Olancho 13 4 52% 
Colon 15 4 16% 
Yoro 5 3.5 16% 
El Paraiso 6 3.5 13% 
Other regions* 2.5 2.7 3% 
Source: Escuela Agricola Panamericana, 2004. 
* Atlantida, Comayagua, Copan, and Santa Barbara. 
 
Regarding technologies of production, roughly half of commercial farms, operating half 
of the total area planted, employ traditional technology, meaning marginal use of inputs 
such as fertilizers, pesticides, and high quality hybrid seeds. Tilling in most of these 
farms is still performed with animals, and planting is primarily done by hand. The 
average yield of traditional corn farms approximates 1 mt per hectare, and their cost of 
production per mt is estimated to be 50 percent higher than that of large farms. 
 31 
 
 
Traditional farming tends to be the predominant production method among small farms 
(Escuela Agricola Panamericana, 2004).  
Medium-size commercial farms, planting an average of 3 hectares, generally employ 
better production technologies and have traditionally obtained yields of around 3.2 mt per 
hectare. Nevertheless, their performance is still poor compared with that of large farms, 
which obtain on average 4.2 mt per hectare at a cost 35 percent lower than medium and 
small farms (Escuela Agricola Panamericana 2004). 
In aggregate, around 45 percent of the total commercial production of corn is self-
consumed by farm households and the remaining 55 percent is commercialized. Food 
processors are the primary purchaser of corn, accounting for roughly half of the total 
volume of trade. The remaining is purchased by wholesalers and other intermediaries 
such as truckers. The relevance of self-consumption by farm households is much higher 
for small farmers, which in many cases do not market grain at all (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica 2007, SICTA 2007). 
The importance of the different marketing channels depends on the size of the farms. 
Small farms tend to rely heavily on intermediaries, primarily truckers dedicated to 
collecting production in remote areas, given that their low volume of production, 
associated in many cases with poor accessibility, makes it economically infeasible to 
negotiate directly with the industry or the final retailer. As a result, small farms tend to 
receive the lowest price for their product, quality differences aside. Medium-size farms 
also rely heavily on wholesalers, although some direct sells to the industry and final 
retailers is reported. Finally, large farms allocate most of their output directly to the 
processing industry, thus obtaining the best prices.   
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White corn is the primary source of calories in the basic food basket, contributing 28 
percent and 48 percent of the caloric intake in urban and rural areas, respectively. Most 
maize is purchased as plain grain and processed by households. Corn is also used for the 
production of snacks and flour. The food processing industry sources roughly 20 percent 
of its demand for corn from domestic supplier, and 80 percent from imports (Escuela 
Agricola Panamericana 2004). Honduras is a net importer of corn; around a third of the 
total domestic consumption, equivalent to some 220 tmt a year over the last several years, 
has been satisfied by foreign suppliers, primarily the U.S. In fact, all yellow corn 
consumed by Honduras is imported, and used by the food processing industry for the 
production of animal feeds and, to a less extent, the production of snacks for human 
consumption (SICTA 2007). Imports of white corn have also increased significantly over 
the last years, from an average of 15 tmt per year during the period 1995-2000, up to 44 
tmt annually for 2002-07, with a record high of 71 tmt (roughly 15 percent of domestic 
production) in 2005. Almost all imports of white corn come from the U.S. (Secretaria de 
Integracion Economica de Centroamerica 2008).  
2.1.1.2 Rice 
The relevance of the rice sector decreased dramatically during the 1990s, primarily due to 
its low competitiveness in the face of stronger foreign competition. In 1991, and due to 
food security concerns as a result of adverse weather conditions, the government of 
Honduras decided to drastically reduce import tariffs on paddy rice. Production dropped 
by more than a third in one year, recovered during the 1995-1998 period as a result of 
high world commodity prices, but fell sharply again to the lowest levels as a result of 
depressed commodity prices during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Figure 2.3). On 
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average, only 5,000 hectares per year have been planted since 2000, with an average 
output of 17 tmt. Despite a rising trend in land productivity, yields are far from their 
potential, and remain below regional averages. 
Figure 2.3. Trend in rice production, area harvested, and yields over the last 40 years. 
 
As a result of these rapid changes in market conditions, the structure of the rice sector 
was significantly altered. The number of farmers decreased sharply from an estimated 
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figure shrunk to around 5,000 (OXFAM 2004); according to the National Institute of 
Statistics (INE for its initials in Spanish), there were only roughly 2,000 rice producers in 
2006-07 (see Appendix Table 1).  
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domestic millers, whose eligible volume of imports is a function of their purchase of 
domestic rice (performance requirement). 
Domestic consumption amounted to approximately 150 tmt annually over the last five 
years, 87 percent of which is imported predominantly from the U.S. The high cost of 
production makes Honduran rice uncompetitive against U.S. rice. Farmers have been able 
to sell their production thanks to the performance requirements processors are subject to.   
2.1.1.3 Beans 
After corn, red beans represent the largest crop in terms of area planted and total 
production, with an average of 108,000 hectares and 73 tmt over the last ten years. In 
terms of contribution to agricultural GDP, it accounts for 3 percent on average over the 
same period, ranking sixth after coffee, corn, banana, sugarcane, and oil palm. As shown 
in Figure 2.4, despite its high variability, its average contribution to agricultural GDP has 
remained almost unchanged over the last several years. 
Figure 2.4. Bean contribution to agricultural GDP 
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According to INE, there were 40,000 producers of beans in the 2006-07 period (see 
Appendix Table 1). The information from the National Agricultural Roundtable reveals 
that there were some 103,000 bean producers in the 1998-99 season; finally, the latest 
agricultural census of 1993 suggests the existence of 114,000 farmers whose primary 
activity was beans. These estimates reveal a sharp decreasing trend in the number of bean 
producers since the early 1990s.  
This sector encompasses a large number of producers with different production 
capabilities. Sixty three percent of them operate less than 3.5 hectares and account for 50 
percent of the area harvested and 45 percent of total bean production. On the other hand, 
producers operating more than 14 hectares of beans represent 16 percent of the total, 
account for 25 percent of the area harvested, and 32 percent of total bean production (see 
Appendix Table 1).  
Beyond the strong yearly cycles observed, there is a negative trend in the area of 
production, with a yearly decrease of 6,600 hectares and an accumulated decrease of 
almost 50 percent from 1997-98 (144,000 hectares) to 2006-07 (77,000 hectares). This 
trend is partially offset by an increase in yields of around 20 percent during the same 
period; nevertheless, the volume of production has decreased 36 percent over the last ten 
years.  
Like corn, there are a large number of subsistence farmers producing beans, and the fact 
that half of the production is self-consumed by farm households is evidence of it 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2007). Moreover, most small subsistence bean farmers 
produce on the hillside; this has relevant environmental implications given the ecological 
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fragility of these areas and the poor technological level characteristic of this group of 
farmers.  
Commercial production of beans is concentrated in few regions, and is predominant in 
the valleys. For instance, the production in the departments of Olancho, El Paraiso, and 
Comayagua represent roughly 80 percent of commercial production (Table 2.2Table 2.2). 
There exist significant differences in terms of productivity among farms; large farms 
achieve yields that average 1.35 mt/ha; medium and small-size farms obtain averages of 
1.2 mt/ha and 1 mt/ha, respectively.  
Table 2.2. Geographical distribution of bean production, average size farm, and average yield 
REGIONS 
AVERAGE FARM SIZE 
(HA) 
AVERAGE YIELD 
(MT/HA) 
PRODUCTION               
(% OF TOTAL) 
Olancho 2.5 1.4 38% 
El Paraiso 2.5 1.3 30% 
Comayagua 1.3 1.4 13% 
Yoro 2.1 1.2 10% 
Other regions* 1.4 1.1 9% 
* Atlantida, Colon, Copan, and Santa Barbara. 
Source: Escuela Agricola Panamericana, 2004. 
 
Bean production is labor-intensive. For large farms, the cost of labor represents roughly 
45 percent of total variable cost; for small farms, this share is around 54 percent (Escuela 
Agricola Panamericana 2004). Information obtained personally from DICTA indicates 
that for 2008 the share of labor cost to total variable costs for large farms is estimated at 
32 percent, while for small farms it is estimated at 56 percent. Intermediate inputs 
represent roughly the same share of total variable costs for all bean farms. However, the 
use of capital, primarily machinery for tilling, is exclusive of large farms, and represents 
around 26 percent of total variable costs.  
According to a study by the Escuela Agricola Panamericana (2004), the producer price 
represents approximately 75 percent of the retail price. This high share reflects the low 
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value added in the supply chain. The margins obtained by the different intermediaries are 
low, and their economic subsistence conditional on large volumes of trade.  
Consequently, and unlike corn, the importance of the food-processing industry as a 
purchaser is marginal, and the role of intermediaries such as truckers is relevant, 
accounting for roughly 60 percent of the volume commercialized over the last several 
years (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2007, Escuela Agricola Panamericana 2004). 
Thus, the purchase price paid by intermediaries has become the reference price for beans. 
Beans are a staple in Honduras, representing a cheap source of proteins and minerals, 
mainly iron. Per-capita consumption has grown slowly from around 6 kg to roughly 10 
kg annually. All production and consumption consists of small red beans and, unlike 
corn, all production goes into human consumption. Beans are consumed primarily as 
grain, and only a marginal part is processed into fried and canned beans.   
Had it not been for the large post-harvest losses, Honduras would have been self-
sufficient with regards to red beans every year for the last ten years. However, losses of 
around 11.4 percent generate a deficit in the market that has been covered by imports. 
Imports of red beans grew from a marginal 503 mt or 0.5 percent of the total human 
consumption in 1998 to 10,000 mt or 17.5 percent of the consumption in 2006 (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica 2007).   
2.2 LIMITATIONS OF BASIC GRAIN SUPPLY CHAINS 
In 2002, the Secretary of Agriculture conducted the National Agricultural Roundtable, a 
series meetings with key agricultural sectors (20 in total) to discuss the situation of the 
different supply chains in light of future trade negotiations Honduras was entering into, 
and to suggest future lines of work aimed at improving the competitiveness of Honduran 
agriculture, but also taking into consideration issues of food security and poverty, so 
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worrisome in this nation. Relevant information emerged from these meetings between 
government and representatives of the different agricultural sectors regarding the 
limitations to increase productivity and competitiveness. The information presented in 
this section originates primarily from this source. 
Based on the findings from the Agricultural Roundtable, Sanders, Ramirez, and Morazan 
(2006) analyze the limitations by agent of the agricultural supply chains (see Table 2.3 
below). These problems were enumerated by agents of the different supply chains, and 
can be seen as primarily, but not exclusively, traditional-agriculture problems. These 
limitations highlight the areas where assistance, either private or public, is needed.  
Evidence on the impact of outdated technology on the productivity of basic grains has 
been already presented, with significant differences in yield among farms, and a low 
national average compared to international and regional standards. An important aspect 
highlighted by processors and retailers is the poor quality of the products generated by 
these supply chains; this poor quality is closely related to the outdated production and 
post-harvest technology cited by all producers. Another limitation cited by all agents is 
the poor infrastructure and high cost of services that undermine the competitiveness of 
agricultural supply chains (Sanders, Ramirez and Morazan 2006). Limitations cited 
specifically by small farmers are the limited availability of financial resources and limited 
access to market information.  
 It is important to notice that there are several supply chains that have achieved a high 
level of competitiveness and have gained significant markets overseas. Such are the cases 
of the melon/watermelon industry, and the palm oil industry. These sectors share the 
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characteristic of being highly concentrated in intermediate stages, from transportation to 
final supply to retailers. 
Table 2.3. Most relevant problems affecting the different agents throughout the agricultural 
supply chains. 
Small farmers 
• Outdated production and storage technology that limits both their 
productivity and quality of production. 
• Limited financial resources needed to adopt better production 
technologies. 
• Limited access to market information. 
• Poor infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and irrigation. 
• High cost of services, such as electricity, and inputs. 
Medium and large-size 
farmers 
• Outdated production and post-harvest technology that limits primarily 
their productivity and, to some extent, the quality of production. 
• Poor infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and irrigation. 
• High cost of services, such as electricity, and inputs. 
Wholesaler 
• Poor quality of product, which constrains the marketing opportunities 
for these products.  
• Poor infrastructure, primarily roads, which increases transaction costs. 
Processor 
• Poor quality of product and high price due to inefficiencies in previous 
stages of the supply chain, which lowers the competitiveness of the 
sector. 
• Limited financial resources needed to adopt better processing 
technologies. 
• High cost of inputs, such as electricity. 
Final retailer 1) Poor quality of domestic products, which at similar prices cannot 
compete with higher-quality imports from other countries. 
Source: Sanders, Ramirez, and Morazan (2006). 
 
Appendix Table 2 presents the limitations cited by all agents and organized in 8 main 
areas of interest, namely (1) market and business development; (2) institutional 
development; (3) financing; (4) rural infrastructure; (5) promotion of technological 
innovation and production diversification; (6) sanitary and phytosanitary measures; (7) 
sustainability of natural resources; and (8) education and training.  
As can be seen, agents identified numerous areas where assistance is needed. Given the 
variety of concerns, attending all of them would require coordination between different 
levels of government, between the private and public sector, and among agents of each 
supply chain. Furthermore, it would likely imply an increase in the resources, both public 
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and private, that need to be allocated to the basic grain sector, and a reallocation of public 
resources into more efficient uses.  
2.3 ALTERNATIVES TO BASIC GRAIN PRODUCTION 
Given the increase in competition in basic grain markets expected as a result of the 
implementation of DR-CAFTA, the government and other organizations with interest in 
agricultural and rural issues must evaluate the challenges for those who depend on basic 
grains as a relevant source of income, and work towards developing the conditions for 
viable income-generating strategies that help them afford a reasonable standard of living.  
For producers with production potential in more competitive markets, assistance must 
focus on (1) transferring new technology of production and post-harvest handling; (2) 
investing in infrastructure, primarily roads 14
Small commercial farms and subsistence farms face a number of limitations that would 
likely impede most of them to compete under the new market conditions. For these basic 
grain producers, it is imperative to identify potential alternatives and work on developing 
the conditions for these alternatives to become viable options. Among the alternatives we 
can cite (1) switching to the production of export products, preferably those with 
expanding markets; and (2) shifting resources into the production of commodities with 
increasing opportunities in the domestic market.  
, irrigation systems, and drying and storage 
facilities, and (3) promoting more efficient markets, such as developing market 
information systems available to all agents in the supply chain.  
                                                 
14 A study by the World Bank (World Bank 2007b) shows that, for Honduras, (1) investment in roads is 
below average regional levels (1.3 percent of GDP a year for the period 2002-2005); (2) the road service is 
below average regional standards (0.45 km/ 1,000 people compared to 0.63 for the Central American 
region); (3) and the road density is also below average regional standards (29 km/1,000 km2 compared to 
55 for Central America). On the other hand, Honduras ranks high regarding quality of roads.    
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An analysis of past trends in agricultural exports shows that Honduras has lost market 
share for many agricultural and food products in the U.S., and this has occurred primarily 
in shrinking U.S. markets (see Appendix Table 3). These ex-post analyses highlight the 
need for Honduras to diversify agricultural production and exports, finding markets in the 
U.S. and elsewhere for products for which Honduras has proved to be competitive.  
In fact, there are numerous agricultural and food products for which Honduras has 
advantages in other markets worldwide but the U.S.  
Using the revealed comparative advantage index (RCA), Monge-González (2004) 
identifies a large list of products Honduras should consider for export promotion (see 
Appendix Table 4). 
An analysis of more recent trade data shows that new agricultural trade is being created 
for a number of products. After their introduction in the mid 1990s, export of oriental or 
Asian vegetables such as bittermelon, Japanese eggplant, and oriental squash, most of 
which goes to the U.S., have increased rapidly from 900 mt exported to the U.S. in 1998 
to 6,750 mt in 2006. The production of oriental vegetables has expanded primarily among 
small independent farmers in the Comayagua Valley. There are currently 4 firms 
authorized to export to the U.S. (Fundacion Hondureña de Investigacion Agricola 2007).  
Policies are needed also for workers currently employed in the basic grain sector. The 
reduction in the number of primarily small labor-intensive farms would release a large 
number of workers, which are not likely to be absorbed by expanding, medium and large 
basic grain farms, creating an excess labor supply in rural areas where basic grains are 
concentrated. This excess supply would have to be allocated into either new agricultural 
activities, new rural businesses, or migrate to other regions (within and outside the 
 42 
 
 
country) in search of new, and hopefully better income opportunities. Hence, policies 
should aim at creating the conditions necessary for workers to relocate into other 
production activities.  
The transformation of basic grain production, which in turn depends partially on the 
development of proper policies as cited previously in this section, would likely be 
associated with the generation of new businesses (input and service suppliers) in rural 
areas (also dependent on the creation of proper policies and incentives). The expansion of 
agriculture into alternative, higher-value crops based on resources freed-up by basic 
grains will also demand workers and likely spark the expansion of businesses into these 
rural areas. From the above we can see that the fate of workers currently employed in the 
basic grain supply chains depends greatly on the private and, to a larger extent, public 
policies adopted to deal with the changing market environment implied by DR-CAFTA.           
2.4 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN HONDURAS 
Poverty and crime have been the most relevant underlying issues in the formal agendas of 
government since the early 2000s. Regarding poverty, in 2001, and after a fluent dialog 
between the government and different representatives of society, Honduras developed the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (ERP for its initials in Spanish). The ERP is a long-term state 
policy strategy, built on the basis of the World Bank/United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals, that guides public action regarding poverty reduction, with the 
overarching goal of reducing poverty by 24 percent in 15 years through specific actions 
in 6 main areas: (1) stimulating sustainable economic growth; (2) reducing rural poverty; 
(3) reducing urban poverty; (4) investing in human capital; (5) improving welfare 
protection for specific groups; and (6) ensuring the sustainability of ERP. 
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The government of President Maduro (2002-06) was in charge of implementing the ERP, 
obtaining most of the funds for its implementation through foreign debt relief and 
international cooperation. Despite the efforts made to fight poverty during the first half of 
the current decade, the national poverty rate actually increased slightly between 2001 and 
2005. However, poverty decreased over 5 percentage points between 2005 and 2007, 
possibly as a result of the accumulated effects of the ERP over the years (Unidad de 
Apoyo Tecnico, 2007b). 
Significant reform has been undertaken at the public level since 2006 to facilitate the 
implementation of the ERP. The new administration advocates for a change in 
governability based on three pillars, namely (1) increasing the participation of the society 
in the policy process at all levels, (2) improving the transparency in the use of resources, 
and (3) taking strong actions to fight poverty. To that end, numerous laws were enacted 
and institutional reforms undertaken; to date, however, no assessments of the impact of 
these reforms have been conducted. 
With regard to rural poverty in particular, the efforts of the government during the year 
2006 15
                                                 
15 This is the latest year for which a report on the progress on the ERP is available. 
 centered in the following areas: (1) improving the conditions of proprietorship in 
rural areas, with the release of some 9,000 titles of property ownership; (2) strengthening 
the funding of the National Program for Sustainable Rural Development (PRONADERS 
for its initials in Spanish), through which producers receive technical and financial 
assistance; (3) strengthening the funding of other programs aimed at promoting the 
sustainability of natural resources in the most vulnerable areas of the nation; (4) 
improving the information services provided through INFOAGRO; (5) implementing the 
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Technological Stamp Program; and (6) endowing financial institutions serving the rural 
sector to improve their services in these areas (Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico 2007a).      
Although the political rhetoric seems to indicate that the current government of President 
Zelaya has emphasized more the fight against poverty than its predecessor, this does not 
translate into the allocation of more resources to this end. ERP funds have averaged 8.2 
percent of the GDP (USD 650 million) for the 2000-06 period. Furthermore, analysts 
argue that the allocation of these resources is still sub-optimal, with salaries and wages 
for education and health accounting for 45 percent of the budget dedicated to fighting 
poverty (World Bank 2007). Furthermore, while the most worrisome poverty estimates 
are in rural areas, only 7 percent of the ERP budget went to the reduction of poverty in 
rural areas in 2006 and 2007 (Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico 2007b).  
With the goal of improving the efficiency in the use of resources devoted to the fight 
against poverty, the President created the Red Solidaria (Solidarity Network) in 2006. 
This institution, administered by the Office of the First Lady, acts as a link between the 
activities of the government and civil society organizations with the goal of coordinating 
and complementing their actions aimed at improving the living conditions of the poor. In 
spirit, the goal of the Red Solidaria is very important, and has the potential to increase the 
effectiveness of pro-poor interventions. However, analysts question the political viability 
of the Red Solidaria beyond the current administration, since it is seen as a government 
rather than a state policy and, consequently, subject to changes with the electoral cycle 
(Moore, 2008). Furthermore, transferring the administration of ERP programs to Red 
Solidaria might also hinder progress on the implementation of this state policy initiative.     
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In conclusion, the political context is prone to accept the introduction of new issues 
related to poverty and crime in the relevant formal agendas. Hence, it is advisable to 
define the problem of basic grain producers in light of DR-CAFTA in such a way as to 
make the linkage between it and the fight on poverty clear.          
2.5 AGRICULTURAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Based on the findings from the National Agricultural Roundtable and the consensus of 
relevant groups with a stake in agriculture and rural issues, the Government of Honduras 
defined its policy plan for the agricultural, food, and rural sectors. The State Policy for 
Agriculture, Food, and Rural Environment 2004-2021 (PESA for its initials in Spanish) 
serves as the guide for future agricultural and rural policies. It advocates for a new, 
broader view of agriculture, which encompasses the sectors that are linked backward and 
forward to primary production and that constitute the agricultural and food supply chains; 
furthermore, it acknowledges the linkages between agriculture, the rural sector, and the 
entire economy (Table 2.4). This new paradigm demands significant reform at the 
institutional level to cope with the new responsibilities of the relevant public agencies, 
some of which was already undertaken.  
The overarching goals of PESA are: (a) to transform the agricultural and food sector with 
the objective of increasing its contribution to economic growth, and (b) to reduce rural 
poverty and enhance food security, not through public assistance but through genuine 
economic growth.  
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Table 2.4. Elements in the new agricultural paradigm 
ELEMENTS OF THE NEW APPROACH IMPLICATIONS 
Broad view of agricultural sector 
• Grant increasing importance and attention to 
other sectors participating in the supply chain 
• Policies expand beyond the domain of the 
Secretary of Agriculture  
Recognition of the strong linkages between the 
agricultural and rural sectors 
• Improve the cooperation and networking among 
public agencies and private interests, creating 
the forums where this interaction can take place 
in an organized way 
Decentralization of functions traditionally 
performed by the Secretary of Agriculture 
• Create a smaller, more efficient administration 
with the primary goal of promoting the creation 
of markets for basic services such as research 
and extension 
Source: Gobierno de Honduras, 2004. 
PESA calls for close coordination of policies at different levels in order to promote 
agricultural and rural development, and for the development of proper multi-sector 
policies in areas of food security and rural development, for which the coordination of 
activities between health, education, and agricultural agencies, among others, is crucial. 
Finally, with the goal of (a) improving agricultural competitiveness and quality; and (b) 
stimulating agricultural production and supply chain integration, PESA highlights the 
eight main areas agricultural policy must focus on, namely (1) market development and 
trade negotiations; (2) food safety and quality; (3) technological development; (4) 
investment in human capital (improvement of education in agricultural schools, training 
workers and producers, promoting agribusiness development); (5) promotion of 
agricultural investment and risk management techniques; (6) rural infrastructure 
development; (7) natural resource sustainability; and (8) improvement of access to land 
and private property rights (see Appendix Table 5).     
PESA promotes institutional reform aimed at increasing the efficiency and transparency 
in the use of resources and strengthening the legitimacy of policies, programs, and 
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services. To this end, decentralization of activities, facilitation of channels for public 
participation in the formulation of policies and programs, and increasing the social capital 
of public agencies are among the reforms PESA encourages. Furthermore, PESA 
highlights the importance of encouraging the participation of the private sector in the 
market for numerous services such as extension and research. Up until the early1990s, 
the government financed most of the agricultural technology and extension services. 
Despite the significant public resources devoted to research and development, these 
programs proved to be inefficient, and the achieved levels of productivity were far 
inferior to the target level (Serna 2007, SICTA 2007). Increasing the participation of the 
private sector is seen as the only option to improve the supply of services in rural areas, 
including agriculture. Consequently, PESA advocates for a change in the role of the 
government from intervention in the market to regulator and facilitator of private markets 
for rural services. 
Within this policy umbrella, the government implements some programs targeted 
exclusively to the basic grain sector; some of these programs date back to the 1990s, 
while others have been implemented more recently under the guidelines of PESA.                     
2.6 PUBLIC PROGRAMS FOR BASIC GRAINS 
Honduras maintains a number of programs involving basic grains with the goal of 
protecting the domestic market from foreign competition and promoting domestic 
production. Following is a brief description of the most relevant interventions.  
2.6.1 IMPORT PRICE BANDS 
A system of import price bands has been in place since 1992 for corn, corn flour, and 
sorghum (at some point it also included rice); it was implemented with the goal of 
ameliorating the domestic impact of fluctuation in international prices. When the 
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reference international price decreases (increases) below (above) certain level, a duty is 
added (discounted) to the fixed, 15-percent ad-valorem import tariff so as to avoid a 
proportional decrease (increase) of prices in domestic markets (Unidad de Apoyo 
Tecnico 2005).  
The reference price is estimated by the Honduran Institute of Agricultural Marketing 
(IHMA for its initials in Spanish), who every year defines the price bands based on an 
international reference price (Gulf of Mexico) and transaction cost estimates. The specific 
import duties are estimated and collected by the Executive Directorate of Income (DEI 
for its initials in Spanish). The latest available information on applied import tariffs 
correspond to the marketing seasons 2002-03 and 2003-04, and show that the average 
applied import tariff was 15 percent and 10 percent for corn and 13 percent and 10 
percent for sorghum, respectively. 
2.6.2 STRATEGIC RESERVES 
The IHMA also administers the strategic reserves of beans and white corn, aimed at 
preventing a market deficit and food security crisis. The reserves, which by law should be 
equivalent to 3 percent of the annual national consumption of beans and corn, must be 
made readily available in those markets where a deficit is observed. These reserves have 
lately been used to counter the behavior of speculators and maintain the market price at 
reasonable levels.  
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2.6.3 PURCHASE AGREEMENTS 
Another approach taken to protect basic grain producers from increasing competition is 
the signing of purchase agreements between food processors and organized farmers 16. 
These agreements set the purchase price 17
Although it is not clear from the text of the DR-CAFTA agreement that these sectoral 
accords would expire after certain time, it is the understanding of analysts and public 
officials that they will remain in place until DR-CAFTA is fully implemented for each of 
the commodities involved, that is, year 18 and 15 for rice and yellow corn, respectively 
 that the industry commits to pay, as well as the 
volumes they are willing to purchase from domestic producers. As counterparts, food 
processors obtain import rights according to the amount of domestic production they 
purchase, these relationships being of the order of 4 to 1 (imports to domestic) for yellow 
corn and paddy rice, and 2 to 1 for white corn. These import rights are subject to a lower 
import tariff of 1 percent for corn and sorghum and zero for paddy rice. Most imports of 
corn and rice are performed under these conditions, and consequently only a marginal 
tariff revenue is collected (Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico 2005). The marginal effective tariff 
on these staples explains why most analyses of DR-CAFTA forecast only marginal 
changes in the domestic markets for basic grains. However, the comparative advantage of 
the U.S. in the production corn and rice suggests that the impact could be much more 
significant. 
                                                 
16 Large, organized farmers reap most of the benefits obtained from these agreements. Small farmers, 
constrained by their lack of association, usually do not participate of these negotiations with the food 
processing industry. 
17 The purchase price is estimated based on a formula that takes into consideration (1) the reference import 
price (for yellow corn, this is U.S. No 2, CBT; plus (2) transaction costs associated with the movement of 
the product from the production areas to the export board, and from the import board to the storage facility; 
plus (3) freight and insurance costs; plus (4) a 20-percent price premium.   
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(Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico, 2005). The expiration of these sectoral accords associated 
with the full implementation of DR-CAFTA would likely lead to the substitution of U.S. 
yellow corn for domestic white corn used by food processors 18
2.6.4 NATIONAL PLAN FOR BASIC GRAINS 
. Considering that the 
industry absorbs roughly 15 percent of the domestic production of corn and 70 percent of 
the domestic supply of rice, this could have a significant impact for many households 
whose income depends greatly on these basic grains.    
The government implemented the Basic Grain National Plan (PNGB for its initials in 
Spanish) in 2006 with the goal of improving food security among the rural population 
and the generation of surpluses among small farmers producing basic grains through the 
improvement of their productivity resulting from the use of more appropriate 
technologies of production. This plan contemplates improving the financial resources 
available to producers of basic grains, reducing the risk of production by encouraging the 
adoption of agricultural insurance, and subsidizing inputs to small farmers, thus ensuring 
a higher production and the adoption of high-quality seeds.  
The principal component of PNGB for small farmers is the Technological Stamp program 
(BT for its initials in Spanish), a certificate emitted by the government to eligible farmers 
that can be used for the purchase of fertilizer and certified seeds for up to 0.7 hectares, 
conditional on the future repayment of the loan to eligible, local microfinance 
institutions, which are also in charge of distributing the stamps in all communities. These 
                                                 
18 According to personal comments from industry leaders, today it is economically rational to purchase 
domestic white rice for processing, since by doing this they get to import yellow corn at preferential rates. 
With the expiration of the sectoral agreements and the full liberalization of trade, they argue it is likely that 
the industry will substitute yellow for white corn to a large extent.  
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institutions hold the repayments and use them for financing future production, thus 
improving small farmers’ access to capital in rural areas. The PNGB also contemplates 
the provision of technical assistance to farmers through group meetings, for which 140 
professionals were hired during the 2006-07 season.  
According to the Secretary of Agriculture, there are some 80,000 farmers eligible for the 
BT program, namely, those operating less than 4 hectares, dedicated to basic grains. The 
program is administered by the Direction of Agricultural Science and Technology 
(DICTA for its initials in Spanish), dependent of the Secretary of Agriculture. In turn, 
DICTA delegates most of the administrative activities of the BT program to the Inter-
American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA).  
The cost of the program was roughly L 100 million (USD 5.3 million) in 2006, and was 
financed by a number of projects, such as PRONADEL (National Local Development 
Program) and the Rural Productivity and Forests Project. Roughly L 120 million are 
available for the implementation of the BT program and another additional L 30 million 
for the provision of technical assistance in the 2008-09 production year.   
As part of the PNGB and primarily targeted to commercial farms, the government of 
Honduras funds a trust for the financing the production of basic grains; the trust is 
administered by the National Bank for Agricultural Development (BANADESA for its 
initials in Spanish). Sixty percent of the L 500 million available for the 2006-07 season 
were actually borrowed by some 9,000 producers. The remaining L 200 million were 
offered as collateral to agricultural loans offered by private banks. The funds available for 
financing the production of basic grains in the current season are almost double those 
available in previous years. Furthermore, the interest rate on these loans is set at 
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preferential levels, several points lower than the rate in the financial market, to encourage 
on-farm investment. Furthermore, the government, through a fund of L 25 million 
administered also by BANADESA, offers a 50-percent subsidy rate on agricultural 
insurance; this program has benefited some 500 producers of basic grains per year since 
2006.  
The trust created by the government as part of the PNGB came to revert years of 
decreasing financial resources available to agriculture through the public banking system. 
On average, BANADESA devoted some L 80 million a year during the 1990s to finance 
agriculture, and most of these funds were employed specifically to finance basic grains, 
primarily corn. The number of agricultural loans granted by BANADESA decreased 
significantly from 60,000 in 1991 to 10,000 in 2004. All credits are short-term, basically 
to finance current production.  
Financial resources available for agriculture through private banks have decreased over 
the last several years, particularly after hurricane Mitch. For instance, the Honduran 
Coffee Bank (BANHCAFE for its initials in Spanish), a private bank created with capital 
from coffee growers with the objective of financing agricultural production, today 
devotes only 30 percent of its resources to agriculture as a result of the high risk of these 
loans (Villalobos, Deugd and Ochoa 2006). From the L 50 million available in 2001 and 
2002, agricultural loans from private banks decreased to L 10 million in 2004. According 
to the private banking sector, the main reasons leading to such a low service to 
agriculture are: 
1. Farmers’ culture of no-repayment, partially encouraged by the government 
and its policy of writing off agricultural debt. 
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2. Lack of assets that can be accepted as collateral. Land represents the main 
asset farmers own and almost the only asset for small farmers. Although most 
farmers own their lands, many do not have property titles. This situation is 
more common among small, subsistence farmers. 
3. High risk of agricultural production due to poor technological level, no 
diversification of production, scarce technical assistance, insufficient on-farm 
and off-farm infrastructure, and poor management of risks, which 
consequently leads to the high risk of financing the agricultural sector. 
As a result of these limitations, roughly 93 percent of the financial resources were 
allocated among a few hundred large farmers owning over 1,500 hectares with their 
respective property titles. Overall, only 3 percent of farms dedicated to basic grain 
production received some type of financing by formal institutions (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica 2007).  
Besides banks, there are other institutions offering financial services, such as 
cooperatives and development organizations. Although quantitative data on the allocation 
of financial resources from these institutions is hard to find, it is estimated that these non-
traditional financial institutions allocate more funds to agriculture than private banks. For 
instance, cooperatives allocated roughly L 1,100 million to finance agricultural 
production in 2004. However, there is a trend to move their services out from agriculture 
and into other urban activities (Villalobos, Deugd and Ochoa 2006).  
Finally, another important source of financing are input suppliers, wholesalers, and other 
upper-level intermediaries participating in the different agricultural supply chains. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to quantify how much of the production is financed in this way; 
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what is commonly accepted is that the cost of these loans are significantly higher than 
those offered by other institutions (Villalobos, Deugd and Ochoa 2006).  
2.7 ESTIMATION OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT 
Honduras’s support to agriculture was estimated at USD 107 million in 2003, the only 
year for which the total support estimate (TSE 19
According to the Total Support Estimate (TSE), Honduras is among the lowest supporters 
of agriculture (in nominal terms) among Central American nations; only Nicaragua and 
Panama devote less resources, in nominal terms, to agriculture. In relative terms, 
however, Honduras provides the lowest level of support to agriculture, with the TSE 
representing only 1.5 percent of GDP, and 13 percent of agricultural GDP
), as defined by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), has been estimated. 
20
The Producer Support Estimate (PSE
 (compared 
these figures with the 2.14 percent and 17 percent for Central America as a whole, and 
0.86 percent and 78 percent for the U.S.).  
21) represents 90 percent of the TSE, the remaining 
corresponding to General Service Support Estimate (GSSE 22
                                                 
19 Total Support Estimate (TSE): An indicator of the annual monetary value of all gross transfers from 
taxpayers and consumers arising from policy measures that support agriculture, net of the associated 
budgetary receipts, regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm production and income, or 
consumption of farm products. 
20 Serna (2007) also highlights the insufficient and decreasing trend of public expenditure in agriculture. It 
went from 11 percent of the public budget in 1990 to 3.5 percent in 2005.  
21 Producer Support Estimate (PSE): An indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural producers, measured at farm gate level, arising from policy 
measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives, or impacts on farm production or 
income. PSE contributions can be further disaggregated into market price support (MPS) and fiscal support. 
22 General Services Support Estimate (GSSE): An indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers 
to general services provided to agriculture collectively, arising from policy measures that support 
agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives, and impacts on farm production, income, or consumption 
of farm products. 
). Within the PSE, the main 
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mechanism to support agriculture is Market Price Support (MPS 23
Table 2.5. Total support estimate for Honduras, the DR-CAFTA region, and the OECD region, 
disaggregated by components (USD million) 
), namely, maintaining 
domestic prices at a level higher than reference border prices. MPS represents 90 percent 
of the Honduran PSE in 2003, the remaining corresponding to direct fiscal resources 
(provision of private goods). In other words, border protection for imported agricultural 
commodities provided most of the support to agriculture. However, this situation is going 
to change significantly as a result of DR-CAFTA, which has the potential of significantly 
lowering the effective border protection and, given the relevance of MPS in TSE, the 
total level of support to agriculture (Arias 2007).  
INDICATOR HONDURAS DR-CAFTA REGION OECD 
Producer Support Estimate 96 (90%*) 1,856 (86%*) 257,285 (74%*) 
Market Price Support 64 (67%**) 1,631 (88%**) 160,469 (62%**) 
Fiscal Resources 32 (33%**) 225 (12%**) 96,816 (38%**) 
General Service Support Estimate 11 (10%*) 174 (8%*) 61,979 (18%*) 
Research and development 1.38 (12%***) 21.12 (24%***) 6049 (10%***) 
Agricultural Schools 1.26 (11%***) 18.08 (20%***) 1781 (3%***) 
Inspection Services 2.35 (21%***) 17.43 (19%***) 2291 (4%***) 
Infrastructure 5.62 (50%***) 22.83 (25%***) 19943 (33%***) 
Marketing and Promotion 0.42 (4%***) 6.86 (8%***) 24791 (41%***) 
Public Stockholding 0.22 (2%***) 0.22 (0%***) 2223 (4%***) 
Miscellaneous --- 3.43 (4%***) 3673 (6%***) 
Consumer Support Estimate -71      -1,828   -153,793 
Total Support Estimate 107 2,149 349,808 
* Percentage of TSE; ** Percentage of PSE; *** Percentage of GSSE 
Source: Arias (2007). 
 
                                                 
23 Market Price Support (MPS): An indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers arising from policy measures creating a gap between 
domestic market prices and border prices of a specific agricultural commodity, measured at the farm gate 
level. 
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The total value of fiscal resources devoted to support agriculture equals the sum of GSSE 
and direct fiscal resources. An analysis of these resources highlight two main 
characteristics of the structure of agricultural support in Honduras: (1) the low level of 
fiscal resources (USD 43 million) allocated to agriculture support; and (2) the 
concentration on the provision of private rather than public goods (3 to 1 ratio), meaning 
that Honduras devotes three times more fiscal resources to support producers directly 
than to finance rural public goods. Furthermore, half of the resources devoted to the 
provision of public goods go into infrastructure, and another 21 percent goes into 
inspection services. In relative terms, Honduras invests roughly the same as other Central 
American nations in inspection services but significantly more than the group of OECD 
countries; regarding investment in infrastructure, Honduras is considerably above the 
average for the Central American region and OECD countries (25 percent and 33 percent, 
respectively), and is lagging far behind in marketing and development (Arias 2007). The 
differences in the allocation of these resources between Central America in general, and 
Honduras in particular, and the group of OECD countries reflects some of the different 
priorities these countries have, and point to the potential challenges that Honduras might 
face when liberalizing trade with OECD countries, particularly the U.S. 
Data on PSE by crop reveals that rice, dairy, and hog farms receive the largest support, 
with a PSE% 24
                                                 
24 PSE% is estimated as the percentage of the PSE over total producer revenue.  
 of 68 percent, 54 percent, and 32 percent, respectively. Other crops that 
receive significant support are sugar (21 percent) and corn (10 percent). The large support 
received by the rice sector is striking, given that there are only some 2,000 producers and 
the sectoral output represented only 0.2 percent of agricultural GDP in 2003. On the other 
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hand, corn farms receive a much lower level of support, despite the fact that there is a 
much larger number of corn farmers and that the output value represented roughly 5 
percent of agricultural GDP in 2003. Overall, rice farmers receive, on a per-hectare base, 
21 times more support than corn farmers (Arias 2007).  
The exogenous change in the structure of agricultural support mandated by trade 
liberalization increases the pressure on the already precarious public budget. Considering 
that, even with the level of market price protection offered to some crops such as rice and 
corn, numerous producers are struggling to make a profit, the future scenario of shrinking 
MPS as the implementation of DR-CAFTA advances raises serious concerns about the 
viability of farms, at least if the current production and market conditions prevail. It is 
then crucial to devote more resources, but particularly, make a more efficient use of the 
funds devoted to develop adjustment policies and programs to maximize the benefits 
(minimize the costs) from trade liberalization.  
Another relevant source of information on domestic support to agriculture is the 
country’s notifications to the WTO, which Honduras has reported yearly since 2001. All 
the domestic support to agriculture provided by Honduras qualifies as green payments 25
These figures complement the total support estimate presented above, and highlight the 
insufficient support received by Honduran agriculture. It is also alarming to see the 
underfunding in areas such as sanitary and phytosanitary services, highlighted by analysts 
; 
over half of the these funds since 2001 have been allocated into training services, 
predominantly to the conservation and sustainable management of natural resources.  
                                                 
25 According to WTO’s classification of domestic support, green-box payments are those that do not distort 
trade or, at most, cause minimal distortion (Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2).  
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as a key area to enhance market access of Honduran products (Arias 2007, Todd, Winters 
and Arias 2004).  
Table 2.6. Honduras: notification on domestic support to the World Trade Organization (USD 
1,000) 
MEASURE TYPE 
YEARS 
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
General Services 1,636 3,178 11,613 31,492 271 
1. Training services 1,355 1,355 1,877 25,515 46 
2. Research services  111 79 2,054 7 
3. Extension services   2,099 3,923 205 
4. Sanitary and phytosanitary services 281 1,712 1,901  0 
5. Infrastructure services   3,587   
6. Marketing and promotion services   2,070  13 
Investment Subsidies Generally Available to 
Agriculture 1,634 1,042 2,192 2,023 31 
TOTAL DOMESTIC SUPPORT 3,270 4,220 13,805 33,515 302 
Source: own estimations based on Honduras’s WTO notifications on domestic support to agriculture. 
   
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that achieving the rates of growth 
necessary to reduce poverty and improve the standard of living of the population is 
conditional on the performance of the agricultural and food sector. It is crucial to improve 
the productivity and competitiveness of many traditional agricultural sectors, by adopting 
modern production technologies, improving the efficiency of input and output markets, 
and facilitating the reallocation of resources into the production of commodities for 
which Honduras has shown to be competitive.  
As acknowledged in the PESA, achieving these ambitious goals requires significant 
institutional reforms, coordination of efforts across private and public agents, and 
economic resources. The limited resources devoted to agriculture over the last several 
years, the recurrent budget deficits run by the government, and the limitations to serve the 
external debt cast doubts about the feasibility of many of the reforms proposed by PESA, 
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and highlight the need for increasing the efficiency in the use of the scarce resources 
available, and searching for new ways to finance agricultural public policy. External 
cooperation and increased foreign direct investment in agriculture are promising sources 
of funds that need to be expanded. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Analysts have an arsenal of research methods that can be employed for assessing the 
impact of trade policy reform on specific groups of agents and the economy as a whole. 
There are numerous classifications of research methods for policy analysis according to 
the particular specifications of the models and the specific areas of research. For instance, 
a classification of trade policy methods commonly used includes partial and computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models as the two main branches, with further sub-
classifications, such as micro or macro, single or multi-region, dynamic or static CGE 
models 26, and spatial or econometric partial equilibrium models 27
                                                 
26 An example of a micro-CGE models are the disaggregated rural economywide models (Taylor, Dyer and 
Yunez-Naude 2005); an example of a static, multi-region, macro CGE model is GTAP (Hertel 1997); an 
example of a static, single-region, macro CGE model is ORANI (Dixon, et al. 1982), and IFPRI (Lofgren, 
et al. 2001); an example of  a dynamic, multi-region, macro CGE model is GTAP-DYN (Ianchovichina and 
McDougall 2000); and an example of a dynamic, single-region, macro CGE model is extended IFPRI 
model (Thurlow 2004).   
27 An example of a sectoral, spatial, partial equilibrium model is RICEFLOW (Durand-Morat and Wailes 
2003); an example of a multi-sector, multi-region, partial equilibrium econometric model is IMPACT 
(Rosegrant, et al. 2005); an example of a sectoral, multi-region, partial equilibrium econometric model is 
the Arkansas Global Rice Model (Fuller, Wailes and Djunaidi 2003).   
. Obviously, each 
approach has strengths and weaknesses, and the appropriateness of each depends on the 
nature of the problem the analyst is assessing, as well as the particular constraints of the 
research project, for instance, time, economic resources, analytical capability, and data 
availability (Francois and Reinert 1997). 
By definition, partial equilibrium models do not take into consideration many of the 
variables included in a CGE model. As Francois and Hall (1997) state it,  
“While this is the root of the practical limitations of applied partial equilibrium 
modeling, it is also the source of its basic advantage (p. 122).”  
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The main strengths of partial equilibrium models are that: (1) they are less demanding in 
terms of time, analytical capabilities (although in some applications they can be quite 
complex and very demanding), and data than CGE models; (2) in general, they allow for 
a more detailed specification of production, consumption, and market conditions than 
CGE models; and (3) partial equilibrium models allow for relatively rapid and transparent 
analysis of a range of commercial policy issues. On the down side, partial equilibrium 
models do not capture the impact of numerous variables that, in the real world, affect the 
behavior of economic agents (Francois and Hall 1997). Whether ignoring these effects is 
appropriate or not is a judgment call that analysts must make before deciding which 
methodology to use for a specific assessment. 
The strength of CGE models is to actually enable researchers to assess the economy-wide 
impacts of a given policy change. This implies the specification of production, 
consumption, markets, and a series of macro constraints that define the economic 
environment in a given region. Such a simplification of the regional economy implies 
imposing numerous assumptions in order for the model to be manageable. On the down 
side, CGE models are generally more demanding in term of analytical skills, data, and 
time than partial equilibrium models, and for some applications, the results might be less 
transparent and, consequently, more difficult to understand (Hertel and Reimer 2004). 
Despite the fact that the models described above can be specified with a varying number 
of households, applications usually consider broad groups of representative households 
for which impacts can be assessed. Extension of results to individual households 
demands another, more detailed, analytical framework. 
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The interest of researchers to know more about the impact of trade reform on poverty has 
led to the proliferation of methods that link trade reform to the welfare of individual 
households. Hertel and Reimer (2004) classify these methods into 4 categories, namely: 
1. Partial equilibrium and/or cost-of-living approaches: they are typically based on 
household expenditure data, and emphasize the impact of trade on households 
through consumption 28
2. CGE models: based on disaggregated, economy-wide social accounting matrices, 
emphasize the impact of trade on households through changes in the markets for 
products and factors. 
, usually ignoring the income effect through factor 
markets. 
3. Micro-macro synthesis 29
4. Long-run economic growth models: based on economy-wide social accounting 
matrices and other information describing the behavior of exogenous variables, 
emphasize the long-run effects of trade on economic growth and poverty. They 
abstract from income distribution effects, focusing only on aggregate income 
changes. 
: integrate the results from household survey data with 
those obtained from macro CGE models. 
Numerous studies show that, when faced with changes in product and factor prices 
resulting from trade policy reform, households adjust both their consumption and income 
patterns, and that these adjustments can actually offset any impact estimated from a 
                                                 
28 This feature gives the cost-of-living name to these models, since they tend to focus on the impact of 
commodity price changes on household expenditure and hence poverty.  
29 Maybe a more reasonable definition would be “general equilibrium simulation with post-simulation 
analysis of household impacts” (Hertel and Reimer, 2004). 
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model that does not account for them (World Bank 2005, Hertel and Reimer 2004). From 
this point of view, cost-of-living models have the limitations of ignoring the impact of 
trade reform on income as well as the adjustments made on consumption in light of 
changes in relative prices. CGE models do not suffer from these shortcomings; yet, most 
CGE models still have the limitation of working with regional representative households, 
thus constraining the extension of results to individual regional households.  
Few studies have incorporated a large number of individual households into CGE 
models, thus enabling the extension of results to individual households 30
Finally, long-run economic growth models have the strength of introducing long-run 
effects of trade on economic growth and poverty, thus offering a new perspective on the 
problem not emphasized by the previous models. On the downside, these models offer 
 (Cogneau and 
Robilliard 2000, Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo 2003). However, these CGE models 
with a highly disaggregated set of institutions have the weakness of constraining the 
number of activities and sectors that could be defined in order for the model to remain 
manageable; moreover, the number of households that can be included is constrained by 
data availability.  
The micro-macro synthesis allows for changes in products and factors prices to be 
translated into changes in the welfare of individual households. On the downside, and 
like the cost-of-living approach, micro-macro synthesis models abstract from the second-
order impact that price changes might have on households’ mix of consumption and 
earnings (Hertel and Reimer 2004).  
                                                 
30 For instance, the model used by Rutherford, Tarr, and Shepotylo (2003) includes more than 50,000 
households. 
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only an aggregate view of poverty, and remain silent with regard to income distribution 
effects. 
 Despite the particular method used, ex-ante assessments of policy changes are limited by 
the broad set of assumptions required to make predictions before the changes occur 
(World Bank 2005).  
The methods developed particularly for poverty analysis can be employed for the 
formulation of adjustment programs for specific sectors in light of trade liberalization, 
particularly with regard to defining the eligibility of recipients and the magnitude of the 
support to be granted. The norm among agricultural adjustment programs is to define 
eligibility based on some historical estimate, such as the production of a specific crop 
during the period chosen as the benchmark; programs that incorporate an updating 
procedure of the historical estimate and a redefinition of eligibility are less common.  
This study employs a dynamic, macro CGE model to assess the impact of DR-CAFTA on 
the Honduran economy, particularly on the welfare of basic grain producers. 
Unfortunately, data constraints do not allow for an analysis at the individual basic grain 
household level. Nevertheless, the methodology used in this study will shed light on the 
expected aggregate impact, results that can be used to (1) raise awareness about the 
potential impact of DR-CAFTA on the basic grain sector, and (2) influence the 
agricultural policy process in that regard.          
3.2 SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRICES 
A social accounting matrix (SAM) is a squared matrix whose accounts register the 
economic transactions in an integrated framework (Pyatt 1988). A SAM is a means of 
representing the circular process of demand leading to production, leading to income, 
which in turn leads back to demand. On one hand, a SAM can be thought of as an 
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expanded input-output table 31
Different methods have been proposed for the construction of a SAM. Arguably the most 
popular is the hierarchical or top-down approach (Stone 1977, Thorbecke 2003). 
According to this method, the construction advances from the most aggregated 
macroeconomic level to the desired micro level. The first step consists of creating the 
, extended to capture income and expenditure flows 
between other institutions, such as households, government, and the rest of the world 
(Reinert and Rolland-Holst 1997). On the other hand, a SAM can be seen as a 
modification (in form) and expansion of national accounts. The modification in form 
comes from the fact the double entries recorded in the national accounts are recorded as 
one entry in the SAM. The expansion of the national accounts results from the use of 
other data sources to expand single entries recorded in national accounts into sub-
matrices of transactions commonly recorded in SAMs.  
The concept of a SAM evolved from pioneering works conducted over 60 years ago 
(Meade and Stone 1940, Hicks 1942, Stone 1949); since the late 1970s, SAMs have 
become the preferred national accounting format in most nations. 
A SAM has two primary objectives: (1) organizing information in such a way that they 
present, concisely, a static image of the economic behavior of a unit, either a region, a 
country, or a state; and (2) providing the statistical basis for the creation of plausible 
simulation models (King 1985). The size of a SAM depends primarily on the availability 
of data for, and the purpose of, its construction.   
                                                 
31 An input-output table traces the linkages of local industries with each other, with industries outside the 
region, and with final demand sectors. This table can be thought of as composed of four sub-matrices: (1) 
consumption patterns; (2) inter-industry structure; (3) income; and (4) non-market transfers (Schaffer 
1999). Reinert and Roland-Holst (1997) provide a more restrictive definition of an input-output table.   
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macro SAM from the information contained in a country’s macroeconomic account. The 
macro SAM provides control totals for each sub-matrix of the detailed micro SAM. 
According to Reinert and Rolland-Holst (1997), the most recent year for which the 
macroeconomic data are available sets a limit on the choice of a base year. The second 
step consists of building the micro SAM, which requires the use of input-output tables and 
a number of other sources, depending on the desired level of detail. Recent data are 
usually at a higher level of aggregation than less recent data; for instance, it is common 
that input-output tables lag national account data by 5 years or more. In order to make the 
SAM as timely as possible, given the available data, analysts usually employ the more 
aggregate data for control totals, and use the shares from less recent data to obtain the 
micro SAM (Reinert and Rolland-Holst 1997, Sanchez 2006).  
The micro SAM thus obtained is commonly unbalanced; a number of balancing 
approaches can be employed at this stage, such as the RAS procedure (Stone 1962) or the 
cross entropy method (Robinson, Cattaneo and El-Said 2001). This balancing exercise 
constitutes the third step in the building process. The fourth step consists of further 
disaggregating parts of the SAM to obtain, for instance, a more detailed specification of 
households and sources of labor. The additional information at this stage usually comes 
from household surveys and other sources such as farmer organizations and non-
governmental organizations. 
3.2.1 PREVIOUS SAMS FOR HONDURAS 
Two SAMs have been developed for Honduras in the past. The first was constructed by 
Lizardo, Navarro and Suazo (1999) for the year 1991; it divides labor into rural and urban 
categories, has one capital factor, four household categories based on their income level, 
ten economic sectors (five agricultural sectors), a government account, a capital account, 
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and five trading partners. The main sources of information were the Central Bank’s 
National Accounts and Capital Accounts, while remaining parameters were estimated as 
part of the research project (Lizardo, Navarro and Suazo 1999).  
Cuesta (2004) questions the 1991 SAM on the grounds of lack of reliable documentation 
of data sources, and develops a new SAM for the year 1997. The author clearly states the 
sources of data, namely, the National Accounts prepared by the Central Bank; capital 
flow information from the Ministry of Finance; data on labor, income and expenditure 
from the Permanent Household Survey (EPH for its initials in Spanish) and the Income 
and Expenditures National Household Survey (ENIGH for its initials in Spanish); and 
finally inter-industry structure from the Central Bank’s pilot project that constitutes the 
first attempt to build an input-output table for the Honduran economy. The 1997 SAM 
contains ten categories of labor based on education and gender; a government account; a 
capital account including land; sixteen household categories defined by location, gender, 
occupation, and skill characteristics; one government account; twenty four activities and 
commodities categories; and a rest of the world account (Cuesta 2004).  
While the disaggregation of the 1997 SAM could provide a good benchmark to which 
calibrate the CGE model developed for this study, it is desirable to have a more recent 
version of the Honduran SAM if possible, and also a different disaggregation of 
households to include, to the extent allowed by the data, those households depending on 
basic grains as a source of income. Analyzing the impact of DR-CAFTA on sensitive 
agricultural products using an outdated benchmark period adds another source of error 
that decreases the reliability of the results.  
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This chapter describes the process followed to generate a new SAM for Honduras, with 
emphasis on the basic grain sector, namely, rice, corn, and beans, the sensitive 
agricultural sectors believed to be the most vulnerable in the face of DR-CAFTA. The 
new SAM is estimated using the hierarchical or top-down approach. The next section 
describes the macroeconomic data employed and presents the macroeconomic SAM. 
Afterwards, the specification of the microeconomic SAM is introduced along with the 
data sources used for its estimation. 
3.2.2 THE 2004 MACRO SAM FOR HONDURAS  
As previously stated, the most recent year for which the macroeconomic data are 
available sets a limit on the choice of a base year. For Honduras, this corresponds to the 
year 2004 32 (Banco Central de Honduras 2007b) 33
From the information contained in the macro-SAM, we can see that the gross value of 
production generated by the Honduran economy in 2004 is estimated at L 328,393 
million (USD 18,550 million
. The description of the 2004 macro-
SAM for Honduras is presented in Appendix Table 6; the numerical 2004 macro-SAM is 
shown in Appendix Table 7.  
34
                                                 
32 The following accounts provide all the information for the construction of a macro-SAM: (1) Production 
Account, (2) Generation of Income Account, (3) Distribution of Primary Income Account, (4) Distribution 
of Secondary Income Account, (5) Redistribution of in-kind Income Account, (6) Utilization of Income 
Account, (7) Capital Account, and (8) Financial Account. 
33 The Central Bank of Honduras released in November of 2007 the new series of macroeconomic statistics 
using the System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93). 
34 Estimated using the average exchange rate of L 17.7/USD observed for the year 2004. 
), of which roughly 55 percent is used as input in the 
production process. The gross domestic product (GDP) for the same period is estimated 
at L 161,507 million (USD 9,125 million); manufactures and agriculture are the largest 
contributors, accounting for roughly 20 percent and 12 percent of GDP, respectively. 
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Value added represents around 90 percent of GDP, the remaining corresponding to 
indirect taxes on production and imports. 
The distribution of income shows that domestic returns to labor and domestic returns to 
capital represent equal shares of value added, amounting to L 72,273 million (USD 4,083 
million) and L 72,165 (USD 4,077 million), respectively. Adding the foreign returns to 
labor and capital (L 567 million and L 1,049 million, respectively), we obtain the 
aggregate income of labor and capital, which equal L 72,840 million (USD 4,115 
million) and L 73,214 million (USD 4,136 million), respectively. 
Factor income is in turn redistributed among institutions. Most of the labor income goes 
to households (99 percent), and the remaining is transferred to the rest of the world. Most 
of the capital income (roughly 87 percent) accrues to enterprises, which in turn (1) 
redistribute most of it among domestic institutions, namely households (62 percent) and 
foreign institutions, (2) pay income taxes (11 percent), and (3) save (27 percent). The 
remaining capital income accrues to the rest of the world (13 percent). The allocation of 
capital income into enterprises is a simplification commonly made in the construction of 
SAMs for modeling purposes, since it greatly simplifies the specification of institutional 
income. The national product, estimated from the GDP by adding (subtracting) factors of 
production’s net payments from (to) the rest of the world, amounts to L 153,218 million 
(USD 8,656 million).  
Information from the “Secondary Distribution of Income” account 35
                                                 
35 The secondary distribution of income contemplates transfers among all institutions, which for this macro 
SAM are (1) households, (2) government, (3) enterprises, and (4) the rest of the world. 
 shows that 
Honduran institutions received L 24,198 million (USD 1,367 million) in net current 
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transfers from the rest of the world in 2004, of which roughly 86 percent represent 
remittances to households originating primarily from the U.S. 36
                                                 
36 The information contained in the “Secondary Distribution of Income” account allows us to disentangle 
most intra-institutional transfers. Items that can be clearly identified include: 
 Hence, the gross 
disposable income of Honduran institutions in 2004 amounted to L 177,416 million 
(USD 10,023 million), of which 81 percent was allocated into final consumption of both 
• Income taxes: levied on domestic households and enterprises, and valued at L 1,452 million and L 
7,377 million, respectively. 
• Social contributions: provided from households to other households (L 17 million), to the 
government (L 2,318 million), and to enterprises (L 5,313 million). 
• Social contributions: provided by the government, households, and enterprises to households 
(valued at L 734 million, L 17 million, and L 3,592 million, respectively). 
• Other current transfers: 
• Remittances: reached L 20,717 million in 2004, received fully by households. 
• International current transfers: equal to L 18 million, accrued to enterprises. 
• Current transfers within government: equal to L 2,189. 
• Premium of insurance (excluding life insurance): equal to L 1,088 million, transferred within 
enterprises and from the government and households to enterprises. 
• Insurance allowances (excluding life insurance): equal to 1,088, transferred within enterprises 
and between these and households. 
• Current international cooperation: transfers from the rest of the world to the government and 
enterprises valued at L 1,430 million and L 2,377 million, respectively; transfers from the 
government to the rest of the world valued at L 5 million. 
• Different current transfers with the rest of the world: this item includes (1) transfers from 
Honduran enterprises to the rest of the world for L 5 million; and (2) transfers from the rest of 
the world to Honduran enterprises for L 18 million. 
• Compensatory payments: amounting to L 22 million, transferred from enterprises to 
households. 
 
The following assumptions were made to disentangle the information contained in the following items: 
• Fines and economic sanctions: valued at L 385 million paid by households (L 142 million), 
government (L 114 million), and enterprises (L 129 million), to the government (L 304 million) 
and enterprises (L 81 million). The assumption made here is that households and enterprises 
transfer their payments to the government, and the government transfers payments to enterprises. 
The remaining amount is assumed to represent transfers within the government.    
• Other current transfers: valued at L 8,147 million paid by households (L 2,960 million), 
government (L 1,678  million), enterprises (L 3,504 million), and the rest of the world (L 5 
million) to households (L 4,835 million), government (L 1,632  million), enterprises (L 1,339 
million), and the rest of the world (L 341 million). The assumption made here is that (1) all 
transfers from the rest of the world go to the government; (2) the remaining government receipts 
come from households; (3) the remaining transfers from households go to enterprises (L 1,333 
million); (4) all transfers to the rest of the world come from the government; (5) the remaining 
household receipts are paid by enterprises; and finally (6) all remaining receipts of enterprises are 
paid by enterprises. 
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domestic and imported goods and services, and the remaining 19 percent was saved, 
primarily by enterprises and households.  
The Income in Kind Redistribution account considers all transfers in kind among 
institutions. For Honduras in 2004, this account provides all the information needed to 
disentangle all transfers in kind among institutions. Transfers in kind from the 
government (L 11,041 million) and enterprises (L 1,309 million) are received by 
households. The final consumption reported for enterprises is actually equivalent to the 
transfers in kind from enterprises to households; consequently, this flow is assumed to 
accrue directly to households, who decide to consume the type of goods they would have 
otherwise received from enterprises. The same assumption applies to the transfers in kind 
from the government to households.  
The intra-institutional transfer sub-matrix shows net flows among domestic institutions; 
these net flows are exclusive of income taxes, which are entered separately into the 
income tax account. 
3.2.2.1 Savings-Investment Account 
Non-financial investment transactions and capital transfers among institutions need to be 
accounted for in the SAM. These transactions are recorded in the savings-investment (S-
I) account(s) based on the information gathered from the Capital Account, generated as 
part of the System of National Accounts, revision 93 (SNA93). The S-I account(s) can be 
built for each institution separately, primarily if the SAM is going to be used for 
investment and savings analysis. Otherwise, a common simplification performed is the 
creation of only one S-I account for the whole economy, which records total savings and 
total investment performed in the economy; this is the approach followed in this study. 
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Furthermore, changes in stocks are also disaggregated into an account of its own, and 
merely report the transfers received from the S-I account and allocated into goods and 
services. Based on the information from the SNA93, total disposable savings in Honduras 
amounted to L 53,414 million in 2004, of which 63 percent are savings by domestic 
institutions and the remaining are capital transfers from the rest of the world. Savings are 
in turn exhausted in (1) gross fixed capital formation, (2) changes in stocks, and (3) 
capital transfers to the rest of the world.  
3.2.2.2 Decomposition of Taxes 
The Honduran tax system is based primarily on five taxes, namely, (1) sales tax; (2) 
income tax; (3) production and consumption tax; (4) oil derivatives tax; and (5) trade tax, 
each accounting for 35.5 percent, 25.1 percent, 4.6 percent, 20 percent, and 7.7 percent of 
total tax revenues in 2004, respectively. Other taxes include road services, airport fees, 
and selective automobile taxes, which account for the remaining of the tax revenue 
collected by the Honduran government. 
The SAM organizes the different taxes above into five categories of taxes, namely (1) 
sales tax, (2) income tax, (3) production tax, (4) import tariff, and (5) export tariff. The 
information needed for the classification of taxes is provided by the Executive 
Directorate of Income (DEI for its initials in Spanish). 
3.2.2.3 Comments on Diagonal Entries 
A diagonal entry represents transfers made by institutions (identified with a SAM 
account) to themselves. As made clear in the presentation above, many single entries in 
the macro-SAM are disentangled into matrices in the micro-SAM, and what were diagonal 
flows in the former become off-diagonal entries, or flows between different institutions, 
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in the latter. Nevertheless, some flows might still remain diagonal. Diagonal entries in the 
target micro-SAM do not serve much purpose, since they simply represent the amount of 
duplication in production, income, or investment, depending on the account where the 
diagonal entry is reported. Thus, this study follows the common practice of reporting 
diagonal entries in the macro-SAM, but removing them in the final micro-SAM.  
3.2.2.4 Further Comments 
The supply and demand table generated by the Central Bank of Honduras as part of the 
System of National Accounts 37 shows that, for two commodity bundles, namely (1) alive 
plants and flowers, and (2) metallic debris, Honduras exported more than it produced, 
thus implying that there were re-exports of these products 38
                                                 
37 All tables conforming the Honduran System of National Accounts are available electronically at 
. Of course, re-exports might 
have occurred in more sectors, but given the information available, namely aggregate 
import values with no data on the final use of these flows, it is not possible to discover 
their occurrence. Since the CGE model that would employ this SAM does not handle the 
possibility of re-exports, then the information contained in the supply and demand table 
has to be adjusted. This study follows the common practice of eliminating the export flow 
of those commodities where re-exports are observed, and adjusting the import level 
accordingly to maintain the account balance (Wobst 1998, Nielsen 2002). As a result of 
this modification, neither the resulting commodity export and import figures nor the 
aggregate trade figures in the SAM coincide any longer with those reported in the supply 
and demand table.  
http://estadisticas.bch.hn/anexos_sector_real.php  
38 Together, these commodity bundles represent less than 0.5 percent of the gross value of production.  
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The supply and demand table also reports the distribution margins, namely transportation 
and commercialization margins, for each commodity that added to the basic price 
determine the purchaser’s price. These commodity margins are actually an aggregation of 
the margins in domestic, import, and export markets. In other words, these margins 
include the margin incurred in (1) moving the domestic commodity from the production 
site to the domestic market; (2) moving exports from the production site to the border; 
and (3) moving imports from the border to the domestic market. The disaggregation of 
distribution margins among these three markets is done proportionally to their 
contribution to final use; domestic consumption of domestically-produced commodities is 
estimated as the difference between domestic production and exports.  
3.2.3 THE 2004 MICRO SAM FOR HONDURAS 
3.2.3.1 Disaggregation of the Basic Grain Sector 
The basic grain sector is disaggregated into 6 activities according to the most relevant 
systems of production used in Honduras, and for which the Secretary of Agriculture 
generates production budgets. For corn, three activities are defined, namely (1) corn 
produced with high, (2) with medium, and (3) with low level of technology (traditional). 
For beans, two activities are specified, that is (1) valley, and (2) hillside production. 
Finally, rice is considered a single activity, given that the technology applied does not 
vary significantly among producers. Thus, the single basic grain activity defined in the 
original input-output table is disaggregated into six activities in the micro SAM. 
3.2.3.2 Disaggregation of Labor 
Four categories of labor are specified in the micro-SAM based on their geographic 
distribution and level of education. All the information needed to disaggregate labor, 
namely geographic location, years of schooling, employment by economic activity, and 
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transfer to households, comes from the Standard of Living Survey (ENCOVI for its 
initials in Spanish) administered twice a year by the National Institute of Statistics (INE 
for its initials in Spanish). The particular categories of labor considered in this study are: 
1. Urban skilled labor: labor offered by the urban population with at least 7 years of 
schooling. This labor category accounts for roughly 25 percent of the total return 
to labor and 12.5 percent of total value added in 2004.  
2. Urban unskilled labor: labor offered by the urban population with less than 7 
years of schooling. This labor category accounts for 44 percent of the total return 
to labor and 21.5 percent of total value added in 2004. 
3. Rural skilled labor: labor offered by people living in rural areas that have at least 
7 years of schooling. This labor category accounts for 8 percent of the total return 
to labor and 4 percent of total value added in 2004. 
4. Rural unskilled labor: labor offered by people living in rural areas that have less 
than 7 years of schooling. This labor category accounts for 23 percent of the total 
return to labor and 11 percent of total value added in 2004. 
3.2.3.3 Disaggregation of Households 
Representative households are specified according to their main economic activities. 
Since the main reason for the construction of this SAM is to calibrate a CGE model for 
the assessment of DR-CAFTA on the welfare of those households depending on basic 
grains for their economic survival, the categories of households must account, to the 
extent allowed by the available information, for households’ agricultural and basic grain 
activities.  
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There is no survey in Honduras that would allow us to obtain representative information 
on income and expenditure at the agricultural activity level. Agricultural households are 
surveyed in the ENCOVI to obtain representative rural and national information on 
several aspects used to infer their standard of living. Moreover, basic grain producers are 
surveyed twice a year as a part of the Basic Agricultural Survey but only to obtain 
information on agricultural production and marketing. 
This study disaggregates households into four categories, namely: 
1. Basic Grain households: the approach followed in this study was to aggregate 
households surveyed in the ENCOVI whose reports indicate that at least 25 
percent of their income comes from the production of basic grains. This 
representative household accounted for only 5 percent of total household income 
in 2004. 
2. Livestock households: the approach followed in this study was to aggregate 
households surveyed in the ENCOVI whose reports indicate that at least 25 
percent of their income comes from the livestock. This representative household 
accounted for only 3 percent of total household income in 2004.  
3. Other agricultural households: the approach followed in this study was to 
aggregate households surveyed in the ENCOVI whose reports indicate that at 
least 25 percent of their income comes from agricultural activities other than basic 
grains and livestock. This representative household accounted for only 7 percent 
of total household income in 2004. 
4. Other households: this representative household in made up primarily by urban 
households and some limited number of rural households whose income do not 
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depend on agriculture. This representative household accounts for roughly 85 
percent of total household income in 2004. This shows the significant income 
inequality between urban and rural households, given that roughly half of the 
Honduran population lives in rural areas and depends primarily on agricultural 
activities for their survival. 
The ENCOVI provides detailed information on income from which income shares were 
obtained. These shares are applied to the control total reported in the macro-SAM to 
obtain household-specific control totals. The ENCOVI is not designed to obtain detailed 
information on the expenditure of households. Consequently, another source of 
information is needed to obtain the shares of consumption by commodity and household. 
In this study, household expenditure shares are estimated from the ENIGH. 
The final step in the construction of the household accounts is the determination of 
income taxes and savings. Unfortunately, the information available only allows for the 
estimation of control totals across all households. The approach taken in this study was to 
(1) disaggregate income taxes according to the level of income of each representative 
household, and (2) estimate savings for each representative household as a residual.    
3.2.3.4 Disaggregation of Regions 
The foreign sector in this SAM is represented by two accounts, namely, (1) the U.S., and 
(2) the rest of the world. Disaggregating the U.S. from all other regions that trade with 
Honduras is essential for an assessment of DR-CAFTA, since the agreement will alter 
bilateral U.S.-Honduras trade policies while keeping all other bilateral trade barriers 
unchanged.  
 78 
 
 
The c.i.f. values of bilateral trade by commodity used to disaggregate the total value of 
trade were obtained from the National Institute of Statistics. The total values of import 
tariff revenues by commodity were disaggregated by region based on the estimated 
import tariffs applied to U.S. Import taxes on flows from the rest of the world are 
estimated as a residual. 
3.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE CGE MODEL 
The model developed for this study is written in linearized form, namely, all equations, 
most of which are non-linear, are transformed into their linearized form 39
3.3.1 PRODUCTION SECTOR 
. Consequently, 
all variables in the model are represented by their percentage change rather than absolute 
value. The linearization of non-linear equations has the main advantage of simplifying 
the model while yielding the same results as “levels” models (Hertel, Horridge and 
Pearson 1991). 
Before proceeding with the description of the model, the sets defined in the model are 
introduced in Appendix Table 8. The definition of the values from the SAM used to 
calibrate the model is presented in Appendix Table 11, along with their formula (if 
estimated within the model) and the way in which they are updated during simulations. 
From a modeling point of view, the production sector can be specified in two ways: (1) 
by activity and commodity so as to allow for the possibility of multiple outputs being 
produced by one production activity; and (2) by production sector, which integrates each 
activity and associated commodity into a single account. The first specification is used in 
                                                 
39 Although most CGE models are written in non-linear form, the popular multi-region, multi-sector GTAP 
model is written in linearized form. For more information on the linearization of CES and other functions, 
see Hertel, Horridge, and Pearson (1991), and Hertel (1997). 
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the IFPRI model (Lofgren, et al. 2001) and the ORANI model (Dixon, et al. 1982); the 
second specification is used in the GTAP model (Hertel 1997). The model built for this 
study follows the first approach, since it better describes the scenario under 
consideration: a number of basic grain activities producing commodities that are treated 
as homogenous in the market. 
For all activities, the structure of primary production is specified as two-level tree (Figure 
3.1).  
3.3.1.1 Activity Level Nest 
At the top of the inverted tree in Figure 3.1 is the activity level nest. Following standard 
neoclassical economics, it is assumed that producers’ goal is to maximize profits or, 
which is the same, minimize costs; this optimization process determines the activity level. 
The derived demands for intermediates and value-added composites, qva(a) and qinta(a), 
are a function of the activity level and the technological characteristics of production. In 
this model, the activity level is specified as a Leontief technology, which implies no 
substitution effects between the factor composite and the intermediates composite (see 
equations 1 and 2 in Appendix Table 10).  
The model includes a number of technology-related exogenous variables that can be 
shocked arbitrarily as part of an experiment. Variables ava(a) and ain(a) represent 
augmenting technical changes in the productivity of the value-added and intermediates 
composites by activity, respectively. A positive change in ava(a) has two main effects: 
(1) at constant prices, it uniformly reduces the demand for factors of production; and (2) 
it lowers the cost of value-added thus encouraging the expansion of production.  A 
positive change in ain(a) works similarly to a change in ava(a) but on the intermediates 
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composite. The variable ao(a) stands for the output-augmenting technical change by 
activity; a shock to ao(a) is equivalent to a Hick-neutral technical change. An increase in 
ao(a) has two main effects: (1) at constant prices, it uniformly reduces the demand for 
both the value-added and intermediates composites; and (2) it lowers the cost of 
production thus encouraging expansion of production.  
Figure 3.1. Structure of primary production 
 
3.3.1.2 Value-Added and Intermediates Nests 
At the bottom of the inverted tree in Figure 3.1 are the value-added nest and the 
intermediates nest, in which the derived demands for factors of production, qf(f,a), and 
intermediate inputs, qint(c,a), are determined (see equations 3, 4, and 5 in Appendix 
Table 10). These derived demands are obtained from a cost-minimization problem 
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assuming a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. The functional 
form of these derived demand equations follows directly as a consequence of the 
assumption of constant returns to scale and cost functions of the CES type. The value-
added composite price by activity, pva(a), is estimated simply as a value-weighted 
average of the price of specific factors paid by this activity (Appendix Table 10, equation 
6). Similarly, the intermediates composite price by activity, pinta(a), is estimated simply 
as a value-weighted average of the price of specific inputs paid by this activity (Appendix 
Table 10, equation 7). For more details on the derivation of these equations, see Hertel, 
Horridge, and Pearson (1991), and Hertel (1997). The cost of production by activity is a 
function of the composite prices pva(a) and pinta(a) and the respective shares of value 
added and intermediates in the total cost of production of activity a 40
The variable afe(f,a) represents the augmenting productivity change in factor  used by 
activity a. An increase in afe(f,a) has three effects: (1) at constant prices, it reduces the 
demand for the specific factor of production; (2) it reduces the effective price of the 
factor thus encouraging factor substitution; and (3) it lowers the cost of value-added thus 
encouraging expansion of production. Likewise, the variable aie(c,a) represents the 
percentage change in the productivity of specific intermediate inputs by activity, and its 
effects are similar to those described above for afe(f,a).  
.  
The linearized form of these derived demand equations is simple, and facilitates the 
decomposition of the changes in derived demand. The first term in equations (3) through 
(5) corresponds to the partial effect of the augmenting technical change variable on the 
                                                 
40 By virtue of the zero profit condition imposed on production, the unit cost of production by activity 
(exclusive of activity taxes) equals the price received by producers, represented by pap(a).  
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derived demand of factors and intermediates; since these variables are declared as 
exogenous in the standard model, they can be shocked at the discretion of the user. The 
second term corresponds to the expansionary effect, that is, how much the derived 
demand for any given factor of production or input changes as a result of an expansion in 
the output of the specific activity, relative changes in factor and input prices aside. 
Finally, the third term corresponds to the substitution effect, that is, to what extent the 
changes in intermediate demand for any given factor of production or intermediate input 
are explained by changes in their relative prices vis-à-vis the value-added composite price 
and the intermediates composite price, respectively.     
3.3.1.3 Commodity Production by Activity 
Despite the fact that most SAMs have highly sparse make tables, this model still allows 
for each activity to produce a mix of potentially all commodities. The quantity of 
commodity c produced by activity a is represented by qac(c,a). Revenue maximization 
under the assumption of a Leontief transformation function results in a production mix 
that does not vary with relative changes in commodity prices but only in fixed 
proportions to changes in activity levels (see equation 8 in Appendix Table 10). The 
average unit revenue or market price of activity a, pam(a), is estimated as a weighted 
average of commodity prices received by each activity, ptoa(c,a) (equation 9 in Appendix 
Table 10). 
3.3.1.4 Aggregate Traded Output 
As shown in the upper part of Figure 3.1 above, the production of domestic goods by 
specific activities can be either traded in the market or kept for self-consumption by the 
relevant households. The demand for domestic goods for self-consumption is derived for 
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each household as part of a utility maximization process described later in this chapter. 
The quantity that each activity sales in the domestic market, qtoa(c,a), is derived from the 
aggregate demand for each domestic good c, identified here by qto(c) (Figure 3.2). The 
aggregation function is specified as Cobb-Douglas (Appendix Table 10, equation 10). At 
equilibrium, the aggregate demand for domestic good c must equal the aggregate supply 
or sales of the same good. In this model, instead of creating two different variables for the 
aggregate demand and the aggregate supply or sales of good c and equating them through 
a market clearing equation, the approach taken is simply to define both aggregate demand 
and supply by the same variable qto(c). 
Note the similarity between equation 10 and equations 3 and 4. Beyond the augmenting 
technical variables in the production sector, the only difference between these equations 
is the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution. While a CES functional form allows for 
the use of different values of the elasticity of substitution, the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form implies an elasticity of substitution equal to one.  
The model allows for the price of any given commodity c produced domestically to vary 
across activities. The wholesale price of domestic commodity c, px(c), is estimated as a 
weighted average price of activity-specific prices ptoa(c,a) (Appendix Table 10, equation 
11). 
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Figure 3.2. Marketing of domestic goods, imports, and the production of a composite commodity 
 
3.3.1.5 Allocation of Sales of Domestically-Produced Goods 
Wholesalers have two options when it comes to selling their products: they can sell them 
either domestically or internationally. The allocation of output into either market is 
assumed to result from a revenue maximization problem. For all commodities, the 
production possibility function is defined as a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function; consequently, revenue maximization given (1) the price of domestic output 
traded domestically, pds(c), (2) the market price of exports, pe(c), and (3) aggregate 
tradable output, qto(c), determines the aggregate volume of exports and domestic sales, 
qe(c) and qd(c), respectively (Appendix Table 10, equations 12 and 13, respectively). 
The zero profits condition at the wholesale level enforces that the revenue from selling a 
unit of commodity c actually equals its cost of production, which for the wholesaler is 
px(c).   
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3.3.1.6 Export Supply 
The allocation of exports by destination, qed(c,r), is specified as a CES function; 
commodities possess country-specific characteristics that make them imperfect 
substitutes among each other (Appendix Table 10, equation 14). Note the similarity 
between this equation and the derived demand for factors of production and intermediate 
inputs as well as the aggregation function. As discussed previously, the simple form of 
these equations enable users to easily decompose the expansionary and substitution 
effects driving the changes in the endogenous variables, in this case, the volume of 
exports by destination.  
The composite export price for commodity c, pe(c), is estimated as a trade-weighted 
average of region-specific export prices, pepd(c,r). 
3.3.1.7 Composite Commodity Production 
Unlike some models such as GTAP that maintains different accounts for domestic and 
imported commodities, this model integrates imports and domestic sales of the same 
commodity into a composite commodity account. In fact, this approach is the most 
commonly used given that it is compatible with the standard design of the SAMs. 
Maintaining separate accounts for imported and domestic products is a desirable 
specification that would allow us to disentangle the potential differences in the demand 
for similar imports and domestic goods. On the downside, maintaining separate 
commodity accounts demands that data on final and intermediate consumption be 
disaggregated into consumption of imports and domestic products. Many nations, 
including Honduras, do not collect this type of data.  
Domestic commodity c sold in the domestic market, qd(c), and imports of commodity c, 
qm(c), are assumed to be imperfect substitutes in the production of composite commodity 
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c, qq(c). This specification is commonly known as the Armington model (Armington 
1969). This step can be seen as a production process that generates a composite 
commodity c using two inputs, namely domestic and imported commodity c, that are 
imperfect substitutes and whose substitution is dictated by the Armington elasticity of 
substitution (see equations 16 and 17 in Appendix Table 10). 
In turn, the composite commodity is later allocated into final and intermediate 
consumption, including the production of capital goods. Similar to the case of the 
wholesaler, it is assumed that the producer of the composite commodity incurs a cost of 
production per unit of output that is a function of input prices and their participation in 
the production process. Since the zero-profit assumption applies at this stage as well, this 
cost of production equals the supply price of composite commodity c, pqs(c). 
3.3.1.8 Sourcing of Imports 
Imports of commodity c by source, qms(c,r), are also assumed to be imperfect substitutes 
among each other. The sourcing of imports is specified as a CES function (Appendix 
Table 10, equation 18). The aggregate market price of imports, pm(c), is estimated as the 
trade-weighted average of region-specific import prices, pmms(c,r) (Appendix Table 10, 
equation 19). 
3.3.2 FACTOR SUPPLY 
Factor supply in CGE models has been specified in three primary ways, namely (1) 
factors with fully flexible supply functions (the endowment of factors can be expanded 
infinitely at the ongoing price); (2) factors with perfectly inelastic supply functions (the 
endowment of factors is fixed regardless of the market incentives to expand or contract); 
and (3) factors with an upward-sloping supply function (endowments might expand or 
contract depending on market price signals; the extent of the change is dictated by a 
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factor supply elasticity). The first specification is commonly adopted for unskilled labor 
in developing countries in order to account for unemployment. Care must be taken when 
using this specification to ensure that the growth in the endowment is actually feasible. 
The second specification is commonly adopted for highly skilled workers in developed 
countries or land in general; this fix supply assumption on labor is appropriate only in 
short-run assessments where the short supply of highly skilled workers is more severe; in 
the medium and long term, the skills with high market demands can be acquired and the 
supply consequently expanded. Finally, the third specification attempts to capture the 
effect that price signal might have on factor endowments. This specification represents an 
intermediate situation, in which prices and quantities are allowed to vary to some degree 
(dictated by the factor supply elasticity), which in part addresses the unemployment or 
underemployment issues commonly seen in developing nations, but on the other hand 
accounts for some constraints in the availability of resources.  
In this model, the aggregate supply for all factors included in subset FSUP is specified as 
an upward-sloping function of real factor prices (Appendix Table 10, equation 20). The 
total supply of capital is specified as fully inelastic within periods, but adjusted every 
year to account for net investment from the previous year (Appendix Table 10, equation 
86).  
The model also differentiates factors based on their mobility. Perfectly mobile factors of 
production can move freely among activities in the pursuit of higher returns; however, at 
equilibrium, the perfect mobility of factors determines a unique market price for the 
entire market. Hence, the activity-specific supply of mobile factors is a response to 
equalize mobile factor prices across activities. The situation is different for sluggish 
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factors, whose market prices vary across activities and, consequently, so does their 
supply. The allocation of sluggish factor supply across sectors, qfsa(f,a), is specified as a 
CET function (Appendix Table 10, equation 21). This stylized specification of the 
workings of capital implies that without changes in relative prices, new capital will be 
allocated uniformly across activities (expansionary effect). With this specification there is 
no role for future expectations to affect the allocation of total investment across sectors. 
Changes in relative prices will yield a reallocation of investment across sectors according 
to the elasticity of capital transformation. The composite market price for sluggish 
factors, pf(f), is estimated as a value-weighted average of activity-specific returns to 
sluggish factors, pfa(f,a) (Appendix Table 10, equation 22). 
3.3.3 TRANSACTION SERVICES 
Transaction services are used for moving (1) the domestic output from producers to 
consumers; (2) exports from domestic markets to the border; and (3) imports from the 
border to the domestic market. The demand for transaction services, qt, is estimated 
based on the assumption that the movement of goods demand fixed units of a single 
transaction service (Appendix Table 10, equation 23). 
The unit price of transaction services is determined by the prices of the goods used as 
inputs in the marketing process. These commodities are identified in the SAM because 
they are demanded by the transaction service sector. The price of the single transaction 
service, pt, is defined as a value-weighted average price of the commodities demanded by 
the transaction service sector (Appendix Table 10, equation 24). 
In order to provide its services, the transaction service sector demands composite 
commodities; in this model, the derived demand for composite commodity c by the 
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transaction service sector is specified simply as a fixed proportion of the output generated 
by the transaction service sector (Appendix Table 10, equation 25). 
3.3.4 THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
The consumer price index, cpi, estimated as a consumption-weighted average of 
composite commodity prices, serves as the numéraire in the standard model, and is kept 
fixed at the baseline level (see equation 26 in Appendix Table 10). Consequently, all 
results are expressed as percentage changes vis-à-vis the cpi.                                                                         
3.3.5 DETERMINATION OF FACTOR INCOME 
Factor income, fy(f), is defined simply as the sum of the revenue obtained from domestic 
activities that employ them as inputs, plus foreign transfers in return to the domestic 
factors of production used overseas. It is assumed that foreign transfers to factors in 
foreign currency by source, rtff(f,r), remain fixed (unless shocked as part of an 
experiment) while foreign transfers to factors of production in domestic currency,  
rtfd(f,r), adjust to changes in the exchange rate (Appendix Table 10, equation 27). 
Owners of mobile factors of production receive payments from activity a equal to [pf(f) * 
qf(f,a)]. Sluggish factors have activity-specific market prices, pfa(f,a), which combined 
with the volume of inputs demanded, determine the gross factor income from specific 
activities, [pfa(f,a) * qf(f,a)] (see equations 28 and 29 in Appendix Table 10).  
Consequently, factor income is estimated as the sum of the returns obtained from 
activities plus the transfers received from overseas.   
3.3.6 DISTRIBUTION OF FACTOR INCOME 
Factor income can be either (1) transferred overseas, or (2) distributed among domestic 
non-government institutions. Transfers overseas by destination in foreign currency, 
ftrf(f,r), are assumed to remain fixed at the baseline level, while foreign transfers in 
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domestic currency, ftrd(f,r), are allowed to adjust to changes in the exchange rate. 
Aggregate factor transfers overseas in domestic currency, fto(f), are simply the sum of 
region-specific transfers (Appendix Table 10, equation 31). 
The share of factor income that flows to domestic institutions, yfd(f), is estimated as the 
residual of factor income and total foreign transfers. Finally, it is assumed that factor 
income is distributed among domestic non-government institutions, yfi(i,f), in fixed 
proportions.    
3.3.7   INSTITUTIONS 
There are four groups of institutions defined in this model, namely, households, 
enterprises, the government, and the rest of the world. Households collect income from 
two sources, namely, (1) returns to the factor endowments they own, and (2) transfers 
from other institutions. They in turn spend their income in (1) either current or future 
consumption (savings), (2) transfers to other households, (3) payment of income taxes, 
and (4) transfers to the rest of the world. By construction, households are not allowed to 
transfer income to enterprises.  
Enterprises collect gross profits and government transfers and use them to pay taxes, 
save, and transfer surpluses to households and the rest of the world. Thus, enterprises 
differ from households in that they do not consume; apart from this distinction, both 
institutions perform the same economic activities.  
The government collects its revenue from four taxes, namely, taxes on production, sales, 
income, and trade (exports and imports), as well as transfers from the rest of the world, 
and allocates total public funds into either final consumption or transfers to other 
institutions. The macroeconomic closure for the government in the standard model 
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implies that government savings are determined as a flexible residual (government total 
revenue minus total expenditures). 
Finally, the rest of the world receives income (foreign currency spending) from sales of 
goods and services to the production sector and transfers from domestic institutions. On 
the other hand, the expenditure (foreign currency receipts) of the rest of the world 
includes the purchase of domestic goods and services (exports by the domestic economy), 
the payment for the use of domestic factors of production abroad, transfers to domestic 
institutions, and foreign direct investment. Foreign savings, or the current account deficit, 
is the difference between foreign currency spending and receipts. 
3.3.7.1 Income of Domestic, Non-Government Institutions 
Domestic non-government institutions include households and enterprises; as commented 
above, enterprises perform the same economic activities that households except 
consuming composite goods.   
The gross income of domestic non-government institutions, y(i), comes from four 
sources: (1) revenues from factors of production that they own; (2) transfers from other 
domestic, non-government institutions, trii(j,i); (3) transfers from the government; and 
(4) transfers from the rest of the world (Appendix Table 10, equation 36). Constant 
government transfers, govt(i), are assumed to be fixed in the standard model, while 
current government transfers, gtdii(i), are allowed to adjust to changes in the cpi (see 
equation 34 in Appendix Table 10).  
Similarly, overseas transfers to domestic, non-government institutions in foreign 
currency, rtif(i,r), are assumed to remain fixed, while overseas transfers expressed in 
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domestic currency, rtid(i,r), are allowed to adjust to changes in the exchange rate (see 
equation 35 in Appendix Table 10). 
3.3.7.2 Expenditure of Domestic, Non-Government Institutions 
Non-government institutions pay income taxes, whose power is represented by, tinc(i). 
The power of the direct tax on income of institution i is estimated as tinc(i) = (1 – 
ty(i)/100), where ty(i) represents the ad-valorem tax levied on the income of institution i. 
The percentage change in after-tax income, or net income, yn(i), is estimated from gross 
income after subtracting income taxes (see equation 37 in Appendix Table 10). 
Transfers from domestic non-government institution i to region r expressed in foreign 
currency, itrf(i,r), are assumed to remain fixed while allowed to vary when expressed in 
domestic currency, itrf(i,r), so as to account for changes in the exchange rate (see 
equation 38 in Appendix Table 10). Furthermore, transfers among domestic non-
government institutions are assumed to vary proportionately to net income (Appendix 
Table 10, equation 39). 
Enterprises savings, esav(e), is specified as a constant share of their net income; that is, 
they have a fixed marginal propensity to save, mps(e) (see equation 40 in Appendix Table 
10). In this model, the marginal propensity to save is specified as an exogenous variable 
and, consequently, subject to arbitrary manipulation by the user. 
The net income of households that remains after transfers to other domestic institutions 
and the rest of the world are accounted for, utilbud(h), is allocated into (1) current 
consumption of traded goods, (2) current consumption of non-traded goods, and (3) 
future consumption or savings, according to an aggregate utility of the Cobb-Douglas 
form. 
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3.3.7.3 Household Consumption Expenditures 
It is assumed in this model that households allocate their budgets available for 
consumption among three upper-level commodities, namely, (1) a traded-good 
composite, (2) a non-traded-good composite, and (3) savings, according to a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate utility function. Consequently, allocation of household total 
expenditure into each upper-level commodity is done at roughly constant shares 41. The 
traded-good sub-utility is specified as a Constant Difference Elasticity (CDE) function, 
while the non-traded-good sub-utility is specified as Cobb-Douglas. Savings is a single 
commodity, defined as savings deflated by a savings price (see Figure 3.3 below). 
The model is kept manageable by assuming weak separability in each sub-utility. Weak 
separability implies that the demand for the ith
                                                 
41 The reason for shares to adjust with changes in income, something we would not expect from a Cobb-
Douglas demand system, is the presence of a non-homothetic sub-utility system for traded commodities.   
 tradable good, for instance, is only a 
function of the individual prices of the tradable goods and services that make up the 
tradable composite, and the total expenditure on the tradable composite; the shadow price 
of non-traded commodities and the price of savings are only relevant insofar as they 
determine the expenditure on the tradable composite.  
Therefore, we can think of consumption decisions as taking place in two stages: first, 
based on composite price indexes, consumers decide how much of the upper-level 
commodities to consume; second, consumers define their level of consumption of 
specific goods and services given their prices and the total expenditure on the respective 
composite. 
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Homothetic utility functions simplify the two-stage maximization problem by yielding 
linear budget constraints, that is, budget constraints whose terms are quantities times 
prices (Varian 1992). When sub-utilities are non-homothetic, as is the case of the CDE 
function used to represent the consumption of tradable goods and services in this model, 
then the budget constraints contain terms where the relationship between prices and 
quantities is nonlinear, which requires further development in order to obtain a suitable 
functional form.  
While non-homothetic utility functions imply some extra work in the derivation of the 
relevant demand equations, the evidence suggests the effort is granted since, for the most 
part, demand follows nonlinear patterns as income increases (Deaton and Muellbauer 
1980). The development of household demand system used in this model is based 
primarily on the work of McDougall (McDougall 2003), and readers interested in having 
a more in-depth description of the demand system and the derivation of the relevant 
equations presented in Appendix Table 10 (equations 42 to 61) are encouraged to review 
McDougall’s study. 
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Figure 3.3. Specification of household consumption behavior 
 
3.3.7.4 Government Revenue 
In this model, government receipts consist of (1) receipts from the four categories of 
taxes, namely, taxes on production, sales, income, and trade, and (2) transfers from the 
rest of the world. Tax receipts are a function of the applied level of the tax and the 
relevant volumes and prices to which they apply (this applies for production, sales, and 
trade tax receipts) or the level of income of the domestic institutions (this applies to 
income tax receipts). Transfers from the rest of the world to the government are assumed 
to remain fixed in foreign currency and flexible in domestic currency to account for the 
changes in the exchange rate (Appendix Table 10, equation 62). Thus, total government 
revenue, grev, is determined as the sum of individual tax revenues and foreign transfers 
in domestic currency (see equation 63 in Appendix Table 10).  
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3.3.7.5 Government Expenditure 
The government allocates revenues into either (1) current spending, or (2) future 
consumption (savings). Current government spending, gexp, consists of (a) transfers to 
domestic institutions, gtdii(i), which are assumed to remain fixed in real terms; (b) 
transfers to the rest of the world, govtrd(r) and govtrf(r), which are assumed to remain 
fixed in foreign currency; and (c) current government consumption, qg(c), which is 
simply defined to equal the baseline level of consumption, which can be adjusted 
arbitrarily by shocking the uniform adjustment coefficient for government consumption, 
ugovadj, or the commodity-specific adjustment coefficient, govadj(c) . Treating the 
baseline level of consumption as a parameter, the percentage change in government 
consumption is defined solely by the percentage change in the adjustment coefficient (see 
equations 64 to 67 in Appendix Table 10). 
3.3.8 PRICE LINKAGES 
Nine equations define the price linkages in this model. The activity market price, pam(a), 
is linked to the producer price, pap(a) through the power of the production tax, to(a). The 
second price linkage equation defines the relationship between the supply and market 
price of domestic goods sold in the domestic market, pds(c) and pdm(c), respectively. 
The prices are linked to each other through the domestic transaction cost, pt. The third 
equation specifies the linkage between the supply price and demand price of composite 
commodities, pqs(c) and pq(c), respectively, which are linked to each other through the 
power of the sales tax, ts(c).  
The remaining six price linkage equations (see Appendix Table 10, equations 71 to 76) 
specify the relationship that exists between world, border, and domestic prices for both 
exports and imports. For the case of exports, the domestic (producer) price of exports of 
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good c to region r, pepd(c,r), is linked to the border price of exports, pebd(c,r), through 
the transaction cost of exports, pt. Moreover, these commodity and destination-specific 
border prices are linked to region-specific world prices, pewd(c,r), through the power of 
bilateral export tax on commodity c, ted(c,r). The world price pewd(c,r) is expressed in 
domestic currency, and transformed into a foreign-currency equivalent, pewf(c,r), 
through the exchange rate.  
The same specification applies to imports. The source-specific world price of imports of 
good c in foreign currency, pmwf(c,r), is transformed into its domestic-currency 
equivalent, pmws(c,r), which is in turn linked to the source-specific border price of 
imports of good c, pmbs(c,r), through the power of the bilateral import tax on good c, 
tms(c,r). This border price along with the unit transaction cost of moving imports from 
the border to the market, pt, determine the market price of imports of good c from region 
r, pmms(c,r).  
Given the trading position of Honduras in the world markets for most commodities, it 
seems reasonable to adopt a small-country assumption with respect to both imports and 
exports. This implies that Honduras takes the world price of exports, pewf(c,r), and 
imports, pmwf(c,r), as given, and adjusts its production and consumption patterns 
accordingly. In other words, world prices are exogenous variables not altered by changes 
in the Honduran economy. These world prices can be shocked and their impact on the 
Honduran economy assessed using this model.  
3.3.9 ENDOGENOUS TAX RATES 
In some instances, it might be of interest to change the government closure (discussed 
below), making government savings exogenous and letting government revenue to adjust 
to changes in government expenditures and savings in order to clear the government 
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budget. The traditional way in which governments adjust their revenues is through either 
an expansion of the base on which some particular taxes apply, or through an increase in 
the applied level of particular taxes.  
This model includes three options when it comes to adjusting tax receipts to balance the 
public budget, namely, (1) a uniform increase in the sales tax; (2) a uniform increase in 
the income tax; and (3) a uniform increase in both the income and sales taxes. These 
alternative adjustment mechanisms can be activated one at a time by swapping any of the 
variables tsadj, tincadj, tsincadj for government savings, respectively.    
3.3.10 SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS 
3.3.10.1 Microeconomic Closures 
Microeconomic closures include (1) market clearing conditions for factors of production, 
activity-specific goods, and composite commodities, and (2) zero pure-profits conditions 
for activities, wholesalers, and producers of composite commodities. 
3.3.10.1.1 Clearing in Factor Markets 
Equality of demand and supply must prevail at equilibrium. For mobile factors without 
sector-specific supply of factors, this is enforced by equating total factor supply qfs(f) 
with the sum of sector-specific demands qf(f,a) (see equation 79 in Appendix Table 10). 
For sluggish factors, the market clearing condition is factor and activity-specific in order 
for it to account for their limited mobility (see equation 80 in Appendix Table 10).    
3.3.10.1.2 Clearing in Activity-Specific Commodity Markets 
The commodity produced by any given activity can be either traded, qtoa(c,a), or kept for 
self-consumption by households, qntah(h,c,a). The equality between the supply of 
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commodity c by activity a, qac(c,a), and the demand for activity-specific commodity c is 
maintained through a market clearing condition (Appendix Table 10, equation 81).  
3.3.10.1.3 Clearing in Composite Commodity Markets 
Composite commodities are produced from domestic goods and imports; they are 
consumed as final products by households, the government, and the rest of the world, and 
as intermediate inputs by the domestic production sectors, including the production of 
capital goods and transportation services. Equation 82 in Appendix Table 10 ensures that 
the total demand and total supply of composite commodity c are equal at equilibrium. 
3.3.10.1.4 Zero Profits in Primary Production, Wholesale Activities, and Composite 
Commodity Production 
Zero profit conditions are used to guarantee that no extra profits exist in any production 
activity; by forcing equality between costs and revenues, these conditions ensure that 
factors receive their normal rates of return (see equations 83 to 85 in Appendix Table 10). 
Zero profit conditions are reasonable assumptions for long-run assessments, since it is 
assumed that the limitations to adjust production techniques and resource allocation are 
less stringent in the long run, which would allow for factors of production to move across 
sectors in the pursuit of higher returns. This mobilization of resources would result in the 
elimination of extra profits in any particular sector. In the short run, however, the zero 
profit assumption might be misleading, particularly in developing economies where the 
barriers to entry and exist production are likely to be significant. 
3.3.10.2 Macroeconomic Closures 
3.3.10.2.1 Current Account Balance 
As previously stated, the specification in this model assumes that the economy spends 
foreign currency in (1) purchasing imports to satisfy final and intermediate consumption, 
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(2) paying foreigners for the use of their factors of production, and (3) transferring public 
and private funds for payments of different kind, such as interest on debt or remittances. 
On the other hand, the domestic economy receives foreign currency from (a) exports of 
goods and services, (b) return to domestic factors of production used overseas, and (c) 
transfers to public and private institutions from the rest of the world. Foreign savings, or 
the current account deficit, represented by fsav(r), is the difference between foreign 
currency spending and receipts. Equation 86 in Appendix Table 10 guarantees the 
equality in the current account.   
In the standard closure of the model, fsav(r) is exogenous, and the real exchange rate, xr, 
serves the role of equilibrating variable to the current-account balance. As Lofgren et al 
(2002) point out,  
“The fact that all items except imports and exports are fixed means that, in effect, 
the trade deficit is also fixed (p. 36).”  
3.3.10.2.2 Government Account Balance 
Equation 87 in Appendix Table 10 is introduced to ensure that the government budget 
always remains balanced. In the standard closure of the model, government savings, gsav, 
is the flexible variable that ensures the balance in the public budget; that is, that 
government revenue is fully exhausted into expenditures and savings. This specification 
seems to describe well the behavior of the Honduran government in this regard. Although 
it has run a deficit every year over the last several years on the order of 4.5 percent of its 
GDP for the period 1994-05 and 1.8 percent in 2006-07, the government clearly pursues a 
balanced budget as one of its main macroeconomic objectives (Secretaria de Finanzas de 
Honduras 2007, World Bank 2007a).     
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3.3.10.2.3 Savings-Investment Balance 
In this model, savings are allowed by domestic non-government institutions (both 
households and enterprises), the government, and other regions. Hence, total savings in 
the economy, totsav, are estimated as the sum of these institutional savings. In the 
standard model, total investment, totinv, is defined as the value of the output of the 
capital good sector. The capital good sector is treated as any other production sector with 
the only exception that this sector does not demand factors of production. For simplicity, 
a new variable qcgds is created, and is set equal to the output of the capital good sector. 
Similarly, a new variable pcgds is introduced and set equal to the unit price received by 
the capital good activity.  
Given that total savings and total investment are determined simultaneously and 
separately in any given run of the model, a market-clearing equation is needed to ensure 
that these two values are equal in equilibrium.   
Walras’ law enables us to check the economic consistency of the model. If the model 
satisfies Walras’ law, then one equation is functionally dependent on the other and can be 
dropped. However, dropping one equation implies losing the possibility of easy 
consistency checking, one of the advantages of Walras’s law-consistent models. 
Alternatively, instead of dropping an equation, a new variable can be added and set equal 
to the difference between the two sides of a macroeconomic balance equation. If the 
model is consistent with Walras’ law, then its resulting value must be zero, thus offering 
a simple checking procedure. On the downside, this approach might lead to substantial 
loss of accuracy (so-called subtractive cancellation) when used in linearized models 
(Hertel, Horridge and Pearson 1991). Yet another approach, and the one chosen for this 
model, is to add a new variable, call it walraslack, and to add a new equation that would 
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estimate walraslack as the difference between total savings and total investment. If all 
equilibrium conditions are met, then the variable walraslack must equal zero at 
equilibrium. This approach reduces the potentially negative impact of subtractive 
cancellation and still provides a simple checking procedure. Consequently, and to make 
the link with Walras’s law more evident, the variables totsav and totinv are renamed 
walras1 and walras2, respectively (see equations 90 through 92 in Appendix Table 10). 
3.3.11 DYNAMIC EXTENSION OF THE MODEL 
While the static model would allow us to assess the gains from trade due to increased 
efficiency of resource allocation, improved consumption possibilities, or increasing 
returns to scale in the case of imperfect competition, it would remain silent with regard to 
second-round gains steaming from capital accumulation effects (Thurlow 2004, Francois, 
McDonald and Nordstrom 1997). In order to account for the accumulation effects as well 
as other changes happening over time, the model is extended into a recursive dynamic 
model. 
Capital stock at the end of the period (for instance, a year) is assumed to be a function of 
capital stock at the beginning of the period, and the investment and depreciation value 
during the period under consideration. Forward-looking expectations play no role in the 
saving-investment behavior of economic agents. New capital stock is allocated among 
production sectors according to sector-specific returns to capital.    
3.3.12  OTHER FEATURES OF THE CGE MODEL 
A useful feature of the model is that it provides information on household welfare 
changes as a result of the experiment. The model includes a module that estimates the 
equivalent variation (EV) based on the conditions prevailing at the baseline and the end 
 103 
 
 
of the simulation. The equations included in this module do not affect the results of a 
simulation; they are introduced just to simplify the analysis of the results. 
The model also includes formulas that simplify the analysis of the results. Among the 
macroeconomic variables generated as part of the output are the gross domestic product, 
total volumes and values of trade, aggregate demand (absorption), and trade openness. 
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4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF DR-CAFTA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
DR-CAFTA was signed in 2004 and ratified by the Honduran Congress in 2006 (Law 
2016-2006). This agreement represents another step towards economic integration, a 
process embraced by Honduras since the early 1990s and that has resulted in significant 
reduction of protection and increase in trade. 
Trade liberalization impacts the welfare of households in different ways. Winters (2000) 
highlights 6 ways in which this relationship occurs, namely through changes in (1) the 
price and availability of goods; (2) factor prices, income, and employment; (3) 
government taxes and transfers influenced by changes in revenue from trade policy; (4) 
the incentives for investment and innovation, which affect long-run economic growth; (5) 
external shocks, in particular, changes in terms of trade; and (6) short-run risks and 
adjustment costs (Winters 2000).  
DR-CAFTA is seen by many as a great opportunity for economic growth, as Honduran 
products would have preferential access to the largest market in the world. Many 
Honduran products already enjoyed preferential access through the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative and other later concessions made unilaterally and on an annual basis by the U.S. 
However, the fate of these concessions was conditional on the signing of DR-CAFTA, 
which came to institutionalize these concessions (making them permanent), and 
expanding them to many other products and services. 
However, researchers are quick to point out that several domestic reforms are needed for 
Central American countries to reap the benefits of the agreement. The workings of the 
markets must be improved in many nations to allow for a more transparent transmission 
of the incentives generated by DR-CAFTA; factor markets must also be improved or in 
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many cases even created (e.g., land markets in Honduras); productive infrastructure must 
also be enhanced so as to lower transaction costs and achieve a better integration of 
domestic markets; the regulatory system in areas such as private property rights and 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures must be strengthened so as to encourage domestic 
and foreign investment and have access to the U.S. market. Without these adjustments, 
Central American nations might see the potential benefits of DR-CAFTA vanish (World 
Bank 2005, Serna 2007). 
4.2 PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS OF DR-CAFTA 
Numerous studies have been conducted with the goal of assessing the impact of DR-
CAFTA on different aspects of the economies involved. These previous analyses serve as 
a framework to which the results obtained in this study can be compared. 
The World Bank (2005) conducted an exhaustive assessment of the potential impact of 
DR-CAFTA on the Central American economies. It reviewed numerous approaches used 
to assess this particular agreement, such as general and partial equilibrium models, 
highlighting that results are conditional on the economy’s capacity to change its 
productive capacity. The study also reviews ex-post econometric assessments of the 
dynamic growth effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs) already implemented 
worldwide.  
The results from partial equilibrium models suggest that gains for Central American 
economies will be concentrated primarily in the textile and apparel industry. The static 
general equilibrium model used for assessing the impact of this agreement on the 
Nicaraguan economy suggests a modest but positive impact on income per-capita but 
with only a very small positive effect on poverty. Previous econometric assessments of 
the dynamic effects of trade liberalization point primarily to the positive link between 
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trade and investment, and the negligible relationship between trade and corruption. The 
evidence from the studies surveyed finds no clear relationship between trade and 
technological innovation. Finally, previous studies analyzed in this study by the World 
Bank stress two more interesting findings: (1) the positive relationship between the 
growth rate of GDP per-capita and the participation of a country in RTAs; and (2) the 
lack of a strong relationship between economic growth and the type of partner in the 
RTA. 
The study by the World Bank also acknowledges the particular importance of sensitive 
agricultural products, and presents evidence on the potential impact of trade liberalization 
on sensitive agricultural products using a net-producer net-consumer model (Deaton 
1997, McCulloch 2002), in which the change in the economic welfare of households is 
assessed in response to external changes in prices. The model assumes that households do 
not adjust their production and consumption patterns; this is the reason why results from 
these models have been understood as the worst case scenario. The external changes in 
prices are estimated from baseline prices and effective import tariffs 42
                                                 
42 For sensitive products in Honduras, the effective tariff is estimated as a weighted average from import 
quantities and tariffs applied to different sources and under different import arrangements. Particularly for 
rice, yellow corn, white corn, and beans, the effective import tariffs are estimated at 1.4%, 1%, 1%, and 
7.5%, respectively. 
, under the 
assumption of perfect price transmission. The findings for Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador suggest that the vast majority of households will benefit from the liberalization 
of trade in sensitive products. However, and while DR-CAFTA grants considerable grace 
periods and extended phase-out schedules for the elimination of tariffs and expansion of 
quotas, it highlights the need for adjustment programs for households that are net-
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producers of sensitive crops and that stand to lose significantly from the agreement. 
Furthermore, the review by the World Bank presents evidence of programs adopted by 
other nations in Latin America and their impact. Finally, the study acknowledges the 
economic constraints that most government in Central America have, and the potential 
reduction in tax revenue resulting from the agreement. Governments must increase 
revenue (strengthening the tax revenue agencies and removing tax exonerations), make a 
more efficient use of the available fiscal resources, and promote a proper environment for 
private investment to prosper.    
The World Bank alerts readers about the limitations of each of these approaches, some 
more severe than others, and the caution needed for the interpretation of the results; in 
this regard, the study concludes that ex-ante analyses of RTAs remains more an art than a 
science.       
The Technical Support Unit (UNAT for its initials in Spanish), in charge of assisting the 
President on economic issues, conducted a study in 2005 with the goal of assessing the 
impact of DR-CAFTA on Honduran households. This study uses a net-producer net-
consumer model based on data from the 2004 Standard of Living Survey (ENCOVI for 
its initials in Spanish). The study forecasts only a marginal increase in the aggregate 
welfare of the households as a result of DR-CAFTA, equivalent to 0.7 percent of per-
capita consumption (1.1 percent and 0.3 percent for the representative urban and rural 
households, respectively). Furthermore, the results indicate that 88.8 percent of 
households will have a net gain out of DR-CAFTA, equivalent to roughly 1.5 percent of 
consumption, and only 7.7 percent are expected to experience a loss, equivalent on 
average to 4.5 percent of consumption. Disaggregating these results by geographic 
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location, the results suggest that most winners will be urban households (96 percent of 
urban households are expected to benefit), and most losers be rural households (14 
percent of rural households are expected to lose). When arranged by income level, the 
results suggest that income will increase in all quintiles, with relative income gains being 
higher for the third and fourth quintiles (Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico 2005).  
The UNAT acknowledges the importance of other factors that would affect the results 
obtained from DR-CAFTA and that were not accounted for in their study, such as less-
than-perfect price transmission and the imperfect competition in some markets. The study 
shows evidence from the 1966-91 period that price transmission in Honduras is far from 
perfect (it takes 5 to 7 years for half the change in international prices get transmitted 
domestically). Significant progress towards economic integration has been made over the 
last several years to suggest that price transmission may have improved, but still perfect 
price transmission seems an implausible reality. The study also shows evidence of the 
poor price competitiveness of Honduras in the production of sensitive products.  
Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro (2008) analyze the impact of DR-CAFTA on 
employment, production, and poverty in Honduras. They employ a dynamic CGE 
model 43
                                                 
43 For a description of the dynamic CGE model, see Thurlow (2004).  
 calibrated to the 1997 social accounting matrix of Honduras developed by 
Cuesta (2004). The authors analyze five different scenarios according to alternative 
definitions of exogenous shocks to import tariffs, import quotas, and the behavior of 
foreign direct investment. The assessment of DR-CAFTA on poverty is based on 
household survey information following a simulation method proposed by Vos, Taylor, 
and Paes de Barros (2002).   
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The findings of this study suggest modest increases in economic growth from the 
reduction of import tariffs and quotas according to the terms negotiated in DR-CAFTA, 
from a 3.06 percent average base growth to 3.16 percent. According to the authors,  
“Past trade liberalization in Honduras reduced average tariffs to a level where the 
further reductions resulting from the CAFTA agreement simply are not large 
enough on average to have much of an impact... This does not necessarily mean 
that the effect on particular sectors is not large.” (p. 17).    
 
DR-CAFTA makes permanent the rules of origin for the textile and apparel industry 
introduced by the Caribbean Trade Promotion Act of 2000, which would have otherwise 
expired in 2008. Maintaining these rules of origin for the textile and apparel sector is 
shown to have a large and positive impact on economic growth. The same can be said 
about the behavior of foreign direct investment when it is shocked exogenously according 
to its trend over the last few years. 
Specifically for agriculture, the findings of the study by Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro 
indicate that while production and trade of traditional export products such as coffee and 
bananas will expand, the impact will be negligible for subsistence agriculture (that is, 
corn, rice, beans, and other commodities produced by the poor), and since it comprises 
over 80 percent of total agricultural production in Honduras, agriculture as a whole is 
insensitive to DR-CAFTA. Yet the authors acknowledge that, from a policy perspective, 
it is crucial that the long transition time to free trade negotiated for some commodities be 
used wisely to increase productivity, switch to more profitable crops, and take advantage 
of the new export opportunities opened up by DR-CAFTA.  
Taylor et al (2006) analyze the impact that DR-CAFTA may have on the welfare of rural 
households. For this they employ a microeconomic, rural general equilibrium model, in 
which rural households represent the economic units linked to each other through the 
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market for goods and factors of production. Each rural household has its own production 
technology, source of income, and allocation of expenditures. The ability to specify each 
household separately is the main strength of this type of model. Small, subsistence 
households that produce almost entirely for self-consumption are decoupled from the 
relevant commodity markets, while commercial farms are linked to the relevant markets 
and therefore experience the changes in market prices directly through their impact on 
income and expenditures. Other wage households perceive the price change indirectly 
through income, since most of them are employed by commercial farms, and directly 
through their expenditure level. The social accounting matrices for each of the six 
representative rural households defined in this study 44
1. DR-CAFTA would likely have an unequal impact across rural households: a 
reduction in commodity prices is expected to have different impacts on the 
production decisions of households depending on their integration to the market. 
The impact on household income also depends on the relevance of the different 
sources of on-farm and off-farm income. For instance, a decrease in the market 
price of basic grains will not have a direct impact on the income of non-
 are built based primarily on 
information from a survey conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI-WUR-PRONADERS) in 2001-02 that focus of hillside production. 
The authors run a series of scenarios to assess (1) the short, medium, and long-term 
impact of DR-CAFTA, and (2) the impact of alternative compensatory policies. Their 
main findings are: 
                                                 
44 Rural households are disaggregated into the following groups: (1) producers without land; (2) non-
commercial producers; (3) small-size commercial producers; (4) medium-size commercial producers; (5) 
large-size commercial producers; and (6) wage households.  
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commercial, subsistence households, since they do not participate actively in the 
market. However, their income will be negatively impacted through the labor 
market, since the derived demand for labor by commercial households will 
decrease along with commercial production of basic grains. The reduction in the 
opportunity cost of family labor encourages subsistence households to expand the 
production of basic grains. All households experience decreases in income in the 
long-run scenario. Household expenditures are also impacted differently 
depending on their consumption patterns. Overall, rural wage households, 
comprised primarily of rural workers, stand to lose the most from DR-CAFTA in 
the long-run, given that their reduction in income is so large that cannot be 
sufficiently compensated by the decrease in food prices. The results from the 
short and medium-run scenarios also stress the unequal impact of trade reform on 
the welfare of the different rural households. In conclusion, any compensatory 
policy that ignores these differences among rural households leading to different 
impacts will fail to achieve its goals efficiently.    
2.  Technological innovation and reallocation of resources are viable options to 
increase the demand for labor and the income of rural households: faced with 
decreasing market prices for traditional agricultural products, including basic 
grains, encouraging and facilitating the reallocation of resources toward non-
traditional agricultural production is a promising option. This shift of resources 
requires investment in infrastructure (roads, electricity, processing facilities, 
laboratories, etc.) and human capital, as well as access to capital to finance private 
investment in agriculture. The results from this study suggest that technological 
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innovation could easily offset the negative impact of DR-CAFTA on income and 
production. 
3. Migration is an important strategy in the face of decreasing opportunities in rural 
areas: migration to urban areas within Honduras or to other countries benefits 
rural households, providing sources of income not available in rural areas. 
Temporary migration programs could also help stabilize the income of rural 
households. Remittances to rural households are in many cases the only source of 
income and investment.  
4. DR-CAFTA will have marginal effects in the short-run and could have a positive 
impact on consumption: the gradual liberalization of trade negotiated for many 
sensitive products lessens the negative income and production effects that the 
agreement might have on basic grain producers and workers; but different 
liberalization schedules will have different impacts. For instance, liberalization of 
trade for beans in the short-run without changes in the protection granted to corn 
exacerbates the negative impact on production and income of those households 
highly dependent on beans as a source of income. In the long run, when trade of 
sensitive products is fully liberalized, the negative impact of lower market prices 
will be offset through the reallocation of resources into the production of other 
crops or even other non-agricultural activities. Welfare increases for most rural 
households across the different scenarios analyzed; however, the findings point to 
the vulnerability of rural wage households, whose welfare in the long run is 
estimated to decrease significantly as a result of the new market conditions 
imposed by the agreement. 
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The authors highlight that importance of designing appropriate adjustment programs to 
ameliorate the negative effects of DR-CAFTA on income and production. To that end, 
they identify the main areas in which these programs should focus, namely (1) promoting 
the association among small farmers and the integration among agents in the supply 
chains; (2) promoting technological change and rural investment; (3) facilitating access to 
export markets; and finally (4) developing capital markets to finance agricultural 
production and rural investment.   
The findings from the studies cited above, some of which apply specifically to Honduras, 
show different but, overall, small effects of trade policy liberalization as envisioned in 
DR-CAFTA on the economy, although highlight the vulnerability of certain sectors such 
as basic grains that might suffer significant losses from trade liberalization. The results 
obtained using a micro-CGE model actually disentangle the effect of the agreement on 
different households producing sensitive agricultural products, and find evidence of 
significant impacts particularly for rural wage households.   
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
As stated in the previous chapter, a CGE model is employed in this study for the 
assessment of DR-CAFTA. Two options are available when it comes to adjusting the 
model to the situation at hand; these options are (1) to modify a pre-existing model, 
overwriting existing behavioral equations, or to write a new model with the desired 
theoretical specifications, and (2) modifying the closures (namely, the split of 
endogenous and exogenous variables) so as to ensure the balance of all accounts while 
adopting a desirable specification of the markets. The second approach is the easiest, and 
should be employed to the extent possible since it is more efficient and less troublesome 
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than modifying or writing an entirely new model. However, in some instances 
overwriting the model is the only option available for obtaining the desired specification.  
The standard model described in the previous chapter is modified to better reflect the 
marketing arrangements in basic grains, more precisely, corn and rice, as follows:  
• The derived demand of those production activities participating in the basic 
grain’s purchase agreements is modified to account for the effects of such 
agreements. More specifically, it is assumed that the industries committed to 
purchase a negotiated volume of domestic corn and rice at a negotiated price still 
determine the demand for the corn and rice composites based on their objective of 
maximizing profits according to a Leontief production function. Once the derived 
demand for the corn and rice composites are determined, then producers decide 
on how much of these inputs to obtain from the market and how much to pay for 
them as a residual. Finally, the volume of corn and rice purchased from the 
market must be sourced from either the domestic production or imports based on 
changes in their relative prices according to a CES functional form. This 
specification will allow us to simulate the impact of removing these purchase 
agreements once DR-CAFTA is fully implemented, an aspect ignored by all 
previous studies reviewed. 
The following closures are specified based on the belief that they appropriately reflect the 
conditions of the Honduran economy:  
1. It is common for CGE applications for developing countries to assume a perfectly 
elastic supply of labor in order to account for unemployment; this approach is 
commonly implemented for categories of unskilled labor. However, care must be 
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taken in dynamic simulations to avoid an expansion of the stock of labor that goes 
beyond what is feasible in the real world. Preliminary runs for Honduras under the 
assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of unskilled urban workers (the largest 
category of labor included in the model) led to annual increases in the demand for 
this category of labor that are not sustainable in the long run. Consequently, I 
choose instead to specify the supply for urban unskilled workers as a slightly but 
upward-sloping supply function, reflecting the fact that new labor units might be 
available at little extra cost. The same closure is chosen for all other categories of 
labor, namely, urban skilled, and rural unskilled and skilled labor, although 
steeper supply functions are assumed for both categories of rural labor to reflect 
the fact that rural labor is in short supply in most rural areas in Honduras, as 
reflected by the low rural unemployment rate reported in the literature (Economic 
Commission for Latin American and The Caribbean n.d.).  
2. The factor supply curves are shifted to the right at an annual rate equal to the 
growth in the economically active population for urban labor, and equal to the 
rural population growth for rural labor. I acknowledge the weaknesses of the 
specification above, primarily when it comes to assuming (1) that the pool of 
skilled and unskilled urban labor will grow at the same rate over the span of the 
simulation, this rate being the growth in the economically active urban 
population; and (2) that the pool of skilled and unskilled rural labor will grow also 
at the same rate, in this case equal to the rural population growth. The approach 
followed in this study also ignores the impact of international immigration flows, 
and assumes that the inflow of Hondurans from overseas (primarily deportees) 
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offsets the outflow of Hondurans. This assumption is likely to mislead, actually 
underestimate, the estimation of future trends in labor stocks, primarily unskilled 
labor, given the high number of Hondurans deported primarily from the U.S. 45
3. Coincident with the official goal of maintaining a balanced public budget 
(Secretaria de Finanzas de Honduras 2007), it is assumed here that the 
government actually achieves that goal every year for which simulations are run. 
Government savings is assumed to be the free variable that clears the public 
budget. 
 A 
good assessment of the growth in the different labor categories must at least 
consider past and future trends in education attainment, urban-rural migration, and 
international migration in order to generate more reliable estimates of labor stock 
changes. However, I consider that the alternative of ignoring any increase in labor 
supply seems less appropriate.   
4. Honduras maintains a flexible exchange rate; in the standard model, this is the 
free variable that clears the balance of payments. Foreign savings are specified as 
exogenous.   
The new 2004 Social Accounting Matrix for Honduras built for this study and presented 
in the previous chapter provides all the data needed to calibrate the model to the baseline. 
As commonly done in CGE modeling, behavioral parameters are gathered from 
exogenous sources. The following elasticity estimates are obtained from the Global Trade 
                                                 
45 The number of Honduran deported from the U.S. increased significantly from around 10,000 in 2002 to 
more than 50,000 in 2005 (United Nations Development Program 2006). As of September, the number of 
deportees arriving into Honduras amounts to 44,000 in 2008 (El Heraldo 2008). 
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Analysis Project (GTAP) model 46 (Dimaranan, McDougall and Hertel 2006): (1) the 
elasticity of substitution among factors of production, among intermediate inputs, 
between domestic/imported products, and among different sources of imports; (2) the 
target uncompensated own-price elasticity of demand; and (3) the target income elasticity 
of demand 47
Accounting for the dynamic impact of investment implies to have estimates on the initial 
stock of capital, depreciation rates, and annual gross capital formation. The estimation of 
the initial capital stock for this study is based on the GDP in the initial period using the 
. Factor supply elasticities (for those factors of production with an upward-
slopping supply function) are taken from Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro (2008). 
According to the literature review conducted for this study, there are no estimates for 
Honduras on the elasticity of transformation for sluggish factors as well as for allocation 
of commodity output among alternative uses. Given that an estimation of these 
parameters are well beyond the scope of this study, the approach taken here is to use 
estimates employed in previous studies or in well-known model frameworks. 
Consequently, the elasticity of transformation for the capital factor (considered sluggish 
in this model) is set at the same level employed in GTAP for the land factor. The 
elasticity of output transformation employed is the same as that used by Morley, 
Nakasone, and Piñeiro (2008).  
                                                 
46 Since Honduras is not treated as a single region but rather as part of the Central American region, the 
assumption here is that the parameters estimated for the latter apply to the former. Correspondences 
between the list of commodities used in GTAP and that used in the Honduras SAM were also needed. 
47 GTAP assumes the presence of a single representative household in each region, and consequently 
regional demand elasticities are estimated at that level. Since the model employed in this study accounts for 
5 different households, and given that no other exogenous estimates of own-price and income elasticities 
exist for each of these households in Honduras, I am forced to use GTAP’s representative-household 
elasticity estimates for each of the households specified in this model.  
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formula estimated by Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro (2008) 48
1. Counterfactual scenario: exogenous variables not related to the agreement, e.g., 
population growth rate and world prices, are shocked to their forecasted levels to 
estimate what the future of the economy might look like without changes in 
economic policy resulting from DR-CAFTA. This becomes the benchmark or 
counterfactual scenario to which the impact of the agreement must be compared. 
It is important to keep in mind that benefits granted unilaterally by the U.S. 
through the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) were to expire on 
September 30
. Likewise, this study 
assumes the same depreciation rate as that used by these authors (8 percent annually). 
Assessing the dynamic impact of DR-CAFTA on the Honduran economy entails running 
two sets of simulations: 
th
                                                 
48 Initial capital stock = 2.26 * GDP 
 2008, but the signing of DR-CAFTA made these concessions 
permanent and actually expanded the concessions to include other goods and 
services. Consequently, the counterfactual scenario must account for the 
elimination of the concessions granted to Honduras under CBTPA. Problems arise 
when specifying the elimination of CBTPA benefits. First, assuming that the U.S. 
would have removed CBTPA import tariff benefits to Honduran products but still 
applied a favorable treatment similar to that extended to other developing nations 
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), then no significant changes 
in import tariffs would have occurred since most of the products heavily exported 
by Honduras into the U.S. enjoy a zero import tariff under GSP in 2008. Import 
tariff changes had been negligible even if the Most Favored Nation (MFN) import 
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tariff would have been applied (MFN tariffs are the higher import tariffs the U.S. 
could have applied on Honduran products according to the regulations of the 
World Trade Organization). Analysts argue that the most important benefits of 
CBTPA accrued to the textile and apparel industry through more favorable rules 
of origin (ROO) than those granted by the U.S. previously, which significantly 
increased the competitiveness of the Central American textile and apparel 
industry in the U.S. market vis-a-vis the Mexican and Asian industries, and the 
economic activity of related economic sectors (Morley, Nakasone and Piñeiro 
2008, World Bank 2005). Given the important benefits brought about by the 
changes in ROO introduced by CBTPA, it seems crucial to assess the likely effect 
of ROO removal as part of the counterfactual. Unfortunately, assessing the impact 
of the changes in ROO that would have occurred in the event DR-CAFTA had not 
been ratified is complicated in many ways. First, it requires a significant level of 
data disaggregation that is not yet available in Honduras; more precisely, (1) it 
implies having at least one specific activity account and product account for 
textiles and apparels activities and products, and preferably more to account for 
the differences in intermediate demand across different textile and apparel 
products; the latest information released by the Central Bank of Honduras and 
employed in the construction of the SAM for this study has the textile and apparel 
industry aggregated with several other manufactures; and (2) it demands having 
separate accounts for domestic and region-specific imports, which in turn implies 
having data on intermediate demand by industry disaggregated at that level, 
information not yet available in Honduras. Second and less worrisome is the 
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modification of the modeling framework to account for ROO specifically through 
their impact on the allocation of intermediate demand.  
The limitations cited above, primarily those related to data availability, prohibit 
the assessment of ROO and undoubtedly become a significant limitation of this 
study. These limitations are unfortunately present even for countries with well-
developed statistical services, and may explain why they have been somewhat 
overlooked in the empirical literature and, more specifically, in computable 
general equilibrium modeling analyses (Georges 2007).  
Remittances have become an important source of income and economic growth in 
Honduras over the last several years. In 2006, remittances accounted for 25 
percent of the GDP. However, the erratic nature of remittances makes forecasting 
difficult. Consequently, I opt for shocking this variable up to the year 2007 and 
based on information published by the Central Bank of Honduras. Thereafter, no 
shocks are performed to remittances, which mean that remittances are assumed to 
remain unchanged from the 2007 level.              
2. DR-CAFTA scenario: both the exogenous variables shocked in the counterfactual 
scenario and the policy variables related to DR-CAFTA are shocked to assess the 
future of the economy given the forecasted trends in exogenous variables plus the 
negotiated schedules of liberalization implied by the agreement. Policy variables 
related to DR-CAFTA are basically bilateral (applying to trade with the U.S.) 
import and export taxes, which are expected to change according to the negotiated 
schedules. Annual changes in market access were negotiated for each product at 
the 8-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS). Consequently, annual changes 
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in market access for each of the products included in the SAM 49
There is no controversy about the importance of having good benchmark forecasts. 
Results of “what-if” assessments depend significantly on the future performance of the 
economy and, consequently, on the benchmark forecasts (Dixon and Rimmer 1998). 
However, obtaining good forecasts with CGE models is challenging; it implies gathering 
numerous exogenous data from experts in several economic fields, and specifying the 
model and closures in such a way as to better reflect the behavior of all agents involved. 
This is the main reason why good CGE forecasts are rare. Most researchers working with 
dynamic CGE models recommend that results be interpreted not in absolute but rather in 
relative terms to the benchmark. Despite this, it is important to keep in mind that even 
these relative impacts are affected by the poor calibration of the benchmark forecasts.  
In this study, significant effort is made to obtain reliable forecasts to be used as shocks of 
relevant exogenous variables, but I acknowledge the limitations of using this model as a 
forecasting tool. This implies that readers must be aware that the results presented here 
might suffer from the errors introduced by not having good benchmark forecasts, and 
consequently readers should be cautious about the conclusions.  
 are estimated as 
a trade-weighted average of the 8-digit HS products according to the 
correspondence between the HS and the Nomenclature of Products of Honduras 
(NPH for its initials in Spanish). The matrix of shocks actually defining the DR-
CAFTA scenario is presented in Appendix Table 12.  
                                                 
49 These are basically the products listed in the NPH, with the only exception that seven of these products, 
all of them manufactures, are grouped into a single commodity.  
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CGE modeling has been criticized on several grounds, but arguably the most relevant is 
its lack of econometric foundations. The value of key parameters such as the elasticities 
cited above are taken as point estimates, ignoring the probability function associated with 
them. Furthermore, there is commonly no relationship between the theory employed in 
the econometric estimation and that used in CGE models. The most desirable approach to 
improve the confidence on CGE modeling is to engage in more and better parameter 
estimations. In the meantime, one approach to improve the confidence on CGE results is 
performing systematic sensitivity analysis of the results, that is, to check how robust the 
results are to changes in key parameters (Hertel, et al. 2003).  
Following this suggestion, I perform a sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to 
the elasticity of substitution between domestic products and imports, most commonly 
known as the Armington elasticities. The main reason for choosing only this parameter 
for the sensitivity analysis is that, since we are interested in assessing the impact of a 
trade agreement particularly through its impact on the relative price of imports and 
domestic products, the results will be highly sensitive to its value.  
Performing sensitivity analysis demands significant time and computing resources, more 
so when it is performed for many parameters and scenarios. For instance, conducting a 
sensitivity analysis on the Armington elasticity for all commodities included in this study 
and just one year of only one scenario entails running the model at least 78 times 50
                                                 
50 GEMPACK contains two approaches to run systematic sensitivity analyses, (1) Liu’s quadrature, which 
runs the model two times for each parameter; and (2) Stroud’s quadrature, which runs the model 4 times for 
each parameter. 
. For 
both scenarios (20 years x 2 scenarios) and the 39 Armington elasticities, it demands at 
least 3,120 runs. To reduce the number of runs and still be able to make some inferences 
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about the confidence in the results, I selected (1) ten commodities based on their value of 
imports and import taxes applied on their flows during 2006 51
4.4 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
, and (2) some particular 
years, namely the first, fifth, tenth, fifteenth, and twentieth year of the implementation of 
DR-CAFTA. This reduces the number of runs significantly and still helps us make 
inferences on whether or not the agreement generates significant results compared to the 
counterfactual.       
CGE models usually involve a large number of variables describing the workings of the 
entire economy; consequently, care must be taken to manage the usually voluminous 
outcome in such a way as to highlight the main findings concisely. The approach 
followed here is: (1) to analyze the impact of the agreement at the macroeconomic level; 
(2) to assess the impact at the sectoral level, emphasizing the basic grain sector and 
related factor and input markets; and (3) analyze the impact of the agreement on 
households’ welfare, with special emphasis on those depending primarily on basic grains 
as a source of income. In the discussion that follows, the terms counterfactual, 
benchmark, and baseline scenarios are all used interchangeably.  
4.4.1 MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF DR-CAFTA  
The findings of this study suggest a negligible, and actually negative, impact of DR-
CAFTA on the growth of the Honduran economy in the long run. Results for both 
scenarios suggest that the Honduran economy will grow at a slow pace in the next twenty 
                                                 
51 The ten selected commodities are: (1) machinery; (2) other goods; (3) textiles and apparels;(4) chemicals; 
(5) petroleum products; (6) food products; (7) beverages; (8) processed meats; (9) dairy products; and (10) 
other fruits and nuts.  
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years, but that DR-CAFTA could actually slow down economic growth in the medium 
and long term relative to the counterfactual.  
Table 4.1. Rate of growth of selected macroeconomic variables under the two scenarios  
 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH 
 2007-11 2012-16 2017-21 2022-26 TOTAL 
COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIO      
Gross domestic product 4.89% 4.37% 3.84% 3.40% 4.12% 
Total value of exports 6.11% 5.58% 4.70% 4.04% 5.10% 
Total value of imports 5.06% 4.43% 3.88% 3.43% 4.20% 
Total value of trade 5.47% 4.89% 4.22% 3.69% 4.57% 
Total quantity of exports 5.44% 4.87% 4.19% 3.65% 4.54% 
Total quantity of imports 4.54% 3.83% 3.43% 3.09% 3.72% 
Total quantity of trade 4.89% 4.25% 3.75% 3.33% 4.05% 
Trade openness 0.56% 0.51% 0.37% 0.28% 0.43% 
Absorption 4.49% 3.86% 3.44% 3.09% 3.72% 
Gross investment 5.45% 4.47% 3.88% 3.40% 4.30% 
Capital stock 6.41% 5.63% 4.92% 4.32% 5.32% 
DR-CAFTA Scenario      
Gross domestic product 4.86% 4.25% 3.74% 3.32% 4.04% 
Total value of exports 6.44% 5.51% 4.60% 3.93% 5.12% 
Total value of imports 5.11% 4.35% 3.79% 3.34% 4.15% 
Total value of trade 5.63% 4.82% 4.13% 3.59% 4.54% 
Total quantity of exports 5.57% 4.76% 4.09% 3.57% 4.50% 
Total quantity of imports 4.71% 3.76% 3.35% 3.01% 3.71% 
Total quantity of trade 5.05% 4.17% 3.66% 3.25% 4.03% 
Trade openness 0.73% 0.55% 0.37% 0.27% 0.48% 
Absorption 4.36% 3.73% 3.34% 3.01% 3.61% 
Gross investment 5.00% 4.29% 3.76% 3.33% 4.10% 
Capital stock 6.24% 5.44% 4.76% 4.19% 5.16% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
 
The average annual rate of GDP growth for the 2007-2026 period is estimated at 4.12 
percent 52
                                                 
52 This is the geometric annual average over the implementation period. GEMPACK estimates the 
geometric average for percentage-change variables over n number of years as the nth root of the geometric 
 in the counterfactual scenario (see Table 4.1). When the annual changes in 
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GDP growth are decomposed 53 (see Table 4.2 below), we find that the annual change in 
the stock of capital 54
Table 4.2. Decomposition of GDP growth by groups of shocks applied in each scenario 
 resulting from net investment in the previous year explains almost 
all the annual change. Annual changes in the price of goods and services have actually a 
marginal positive impact on economic growth of the order of only 0.1 percent.  
 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH 
 2007-11 2012-16 2017-21 2022-26 TOTAL 
COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIO      
Total change GDP 4.89% 4.37% 3.84% 3.40% 4.12% 
Price forecasts 0.03% 0.02% -0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 
Population growth 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Shift in labor supply 0.87% 0.82% 0.72% 0.64% 0.76% 
Change in capital stock 3.95% 3.53% 3.13% 2.77% 3.34% 
DR-CAFTA SCENARIO      
Total change GDP 4.86% 4.25% 3.74% 3.32% 4.04% 
Price forecasts 0.03% 0.02% -0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 
Population growth 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Shift in labor supply 0.87% 0.82% 0.72% 0.65% 0.77% 
Change in trade policies 0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 
Change in capital stock 3.85% 3.42% 3.03% 2.68% 3.25% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
 
When tariff-reduction commitments under DR-CAFTA are introduced, the average 
annual GDP growth rate estimated for the 2007-2026 period is 4.04 percent, that is, 0.08 
percent lower than that estimated in the benchmark scenario (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). 
Like in the counterfactual scenario, the decomposition of the results shows the still high 
                                                                                                                                                 
product of year-on-year percentage changes. The geometric product results from compounding each annual 
percentage change over the number of years considered.    
53 GEMPACK allows for the decomposition of the effect of shocks in exogenous variables on the changes 
observed in endogenous variables. If the set of exogenous shocks is partitioned into several mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive subsets, then the total change or percentage change for endogenous variable is 
exactly equal to the sum of the contributions of these subsets of exogenous shocks.   
54 The binary variable delunity is shocked to 1 in the dynamic model to turn on the capital accumulation 
equation, or not shocked to deactivate it. Thus, estimating the subtotal for delunity is equivalent to 
estimating the subtotal for changes in the capital stock.  
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explanatory power of investment. Hence, the decomposition results from the two 
scenarios point to differences in net investment and, consequently, capital stocks as the 
main reason driving these results.   
A closer look at the year-to-year results reveals that the agreement would actually 
increase economic growth relative to the counterfactual in the first year, but this 
relationship is reverted by the second year of the implementation and maintained 
throughout the implementation period. The agreement is expected to improve GDP 
slightly in the first year of the implementation by about 0.3 percent; recall that it is in the 
first year of the implementation when the most substantial removal of tariffs occurs. The 
gain that DR-CAFTA generates relative to the counterfactual in the first year amounts to 
USD 28 million. Although the rate of economic growth resulting from DR-CAFTA is 
lower than that estimated for the counterfactual starting as early as in the second year of 
the implementation, it is expected that in monetary terms the relative benefit of DR-
CAFTA will last for few more years (see Figure 4.2 below). The accumulated economic 
impact of the agreement relative to the benchmark, measured in monetary terms, is 
estimated to amount to a gain of USD 36 million by 2011; significant losses from DR-
CAFTA relative to the counterfactual are estimated in the medium and long term, 
generating a total relative loss of USD 2.14 billion by the year 2026 55
                                                 
55 This monetary loss is not discounted. Using a 10-percent discount rate, the accumulated loss would 
amount to USD 9 billion. 
.  
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Figure 4.1. Evolution of GDP (billion Lempiras) under each of the two scenarios considered 
 
Figure 4.2. Difference in GDP generated in the DR-CAFTA scenario relative to that generated in 
the counterfactual scenario (USD million) 
 
The findings suggest that the dynamic effects generated by DR-CAFTA through its 
impact on capital formation are to a large extent driving the aggregate results. In fact, 
findings from a static, all-at-once-impact simulation of DR-CAFTA show that in fact the 
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agreement would likely generate an increase in economic growth relative to the 
benchmark of roughly 1 percentage point 56
The results show that the significant difference in the change in government savings 
between scenarios is driven primarily by differences in government revenues, more 
particularly, revenues from import tariffs. Table 4.4 below shows the initial composition 
of government revenue as well as the changes expected from each scenario. Hence, 
despite the fact that import tariffs accounted for less than 8 percent of government 
revenue in 2007, their significant decrease as a result of DR-CAFTA is expected to more 
.  
The question of why DR-CAFTA would slow down investment relative to the 
counterfactual is puzzling, but a closer look at the results reveals that total savings (and 
thus, by the savings-investment market closure, total investment) would increase at a 
slower pace in the DR-CAFTA scenario as a consequence of the slower pace of 
government savings relative to that observed in the counterfactual. Let us analyze these 
results particularly for the year 2007, when most of the tariff reductions occurred (Table 
4.3). Savings by firms and households, accounting for 36.8 percent and 24.2 percent of 
total savings, respectively, are actually expected to have increased as a result of the 
agreement by 1.3 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively, relative to the counterfactual. But 
government savings, which account for 13.7 percent of total savings in 2007, are 
estimated to have decreased by 19.7 percent as a result of DR-CAFTA in comparison to 
the benchmark. This significant decrease in government revenues is what actually slows 
down the growth of total savings, dominating the positive impact of the agreement on the 
incomes of households and firms and, consequently, on their savings. 
                                                 
56 Results from the static simulation are not shown, but are available from the author upon request. 
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than offset the increases in other more significant sources of government revenues, such 
as income and sales taxes.  
Table 4.3. Percentage changes in the savings by the relevant institutions in each scenario, year 
2007. 
 
INITIAL SHARE IN 
TOTAL SAVINGS * COUNTERFACTUAL** DR-CAFTA** DIFFERENCE 
Total Savings 100.0% 6.3% 4.5% -1.7% 
Enterprise savings 36.8% 5.7% 7.0% 1.3% 
Household savings 24.2% 6.4% 7.6% 1.2% 
Foreign savings 25.3% -1.2% -0.4% 0.8% 
Government savings 13.7% 21.4% 1.6% -19.7% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
* This is the share in total savings estimated for the beginning of 2007. 
** Percentage change relative to initial values. 
 
Briefly stated, then, decreases in government revenues as a result of the agreement, 
primarily during the first year where most of the reduction in import tariffs has occurred, 
result in significantly lower government savings, which actually slows down total savings 
(investment) relative to the counterfactual. Slower investment results in smaller increases 
in capital stock, which slow down annual economic growth relative to the counterfactual 
starting as early as in the second year of the implementation period.   
Table 4.4. Composition of government revenues and estimated changes resulting from each of the 
two scenarios considered. 
 
INITIAL SHARE IN 
GOVERNMENT 
REVENUES * COUNTERFACTUAL** DR-CAFTA** DIFFERENCE 
Total Gov. Revenue 100.0% 5.1% 0.6% -4.5% 
Income tax 34.4% 4.7% 7.0% 2.3% 
Sales tax 47.9% 5.3% 5.9% 0.6% 
Production tax 9.6% 4.9% 5.8% 0.9% 
Import tariffs 7.8% 5.5% -67.1% -72.7% 
Foreign transfers 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
* This is the share in total government revenue estimated for the year 2007. 
** Percentage change relative to initial values. 
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While there is general agreement on the positive relationship between trade and economic 
growth, the relationship between trade policy reform and economic growth is ambiguous. 
Several studies conducted during the 1990s suggest a positive relationship between trade 
liberalization and economic growth (Dollar 1992, Sachs and Warner 1995). In fact, 
several multilateral organizations and governments have employed these findings to 
support trade liberalization. However, more recent econometric studies have questioned 
these findings primarily on the grounds of severe methodological shortcomings, and 
offered evidence on the still under-developed theoretical relationship between trade 
policy reform and economic growth (Rodriguez and Rodrik 1999). An econometric 
assessment by the World Bank (2005) finds a statistically significant and positive impact 
of free trade agreements on economic growth; the findings suggest a 0.8 percent increase 
in the rate of GDP growth as a result of the implementation of these agreement. However, 
these findings by the World Bank reflect the impact of free trade agreements inclusive of 
all effects they create beyond trade policy removal (e.g., induced changes in the quality 
of institutions and productivity of factors).  
The behavior of total exports and total imports follows closely what happens with the 
total level of economic activity, which lets us infer that the expansionary effects are 
dominating the substitution effects. In other words, the expected future growth of the 
Honduran economy is likely to come primarily from the increase in factor stocks 
specified for each scenario (specified exogenously for labor and endogenously for 
capital) rather than from a more efficient allocation of production sparked by changes in 
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relative output prices 57
Trade openness, measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, is expected to 
increase slightly as a result of the agreement relative to the benchmark. This outcome 
results from the fact that, compared to the counterfactual scenario, the agreement will 
create a decrease in GDP relatively larger than that observed in exports and imports. 
 (allocative efficiency gains). The agreement is expected to have a 
positive impact on total volume of trade in the first year of the implementation, followed 
by minor negative impacts thereafter; when accumulated over the span of the 
implementation period, the final impact of DR-CAFTA relative to the counterfactual is 
expected to be marginally negative. In fact, imports and exports are both expected to 
increase in the short run as a result of the agreement relative to the counterfactual, 
coincident with the relatively higher level of economic activity sparked by DR-CAFTA 
in the first year of the implementation. The expansion in imports in 2007 follows 
primarily as a result of a higher aggregate demand, although the reduction in import 
tariffs explains around 10 percent of the change in aggregate imports.    
Based on the above, we should expect a slight decrease in the total value of trade as a 
result of DR-CAFTA. At first sight, these findings seem to contradict the trade literature 
regarding the impact of trade policy reform on exports and imports. However, the minor 
reduction in trade resulting from the agreement is associated with the negative dynamic 
effect of DR-CAFTA on the capital accumulation as already explained above, which in 
turn is highly dependent on the government closure chosen for this study.  
                                                 
57 For instance, a decomposition of the change in total exports in 2007 shows that 99 percent of the change 
is explained by the expansion in domestic production, and only 1 percent by changes in relative prices 
(domestic vis-à-vis exports). For imports, the decomposition reveals that 89 percent of the change in 
aggregate (trade-weighted) total imports is explained by expansion in consumption, and only 11 percent is 
explained by changes in relative prices of domestic products and imports.  
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The agreement is expected to have a slightly negative impact on aggregate demand or, 
which is the same, absorption. In fact, DR-CAFTA is expected to yield an increase in 
aggregate demand 0.3 percent higher than the counterfactual in the first year of the 
implementation, 2007, but marginally smaller increases relative to the counterfactual 
thereafter.  
The final macroeconomic indicator considered in this discussion is net investment. Its 
behavior has been already discussed indirectly when analyzing the future trend in savings 
and its relationship to gross domestic production. The first year of the implementation of 
DR-CAFTA is expected to generate a reduction in investment of roughly 1.7 percent 
relative to the counterfactual (see table 4.1 above). Thereafter, the annual rate of 
investment is expected to remain slightly lower (around 0.15 percent lower than the 
counterfactual); the accumulated reduction in investment created by the agreement 
relative to the benchmark is equivalent to an average of 0.2 percent a year. 
It should be kept in mind that the DR-CAFTA scenario does not account for any 
exogenous change in investment, particularly foreign direct investment, which could 
materialize as a result of changes in the institutional environment derived from the 
agreement. The differences between scenarios presented above for a group of selected 
macroeconomic variables can be explained primarily by the changes in the savings 
behavior of the government resulting from the implementation of the agreement. From 
the analysis above we can make two important inferences: (1) that care must be taken 
when specifying the model to the particular scenario of interest, particularly in the 
specification of the different model closures; and (2) that changes in savings and 
therefore investment have the potential to significantly alter the results. While the first 
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observation is of particular interest for CGE modelers, the second is particularly 
important for policymakers, and highlights the potentially high returns that could be 
obtained from improvements in the economic environment that could lead to higher 
investment (see the results presented in section 5).   
In conclusion, the findings of this study reveal that Honduras will experience a slight 
improvement in the most relevant macroeconomic indicators in the very early stages of 
the implementation of DR-CAFTA relative to the counterfactual. However, the 
agreement will likely generate a decrease in government savings early in the 
implementation process that could slowdown the economic activity marginally, leading 
to minor negative accumulated effects by the end of the implementation period relative to 
the benchmark.    
4.4.2  SECTORAL IMPACT OF DR-CAFTA 
Of the twenty-two economic activities included in the analysis 58, agricultural activities in 
general, and basic grain activities in particular, are of special interest in this study. 
However, in order to understand much of the changes reported in this study we need to 
analyze the impact of the agreement on the largest sectors of the economy. 
Manufactures 59
                                                 
58 There is a total of 23 activities, but one of them, identified as “a_cgds”, represents the production of 
capital goods and does not count towards GDP.  
59 Manufactures actually encompasses numerous sectors that usually appear as different accounts in more 
disaggregated SAMs. Data limitations constrained the disaggregation of this sector, and consequently 
constrained the discussion of results, ignoring interesting cross-sectoral effects that might be happening 
among manufacturing sectors.  
 is by far the largest sector, accounting for roughly 21 percent of total 
value added and 56 percent of total intermediate demand in 2007; other sectors 
contributing greatly are communication services, agriculture, and construction, each 
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accounting for 15 percent, 13 percent, and 6 percent of total value added, and 5 percent, 7 
percent, and 6 percent of total intermediate demand, respectively. Hence, the fate of these 
four sectors determines to a great extent what happens in the economy as a whole. 
It is estimated that the agreement would have a minor impact on the level of production 
of the manufacture sector relative to the counterfactual for the period 2007-2026; 
however, the findings suggest that the agreement might change the dynamics of 
production slightly, yielding increases in production in the first year of roughly 1.7 
percent, and slightly lower annual growth thereafter, always relative to the benchmark. 
This implies that, by 2008, the manufacturing sector already received the benefits of DR-
CAFTA, and that the effect of the agreement in the medium and long term vis-à-vis the 
benchmark would rather be negative. The same findings can be extended to the other 
large sectors listed above, namely, a larger growth of production the first year of the 
implementation period sparked primarily by the expansion in aggregate demand relative 
to the benchmark, and slightly lower annual growth rates thereafter as a result of 
relatively lower investment generated by the agreement. 
Regardless of the scenario, the findings suggest a slow growth of the Honduran economy. 
Sectoral output is expected to grow below a 5 percent annual average for the 2007-2026 
period for all the sectors in the economy regardless of the scenario, with some sectors 
achieving annual growth rates below 3 percent. These rates of growth in total output are 
slightly higher than those estimated by Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro (2008). However, 
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when compared to the figures reported by the Central Bank of Honduras 60
                                                 
60 According to estimations based on the information reported by the Central Bank of Honduras, total 
output in Honduras grew at 5.7 percent annually in the 2001-06 period (5% arithmetic average), and at 6.5 
percent annually (6.3% arithmetic average) in the period 2004-06.  
 for the period 
2001-06 (Banco Central de Honduras 2007b), our estimates forecast a slower average 
growth of (1) the total economy, (2) the service sector, (3) the manufactures sector, and 
(4) the agricultural sector, in the coming twenty years, regardless of the scenario. 
The agreement, as specified in the DR-CAFTA scenario, is expected to have a minor 
negative impact on total agricultural production relative to the counterfactual. An 
assessment of the changes in production of specific agricultural sectors shows the same 
patterns discussed above for manufactures and other large sectors. As can be seen in the 
Table 4.5 below, all agricultural sectors are expected to grow slightly more in the short 
run as a result of the agreement; however, in the medium and long term, the minor but 
still negative effect of the agreement on capital stocks yields smaller rates of sectoral 
growth relative to the counterfactual scenario.  
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Table 4.5. Activity level for selected sectors under the two scenarios considered 
 AVERAGE 
 2007-11 2012-16 2017-21 2022-26 TOTAL 
COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIO      
Manufactures 5.35% 4.79% 4.14% 3.61% 4.47% 
Communications 5.08% 4.52% 4.03% 3.59% 4.30% 
Construction 4.76% 4.19% 3.75% 3.36% 4.02% 
Agriculture 5.21% 4.58% 3.93% 3.39% 4.28% 
Hillside beans 3.28% 2.65% 2.38% 2.14% 2.61% 
Valley beans 3.92% 3.33% 2.96% 2.65% 3.21% 
High-tech corn 4.00% 3.61% 3.20% 2.86% 3.42% 
Medium-tech corn 3.77% 3.28% 2.94% 2.64% 3.15% 
Traditional corn 3.58% 2.97% 2.69% 2.43% 2.92% 
Rice 4.51% 4.49% 3.96% 3.47% 4.11% 
Other agriculture 5.34% 4.69% 4.01% 3.45% 4.37% 
DR-CAFTA SCENARIO      
Manufactures 5.46% 4.68% 4.03% 3.53% 4.43% 
Communications 4.96% 4.39% 3.90% 3.49% 4.18% 
Construction 4.82% 4.08% 3.64% 3.27% 3.95% 
Agriculture 5.15% 4.47% 3.84% 3.31% 4.19% 
Hillside beans 3.39% 2.62% 2.33% 2.09% 2.61% 
Valley beans 4.02% 3.29% 2.90% 2.60% 3.20% 
High-tech corn 4.08% 3.55% 3.27% 2.70% 3.40% 
Medium-tech corn 3.87% 3.22% 2.97% 2.51% 3.14% 
Traditional corn 3.71% 2.92% 2.70% 2.33% 2.92% 
Rice 4.45% 4.38% 3.85% 3.57% 4.06% 
Other agriculture 5.25% 4.57% 3.91% 3.37% 4.28% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
 
Of particular interest for basic grain producers is what would happen if, as a result of DR-
CAFTA, the purchase agreements currently in place for corn and rice are eliminated by 
the end of the implementation period for these crops (namely, year 15 of the 
implementation for corn and year 18 for rice). This study finds that the expiration of these 
purchase agreements would have no significant effect on the level of production of corn 
and rice. The elimination of the 20-percent price premium above the market price of 
imports obtained by producers through these agreements will have a first-round effect of 
lowering the composite price (market price for market sales and negotiated price for sales 
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under the purchase agreements) of corn and rice by roughly 2 percent and 5 percent, 
respectively. However, the lower composite price for these basic grains encourages 
consumption, primarily intermediate consumption, which in turn generates an increase in 
the market price for domestic corn and rice that offsets the initial negative impact of 
removing the price premium. In conclusion, the purchase agreements will have almost no 
consequences on the performance of these production sectors as a whole; the only 
difference is that farmers would receive extra revenues from the market equivalent to the 
rent generated by these purchase agreements.  
The sectoral findings presented here lead us to infer a minor negative impact of the 
agreement on average for the span of the implementation period. In fact, aside from the 
positive changes sparked by it in 2007, the agreement is expected to result in very 
marginal annual effects that deserve no particular explanation, only for the fact that when 
accumulated across the 20-year span analyzed here, these negligible annual differences 
end up revealing a minor negative net impact of DR-CAFTA.  
The model results can be disaggregated up to the sectoral level. This obviously limits the 
power of the model to explain what happens at a lower level. One approach to circumvent 
this limitation is to disaggregate economic activities, at least those of particular interest to 
the study at hand, to the maximum level possible. To some extent, this is the approach 
taken in this study, in which the basic grain sector, initially a part of the agricultural 
sector, is disaggregated into 5 different subsectors. Another valid approach increasingly 
used by development economists interested in poverty and income distribution effects of 
trade policies is micro-simulation, that is, the combination of CGE modeling and a 
microeconomic module with very disaggregated, usually household-level data that takes 
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the CGE results and translates the effects into more detailed units of analysis. Micro-
simulation extends the explanatory power of the analysis to one of the lowest levels of 
disaggregation possible, thus being arguably the most appropriate method for household-
level impacts of economy-wide policy changes. 
The comments above are intended to raise awareness about the limitation of the results 
shown here. The fact that no significant effects of DR-CAFTA on the basic grain sector 
have been found does not rule out the possibility that some particular production units 
would actually experience a loss as a result of the agreement. Farms selling a significant 
part of their output through purchase agreements would likely experience a significant 
reduction in the composite price they receive, and would likely be forced to relocate their 
resources into other more profitable activities and/or incur an extra cost searching for 
new marketing alternatives to sell their production of basic grains. Disentangling the 
effects of DR-CAFTA at the farm level or, for that matter, at the firm level in any other 
sector,  imply obtaining detailed farm/firm data on production and marketing strategies 
currently not available in Honduras.   
4.4.3 IMPACT OF DR-CAFTA ON FACTOR MARKETS     
Economic growth can result from three primary sources: (1) a reallocation of existing 
resources into more productive uses; (2) an increase in factor endowments; or (3) an 
improvement in the technology of production. Most standard factor closures for 
developed countries tend to minimize the effect of expanding labor endowments. 
Furthermore, static models, by construction, ignore the potential for economic growth 
sparked by increases in capital stocks. By adopting (1) labor closures that account for the 
high levels of unemployment and underemployment in some labor categories, and (2) by 
capturing the impact of changes in capital stocks, this model tends to generate results that 
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could be considered too optimistic when compared with findings from static models with 
more neoclassical factor market closures.  
Regardless of the scenario considered, demands for all categories of labor and capital are 
expected to increase at a significant rate over the next twenty years, which depicts a 
promising future for the fight against poverty. In fact, the rates of growth in rural and 
urban employment estimated for both scenarios are higher than the rural and urban 
population growth estimates and also higher than the rates of growth of the economically 
active population available for Honduras (Economic Commission for Latin American and 
The Caribbean 2008). The relatively large rate of growth in employment imply that the 
future economic conditions have the potential for significantly reducing the high 
unemployment and underemployment rates that have been observed in Honduras over the 
last two decades. A simple estimation assuming that (1) the stock of both categories of 
urban and rural labor would increase at the same rate that the urban and rural population 
respectively, (2) that unemployment and underemployment have the same incidence 
among labor groups, and (3) that underemployment amounts to 50 percent 61
                                                 
61 This means that all workers reporting to be underemployed are working half time on average.   
, reveals that 
unemployment among urban skilled labor might be halved by 2026, while unemployment 
among unskilled urban workers might decrease roughly 80 percent. The results regarding 
rural unemployment are shocking, revealing that in fact the future economic environment 
would actually increase both skilled and unskilled rural labor demand slightly above the 
stock of unemployed rural workers estimated following the simple approach above. This 
analysis of the future labor market conditions is highly simplistic, but is intended to 
highlight the importance of working towards improving the functioning of factor markets 
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to ensure a freer, less costly movement of labor resources not only among urban sectors 
but also between the urban and rural sector.      
Focusing now on the relative impact of DR-CAFTA on the behavior of factor markets, 
the findings suggest very marginal changes in both the stocks and prices of factors and, 
consequently, very minor changes in factors’ income between scenarios (see Table 4.6 
below). The first year of the implementation period, that is, 2007, is when the most 
substantial but still minor changes are estimated. In fact, an analysis of the results for the 
first year would yield in general the same conclusions, although with different 
magnitudes, as those obtained from a static assessment of DR-CAFTA; that is, the 
agreement might spark economic growth which in turn increases the demand for all 
factors of production relative to the counterfactual. However, the negative impact of the 
agreement on investment leads to a relative slowdown in the demand for factors of 
production starting in the second year of the implementation period. The annual 
differences in factor demand between scenarios is very slight, less than 0.03 percent for 
all factors, but when accumulated over the 20 years of the implementation, they amount 
to some slightly negative impact of the DR-CAFTA. 
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Table 4.6. Estimated impact of DR-CAFTA on factor markets 
 AVERAGE 
 2007-11 2012-16 2017-21 2022-26 TOTAL 
COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIO      
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS      
Unskilled urban labor 3.81% 3.52% 3.13% 2.81% 3.32% 
Skilled urban labor 3.49% 3.25% 2.92% 2.65% 3.08% 
Unskilled rural labor 3.05% 2.71% 2.34% 2.04% 2.53% 
Skilled rural labor 1.99% 1.70% 1.41% 1.16% 1.57% 
Capital 6.41% 5.63% 4.92% 4.32% 5.32% 
FACTOR RETURNS      
Unskilled urban labor 0.84% 0.68% 0.55% 0.45% 0.63% 
Skilled urban labor 1.06% 0.84% 0.70% 0.58% 0.80% 
Unskilled rural labor 2.13% 1.99% 1.85% 1.72% 1.92% 
Skilled rural labor 2.16% 1.99% 1.84% 1.71% 1.93% 
Capital -1.29% -1.11% -0.98% -0.85% -1.06% 
FACTOR INCOME      
Unskilled urban labor 4.69% 4.22% 3.70% 3.28% 3.97% 
Skilled urban labor 4.56% 4.10% 3.63% 3.23% 3.88% 
Unskilled rural labor 5.24% 4.76% 4.24% 3.79% 4.51% 
Skilled rural labor 4.19% 3.73% 3.28% 2.90% 3.52% 
Capital 4.98% 4.42% 3.87% 3.41% 4.17% 
DR-CAFTA SCENARIO      
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS      
Unskilled urban labor 3.95% 3.49% 3.09% 2.78% 3.33% 
Skilled urban labor 3.56% 3.23% 2.90% 2.62% 3.08% 
Unskilled rural labor 3.14% 2.67% 2.29% 1.98% 2.52% 
Skilled rural labor 2.05% 1.68% 1.38% 1.14% 1.56% 
Capital 6.24% 5.44% 4.76% 4.19% 5.16% 
FACTOR RETURNS      
Unskilled urban labor 0.98% 0.65% 0.52% 0.42% 0.64% 
Skilled urban labor 1.18% 0.81% 0.65% 0.54% 0.80% 
Unskilled rural labor 2.22% 1.95% 1.80% 1.67% 1.91% 
Skilled rural labor 2.28% 1.95% 1.79% 1.66% 1.92% 
Capital -0.96% -1.01% -0.91% -0.81% -0.92% 
FACTOR INCOME      
Unskilled urban labor 4.97% 4.16% 3.63% 3.21% 3.99% 
Skilled urban labor 4.75% 4.05% 3.56% 3.16% 3.88% 
Unskilled rural labor 5.43% 4.67% 4.13% 3.69% 4.48% 
Skilled rural labor 4.38% 3.67% 3.20% 2.82% 3.51% 
Capital 5.17% 4.34% 3.78% 3.33% 4.15% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
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Annual differences in factor prices are also very marginal. The most salient finding 
relates to the smaller decrease in the return to capital in the DR-CAFTA scenario relative 
to the counterfactual, which is related directly to the slightly lower supply of capital 
accumulated over the years. 
All in all, then, we can expect only slight changes in factor incomes between scenarios. In 
fact, the largest average annual difference in factor returns is estimated to be in the order 
of 0.14 percent, a very minor effect. 
4.4.4 IMPACT OF DR-CAFTA ON HOUSEHOLDS     
The preceding discussion highlights the minor impact that we should expect from DR-
CAFTA on the return to factors of production and the price of commodities. These minor 
impacts should then also translate into minor household’s income, utility, and ultimately, 
welfare changes as a result of the agreement. These are the results that will be discussed 
in this section. 
The initial dataset reveals that, in aggregate, households receive roughly 77 percent of 
their income from factors of production (that is, the return for their supply of labor and 
capital, the latter received through firms), followed by foreign transfers or remittances 
(17 percent), and public transfers (6 percent). It is important to recall here that firms’ 
transfers to households is a function of firms’ revenues, which is in turn primarily a 
function of capital income and, hence, endogenous in this model; foreign and government 
transfers to households are assumed to remain fixed in foreign currency and real terms 
(deflated by the consumer price index), respectively. Therefore, household income will 
change primarily as a result of changes in factors’ incomes.  
With factors’ incomes increasing significantly over the next 20 years regardless of the 
scenario, we should expect a significant increase in household income as well. 
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Furthermore, the findings of this study suggest that the real composite consumption price 
paid by households will remain roughly unchanged during the next 20 years. A more than 
proportional increase in income relative to prices results in increases in the utility 
afforded by households. The change in welfare equivalent to the change in utility level 
can be translated into monetary terms. In fact, it is expected that household welfare as 
measured by the equivalent variation 62
                                                 
62 EV can be defined as the amount of money needed to be taken away from households before the price 
change to leave them as well off as they would be after the price change. EV is estimated for each of the 
representative households specified in the model. A positive EV value implies a welfare gain whereas a 
negative value implies a welfare loss. 
 (EV) would increase as a result of the changes 
implied by both the benchmark and DR-CAFTA scenarios. EV cannot be used to 
compare welfare changes between household groups; however, a common approach used 
to compare welfare changes between agents is to compare the ratio of EV to initial 
income. From the findings of this study we conclude that, given the forecasted trend in 
the relevant variables that describe the counterfactual scenario, all representative 
households will experience significant increases in their welfare equivalent to anywhere 
between 4 percent and 5 percent of their income in 2007.  
However, when it comes to assessing the impact of the agreement on the income of 
households, the conclusion is that the agreement will have a very marginal effect on all 
household variables considered. The last column of Table 4.7 shows the negligible 
differences in income, consumption price, utility, and welfare between scenarios. These 
findings should not be surprising provided the slight changes forecasted from DR-
CAFTA in the Honduran economy relative to the counterfactual.   
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Table 4.7. Estimated average annual impact of both scenarios on selected household variables 
VARIABLES BENCHMARK SCENARIO (1) 
DR-CAFTA 
SCENARIO (2) 
DIFFERENCE 
[(2) – (1)] 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME    
Basic grains 3.35% 3.34% -0.01% 
Livestock 3.53% 3.52% -0.01% 
Other agriculture 3.46% 3.45% -0.01% 
Other urban & non-agricultural rural 3.60% 3.60% 0.00% 
COMPOSITE CONSUMPTION PRICE    
Basic grains 0.07% 0.06% -0.01% 
Livestock 0.17% 0.17% -0.01% 
Other agriculture 0.12% 0.10% -0.02% 
Other urban & non-agricultural rural 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 
HOUSEHOLD UTILITY    
Basic grains 2.66% 2.66% 0.00% 
Livestock 2.74% 2.73% 0.00% 
Other agriculture 2.72% 2.73% 0.01% 
Other urban & non-agricultural rural 0.88% 0.88% 0.00% 
HOUSEHOLD WELFARE (MILLION 
LEMPIRAS)    
Basic grains 361 360 -1 
Livestock 248 248 0 
Other agriculture 558 559 1 
Other urban & non-agricultural rural 6928 6928 0 
Total welfare change 8095 8094 -1 
EV / INITIAL INCOME    
Basic grains 4.56% 4.55% -0.01% 
Livestock 4.73% 4.72% -0.01% 
Other agriculture 4.69% 4.69% 0.00% 
Other urban & non-agricultural rural  5.12% 5.12% 0.00% 
Source: own estimates based on model results. Year-on-year results are not shown, but are available upon 
request.  
 
These findings, primarily those regarding the welfare effect of the agreement on 
households depending to a large extent on sensitive, basic grains as a source of income, 
are somewhat unexpected. Although it is true that most previous assessments indicate a 
slight impact of DR-CAFTA on agriculture, they also point to the fact that some 
households, particularly those depending on sensitive products as a source of income, 
would likely stand to lose as a result of the agreement. It was expected that by 
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overcoming some of the limitations of previous studies, namely (1) defining a basic grain 
representative household, and (2) simulating the impact of the removal of the purchase 
agreements of basic grains, this study would find evidence on the potential negative 
impact of DR-CAFTA on the selected group of households. Instead, the findings of this 
study provide no support to reject (under the assumptions implied by this analysis) the 
null hypotheses presented in chapter 1, namely that DR-CAFTA would negatively impact 
the welfare of those households depending on basic grains as a source of income. 
4.5 ASSESSING OTHER DIMENSIONS OF DR-CAFTA 
The findings for the DR-CAFTA scenario presented above can be seen as a worse-case 
scenario in that no indirect effects of DR-CAFTA on variables such as foreign direct 
investment, productivity, and quality of public institutions are considered.  
The goal of this section is to expand the analysis of DR-CAFTA beyond trade tariff 
removal, and assess the potential indirect effects of the agreement on selected areas 
highlighted by previous studies. This section is not intended to provide an in-depth 
discussion of the theories explaining the possible avenues through which regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) might spark domestic changes. It is only intended to provide a rough 
estimate of the potential returns that could be attained by investing resources in specific 
areas that could synergize the workings of DR-CAFTA.  
Theories suggest numerous avenues in which a regional trade agreement (RTA) such as 
DR-CAFTA might spark changes in signatory nations, not only economic but also more 
general social and institutional changes. Previous ex-post assessments of the impact of 
free trade agreements (RTA) provide support for a positive relationship between RTAs 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) (World Bank 2005). However, it is extremely 
difficult to forecast how much FDI in Honduras might increase as a result of the 
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agreement, given the multiple factors, both domestic and international, that might be at 
play. The evidence is more ambiguous when it comes to the relationship between RTAs 
and changes in productivity growth. In fact, the evidence on a relationship between trade 
and productivity is blurry, let alone the relationship between free trade agreements 
(believed to yield positive trade effects) and productivity 63
                                                 
63 A discussion of the literature on trade and productivity is beyond the scope of this section, but interesting 
insights on this topic can be found in Alcala and Ciccone (2004), and Doyle and Martinez-Zarzoso (2006)  
. A review by the World Bank 
(2005) suggests that the relationship between RTAs and productivity growth is not 
significant, and stresses the need for improving national education and innovation 
policies in order to improve competitiveness and, consequently, maximize the benefits 
from DR-CAFTA. On the other hand, other researchers have found strong evidence on 
the positive relationship between free trade, growth, and technological spillovers (Deng, 
Falvey and Blake 2008, Lejour and Nahuis 2005). These studies differ from those 
reviewed by the World Bank in that they use primarily industry-level data by country 
rather than cross-country evidence. Finally, there is no clear evidence on the relationship 
between RTAs and the quality of public institutions. This implies that governments 
should encourage proactive policy changes to increase the transparency and lower the 
levels of public corruption. The World Bank (2005) acknowledges that RTAs such as 
DR-CAFTA, which call for transparency in some processes of government such as 
procurement and regulatory changes, might spark proactive public action in this regard. 
An assessment of the potential benefits that an increase in FDI and TFP resulting from 
DR-CAFTA might generate would shed light also on the potential returns that could be 
achieved from investments aimed at facilitating FDI and TFP improvements.    
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Specifying the increase in FDI that could be achieved as a result of DR-CAFTA is a 
challenge. Cuevas, Messmacher, and Werner (2002) find a positive impact of 
participating in RTAs on FDI; they estimate that the expectation of an imminent entry 
into a larger regional market increases FDI by 30 percent. Furthermore, the authors find 
that FDI growth will also vary with the size of the new regional market relative to the 
economic size of the country; they estimate an elasticity of FDI to relative economic size 
of between 0.10 and 0.07, which implies that if a country joins a regional market twice its 
economic size, then it should expect between a 14 percent and 20 percent increase in 
FDI. These findings say nothing about the annual behavior of FDI, they just express the 
impact of RTAs as a one-time shock to FDI (Cuevas, Messmacher and Werner 2002). 
Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro (2008) apply an arbitrary 6.25 percent annual increase in 
FDI as a result of DR-CAFTA. Given the uncertainty surrounding the increase in FDI, 
the scenario used in this section (called DR-CAFTA+FDI) adds to the specification of the 
original DR-CAFTA scenario a systematic sensitivity analysis (SSA) assuming that FDI 
would increase by 10 percent a year, but with a uniform probability distribution ranging 
from 5 to 15 percent. 
Previous studies have shown the poor productivity of the Honduran economy in general 
(Baier, Dwyer and Tamura 2002), and Honduran agriculture in particular (Coelli and 
Prasada-Rao 2005). However, the literature shows ambiguous relationships between total 
factor productivity (TFP) and trade, let alone TFP and RTAs. However, there are 
numerous ways in which the government can influence TFP growth in the economy, so 
an assessment on the potential benefits of such an investment is granted. To the list of 
shocks specified in the DR-CAFTA scenario, I arbitrarily shock total factor productivity 
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across all sectors by 0.5 percent a year, which is equivalent to an accumulated 10.5 
percent increase at the end of the DR-CAFTA implementation period (call the new 
scenario DR-CAFTA+TFP). No systematic sensitivity analysis is performed because of 
the large number of stochastic runs needed. However, the differences between scenarios 
are so large that it seems very unlikely that insignificant differences would be found 
between the two scenarios, that is, the DR-CAFTA+TFP and the counterfactual 
scenarios.  
The results discussed are the annual average changes expected from each of the two new 
scenarios as well as the counterfactual over the full span of the implementation period, as 
well as the differences between the two new scenarios and the counterfactual 64
4.5.1 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT SCENARIO 
.  
Table 4.8 below shows the average annual rates of growth of selected macroeconomic 
variables. As can be seen, a 10-percent annual increase in FDI has the potential for 
generating significant economic growth of 1.4 percent a year above that estimated in the 
counterfactual. Figure 4.3 shows the significant difference in GDP accumulated over the 
span of the implementation period as a result of the increase in FDI. The figure presents 
the upper and lower bounds for the 95-percent confidence interval estimated from the 
sensitivity analysis 65
                                                 
64 An analysis of year-on-year results is not performed for the sake of brevity, but year-on-year results are 
available from the author upon request.  
; the narrow distribution around the mean gives us confidence in the 
potential impact of FDI on GDP relative to the benchmark.  
65 Although we might know the probability distribution of the shocked variable, in this case FDI, it is 
impossible to know the distribution of each particular endogenous variable. However, there is a general 
result (Chebyshev’s inequality) which assures us that, whatever the distribution of the endogenous variable, 
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The increase in FDI resulting from DR-CAFTA is estimated to improve all 
macroeconomic indicators. The total value and volume of trade are expected to increase 
slightly more than GDP, which leads to improvements in trade openness. Still, 
expansionary effects dominate substitution effects; exports and imports increase 
primarily as a result of changes in overall activity level and aggregate demand, 
respectively, rather than changes in relative prices. Recall that the model assumes 
perfectly elastic excess demand and excess supply functions, which implies that 
Honduras can export and import as much as it wants at the ongoing export and import 
prices. Investment is estimated to increase above 3 percentage points a year as a result of 
DR-CAFTA+FDI relative to the counterfactual; this significant increase leads to sizeable 
increases in capital stocks higher than the expected average rate of economic growth.   
Table 4.8. Average annual rates of growth of selected macroeconomic variables for the two new 
scenarios and difference with respect to the counterfactual 
  Average 2007-2026 
  Counterfactual DR-CAFTA +FDI Difference 
DR-CAFTA 
+TFP Difference 
GDP 4.12% 5.53% 1.40% 6.34% 2.21% 
Total value of exports 5.10% 6.12% 1.01% 7.09% 1.99% 
Total value of imports 4.20% 6.05% 1.85% 5.88% 1.68% 
Total value of trade 4.57% 6.08% 1.51% 6.38% 1.82% 
Total quantity of exports 4.54% 5.66% 1.12% 6.62% 2.09% 
Total quantity of imports 3.72% 5.75% 2.03% 5.55% 1.83% 
Total quantity of trade 4.05% 5.71% 1.66% 6.00% 1.95% 
Trade openness 0.43% 0.52% 0.09% 0.04%   -0.38% 
Absorption 3.72% 5.62% 1.90% 5.69% 1.97% 
Gross investment 4.30% 7.81% 3.51% 6.32% 2.02% 
Capital stock 5.32% 7.41% 2.09% 6.47% 1.15% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
                                                                                                                                                 
we can be 95% confident that its value will lie within 4.5 standard deviations each way.  Alternatively you 
can be 89% confident that its value will lie within 3 standard deviations. 
 150 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Evolution of GDP (billion Lempiras) under each of the two scenarios considered 
 
The significant increase in the stock of capital resulting from the higher FDI (see Table 
4.8 above) would likely spark expansion primarily among sectors employing a high 
proportion of the capital factor, namely, communication services, manufactures, and 
other agriculture sectors.  
Table 4.9. Activity level for selected sectors under the two scenarios considered 
  Average 2007-2026 
  Counterfactual DR-CAFTA +FDI Difference 
DR-CAFTA 
+TFP Difference 
Manufactures 4.47% 5.56% 1.09% 6.69% 2.22% 
Communications 4.30% 6.02% 1.72% 5.74% 1.44% 
Construction 4.02% 5.69% 1.67% 5.81% 1.79% 
Agriculture 4.28% 5.55% 1.27% 5.68% 1.40% 
Hillside beans 2.61% 3.38% 0.76% 4.03% 1.42% 
Valley beans 3.21% 4.12% 0.90% 4.56% 1.35% 
High-tech corn 3.42% 4.42% 1.00% 4.83% 1.42% 
Medium-tech corn 3.15% 4.15% 1.00% 4.68% 1.53% 
Traditional corn 2.92% 3.89% 0.97% 4.60% 1.68% 
Rice 4.11% 5.37% 1.26% 5.69% 1.59% 
Other agriculture 4.37% 5.67% 1.30% 5.76% 1.39% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
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The growth in these sectors would spread throughout the economy, generating significant 
increases in production in all sectors of the economy, and raising the demand for all 
categories of labor relative to the counterfactual. The increase in the demand for labor is 
expected to generate modest increases in real wages of less than 1 percent a year relative 
to the counterfactual, although these increases are not negligible when compared to the 
past trend in real wages particularly for unskilled labor. The return to capital is expected 
to decrease as a result of DR-CAFTA+FDI, which implies that the increase in the 
demand for capital is not large enough to offset the significant increase in capital stock, 
which leads to a decrease in price to achieve equilibrium in the capital market. 
DR-CAFTA+FDI is expected to increase the income of all factors of production by 
between 1.2 percent and 1.6 percent a year relative to the counterfactual, which would 
translate into slightly less than proportional increases in household incomes (Table 4.11). 
The increase in income along with the almost negligible increase in the real composite 
consumption price paid by households would lead to higher utility levels and, 
consequently, higher economic welfare for all representative households. The differences 
in welfare expected to be generated by DR-CAFTA+FDI vis-à-vis the counterfactual and 
expressed relative to households’ incomes in 2007 are estimated in the range of 2.5 
percent and 3 percent a year. 
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Table 4.10. Estimated impact of DR-CAFTA+FDI and DR-CAFTA+TFP on factor markets 
  Average 2007-2026 
  Counterfactual DR-CAFTA+FDI Difference 
DR-
CAFTA+TFP Difference 
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS      
Unskilled urban labor 3.32% 3.9% 0.62% 4.59% 1.27% 
Skilled urban labor 3.08% 3.5% 0.44% 3.79% 0.71% 
Unskilled rural labor 2.53% 3.3% 0.77% 3.67% 1.14% 
Skilled rural labor 1.57% 2.0% 0.45% 2.26% 0.69% 
Capital 5.32% 7.4% 2.09% 6.47% 1.15% 
FACTOR RETURNS      
Unskilled urban labor 0.63% 1.2% 0.61% 1.86% 1.24% 
Skilled urban labor 0.80% 1.7% 0.85% 2.19% 1.39% 
Unskilled rural labor 1.92% 2.7% 0.77% 3.05% 1.13% 
Skilled rural labor 1.93% 2.8% 0.91% 3.33% 1.40% 
Capital -1.06% -1.5%   -0.49% 0.10% 1.16% 
FACTOR INCOME      
Unskilled urban labor 3.97% 5.2% 1.25% 6.54% 2.57% 
Skilled urban labor 3.88% 5.2% 1.32% 6.04% 2.15% 
Unskilled rural labor 4.51% 6.1% 1.58% 6.84% 2.33% 
Skilled rural labor 3.52% 4.9% 1.39% 5.66% 2.14% 
Capital 4.17% 5.7% 1.54% 6.53% 2.36% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
 
 
Table 4.11. Estimated average annual impact of DR-CAFTA+FDI and DR-CAFTA+TFP on 
selected household variables 
  Average 2007-2026 
  Counterfactual 
DR-
CAFTA+FDI 
Differenc
e 
DR-
CAFTA+TFP 
Differenc
e 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME      
Basic grains 3.35% 4.60% 1.24% 5.23% 1.88% 
Livestock 3.53% 4.82% 1.29% 5.49% 1.97% 
Other agriculture 3.46% 4.72% 1.26% 5.36% 1.90% 
Other households 3.60% 4.87% 1.28% 5.71% 2.11% 
CONSUMPTION PRICE      
Basic grains 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 0.03% -0.04% 
Livestock 0.17% 0.17% -0.01% 0.20% 0.03% 
Other agriculture 0.12% 0.12% 0.00% 0.06% -0.06% 
Other households 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
HOUSEHOLD UTILITY      
Basic grains 2.66% 3.88% 1.22% 4.56% 1.90% 
Livestock 2.74% 4.02% 1.29% 4.65% 1.92% 
Other agriculture 2.72% 3.97% 1.25% 4.66% 1.94% 
Other households 0.88% 2.12% 1.24% 2.92% 2.04% 
HOUSEHOLD 
WELFARE      
Basic grains 361 565 204 696 335 
Livestock 248 395 147 482 234 
Other agriculture 558 877 318 1082 523 
Other households 6928 10737 3809 13729 6801 
Total welfare 
change 8095 12574 4478 15989 7893 
EV / INITIAL INCOME      
Basic grains 4.56% 7.14% 2.58% 8.80% 4.24% 
Livestock 4.73% 7.52% 2.79% 9.19% 4.46% 
Other agriculture 4.69% 7.37% 2.67% 9.09% 4.39% 
Other households 5.12% 7.93% 2.81% 10.14% 5.02% 
Source: own estimations based on model results. 
 
4.5.2 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY SCENARIO 
Turning now to the analysis of the DR-CAFTA+TFP scenario, that is, trade tariff 
removal and a 0.5 percent annual increase in TFP over the span of the implementation 
period, the results suggest a remarkable impact of productivity growth on all the 
economic variables of interest. At the macroeconomic level, a 10 percent increase in 
productivity resulting from DR-CAFTA could generate a significant growth differential 
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with respect to the benchmark of the order of 2 percent a year. Figure 4.3 shows the 
significant increase in GDP generated by this scenario relative to the counterfactual as 
well as the DR-CAFTA+FDI scenario. 
In a partial equilibrium setting, an increase in TFP at constant production levels and 
output prices would generate an imbalance in factor markets and extra profits in primary 
production. However, in general equilibrium neither output level nor output prices are 
fixed. As shown in Table 4.9 above, the increase in TFP leads to a significant expansion 
in production that actually pushes up the aggregate demand for all factors of production 
as well as their returns relative to the benchmark. 
Aggregate exports increase significantly, primarily as a result of the expansion in 
domestic production. Aggregate demand is also expected to expand significantly, pushing 
up the demand for domestic as well as imported goods. As a result of the high economic 
growth relative to the growth of exports and imports, trade openness is expected to 
decrease slightly as a result of DR-CAFT+TFP. Finally, investment is expected to 
increase significantly vis-à-vis the counterfactual, primarily as a result of higher savings 
by domestic institutions, namely, households, firms, and the government, since in this 
scenario no changes in FDI are specified. In fact, the decrease in tariff revenues resulting 
from the removal of import tariffs would be more than offset by the increase in revenues 
from income and sales taxes, which leads to higher government revenues and savings 
relative to the counterfactual. 
An accumulated ten-percent increase in TFP over the 20-year implementation period 
would lead to more than proportional increases in agricultural output. As shown in Table 
4.9 above, on average we can expect a 1.4 percent increase in total agricultural output per 
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year, or which is the same, a 28 percent increase in total output over the next twenty 
years. This significant rate of growth is slightly smaller than that estimated for other large 
sectors such as manufactures, construction, and communication services.    
Higher prices and aggregate demands for all factors of production relative to the 
benchmark lead to higher factor incomes, which in turn lead to increases in households’ 
incomes. Basic grain households are expected to receive slightly lower relative increases 
in income compared to other households (see Table 4.11 above), but still their income 
gains from DR-CAFTA+TFP are expected to be significant and accumulate to a 45 
percent differential by the end of the implementation period relative to the counterfactual. 
Higher incomes and relatively unchanged consumption prices lead to higher utility levels 
and improvements in economic welfare vis-à-vis the benchmark, which expressed 
relative to households’ income in 2007, represent annual increases in income of between 
4 percent and 5 percent.  
The brief discussion on the potential impact of FDI and TFP growth on the performance 
of the Honduran economy and the welfare of representative households reveals that 
public investments aimed at creating the conditions believed to encourage FDI and TFP 
growth could be highly rewarding. While the results shown above might be good proxies 
for the gross revenue, the final rate of return of public investment in these areas will 
depend on the costs incurred to generate the desirable FDI and TFP outcomes.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Agricultural negotiators from the participating Central American nations were under 
significant pressure to obtain beneficial deals for their sensitive agricultural sectors 
during the DR-CAFTA negotiations. Measured by the negotiation outcome, agricultural 
lobbies representing sensitive sectors were successful, obtaining favorable, back-loaded 
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schemes and, in some instances, granting no further access to their domestic markets than 
that offered already under the most favored nation principle.  
Nevertheless, there are still concerns about the impact of DR-CAFTA on sensitive 
agriculture, particularly on corn and, to a lesser extent, the rice and beans sectors. 
Regardless of the extended protection obtained for these products, free-trade competition 
with the U.S. will be a reality in the near future, and there is fear that the welfare of 
households depending to a large extent on these commodities as a source of income 
would be severely affected. This is even more worrisome if we consider the large number 
of poor households that rely on basic grains for their subsistence.   
The findings of this study suggest a negligible impact of DR-CAFTA on the performance 
of the Honduran economy in general, and the agricultural sector in particular. This 
extends to the activities associated with the production of corn, beans, and rice, as well as 
the households depending to a large extent on these crops as a source of income. These 
results stand even assuming that the purchase agreements currently in place between the 
industry and producers of rice and corn would expire by the end of the implementation 
period for each product. The elimination of the price premium received by farmers under 
these purchase agreements would in aggregate be offset by an increase in the domestic 
market price for their products, leaving the trade-weighted composite price received by 
farmers roughly unchanged. 
Based on previous ex-post assessments of the impact of free trade areas, it seems 
misleading to represent DR-CAFTA solely as a reduction in trade barriers. There is 
evidence that free trade agreements spark changes well beyond those resulting from tariff 
reduction. Changes in relative prices are but one of the ways in which free trade 
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agreements might impact the economic performance of a given region and the welfare of 
individuals. For instance, there is broad support to, and evidence suggesting a strong and 
positive impact of trade agreements on investment, a variable found to be an important 
source of economic growth. 
Changing the specification of DR-CAFTA to account for the potential impact of the 
agreement on foreign direct investment and total factor productivity leads to significantly 
positive results and highlight areas where public efforts could prove highly rewarding.      
Although the findings from this study might be seen as a relief for some stakeholders 
with particular interest in the well-being of Honduran farmers, it is important to keep in 
mind the assumptions and limitations of this study, and consequently the generalization 
of these results.  
First, as commented in the previous chapter, the data employed for the construction of the 
SAM is the best data currently available in Honduras. However, the statistical limitations, 
basically, representativeness, of the sample from which household income and 
expenditure data were obtained must be kept in mind as a potential source of error. 
Second, as presented in the previous chapter, the CGE modeling framework has some 
associated limitations that must be kept in mind whenever results are analyzed. These 
limitations are associated primarily with the numerous assumptions that must be made in 
order for the model to be manageable. Perfect competition is assumed in all markets, 
which puts all weight on prices as a source of market adjustment. Modeling imperfect 
competition is a desirable extension of the model, provided that all the detailed data 
needed, usually detailed industry-level data, is actually available. Another modeling 
limitation relates to the technologies of production and consumer behavior. By definition, 
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each activity or institutional account is treated as a homogenous agent that produces 
according to one technology of production and consumes according to one system of 
demand. This limitation can only be overcome by defining more accounts, which is in 
turn limited primarily by data availability. Furthermore, there are a number of exogenous 
parameters needed for the calibration of CGE models whose origin and relevance to the 
study at hand might be questionable. 
Finally, it must be kept in mind that the baseline scenario is specified considering that the 
benefits granted unilaterally by the U.S. through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) are 
maintained regardless of the fate of DR-CAFTA. Recall that the benefits granted under 
the CBI were conditional on the approval of DR-CAFTA or would have otherwise 
expired in 2008. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis, since specifying the 
removal of these benefits is very difficult given the different rules included in the CBI.  
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5. ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM DESIGN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Compared to its performance during the 1990s, the Honduran economy has done very 
well during the last seven years. Economic growth has increased significantly, from an 
annual average 3.3 percent during the 1990s, to a 5.6 percent in 2000-06 (Banco Central 
de Honduras 2007b). This change in growth has been led by changes in sectors such as 
textiles and apparels, tourism, and to a less extent, non-traditional agriculture. However, 
the growth of the Honduran economy just equals the average for the region and for a 
large group of developing nations, which suggests that the improvement in the economic 
activity has been more a consequence of a favorable external economic environment 
rather than structural changes in the domestic economy (World Bank 2007a). 
Furthermore, GDP per-capita has been highly volatile but in average remained stagnant 
during the 1990s, increased modestly but steadily in the early 2000s, and at a significant 
annual rate of 4 percent since 2004.  
Economic growth is considered the most important means to improve the well-being of 
the population, particularly the poor. The evidence is clear in that economic growth 
contributes to the reduction of poverty (Fields 2001). Despite the promising economic 
growth observed lately, analysts agree that Honduras needs to accelerate its growth rate 
in order to achieve the World Bank/United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) set for 2015, because growth and MDG achievements reinforce each other 
(Bussolo and Medvedev 2007). The signing of DR-CAFTA and, in general, the opening 
of the economy, is one of the economy-wide policy reforms undertaken with the goal of 
fostering economic growth; but many other reforms are needed not only to improve the 
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potential benefits from the agreement but also to take advantages of other growth 
opportunities.  
The findings presented in chapter 4 suggest that the Honduran economy will grow only 
modestly over the next twenty years regardless of whether or not DR-CAFTA 
(understood only as reductions in import tariffs) is fully implemented. At the estimated 
rates of economic growth, Honduras would most likely not achieve any of the MDGs, 
and the good performance to date in particular areas such as poverty and education might 
prove insufficient. In fact, the findings of this study suggest a slightly negative impact of 
the agreement on economic growth, primarily because of the negative impact of the 
agreement on total investment. The findings for the DR-CAFTA scenario can be seen as 
a worse-case scenario in that no indirect effects of DR-CAFTA on variables such as 
foreign direct investment, productivity, and quality of public institutions are considered.  
Chapter 4 also shows the promising benefits that could potentially result from 
improvements in foreign direct investment and total factor productivity as a result of DR-
CAFTA. Assuming that the higher rates of economic growth estimated in these two 
scenarios are sustainable, achieving the MDGs would still require additional adjustments 
at the public level. There is a need for a proactive role of the government primarily with 
regard to the management of public expenditure, basically (1) re-directing public 
investment into more productive areas, and (2) improving the cost-effectiveness of 
specific policies and programs (Bussolo and Medvedev 2007). Greater public disclosure 
and transparency of budget allocation and impact assessments are needed to mobilize 
political support for budgetary reforms (World Bank 2007a).  
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The DR-CAFTA agreement still raises significant concerns among those with a stake in 
traditional, basic grain agriculture. The schedules of trade liberalization negotiated for 
these sectors, although significantly back-loaded, still imply a potentially sizeable change 
in the long-term market conditions, bringing direct competition with the more efficient 
U.S. rice and corn sectors. The findings presented in chapter 4 indicate that the agreement 
might have negligible negative effects on the income of the representative household 
highly dependent on basic grains as a source of income relative to the business-as-usual, 
counterfactual scenario (see Table 4.7 in previous chapter). However, the limitations of 
the methodology are significant and should be kept in mind when analyzing the results. 
Perfect competition in factor and output markets, specifically for agriculture, is an overly 
simplistic assumption for the case of Honduras (Taylor et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
imposing optimality conditions in consumption for all households and in production for 
all activities is likely to be also a significant source of error. Even if these assumptions 
were to hold, and further assuming that in aggregate the findings for the representative 
basic-grain household are correct, still the impact on specific households cannot be 
estimated. Differences in the sourcing of income and allocation of expenditures would 
likely lead to significantly different outcomes for particular households compared to 
those estimated by the representative household. Consequently, although the findings 
might be seen as a sign of relief for some because the negative impacts are small, it 
should not deter stakeholders in the pursuit of appropriate programs to facilitate the 
transition to more competitive markets, and more importantly, the transition to improving 
the standard of living for basic grain farmers. 
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This chapter analyses the development of feasible adjustment programs for the basic 
grain sector. This exercise explores the limitations and strengths of applying particular 
policy tools to the Honduran case, as well as assesses to some extent the political 
economy surrounding agricultural policy. The following section focuses on the 
description of the context in which policymaking occurs, with particular emphasis on 
agriculture. The third section describes the desirable features of agricultural policy in 
developing countries, based primarily on evidence from around the world. The fourth 
engages more specifically in the process of formulating an adjustment program suitable 
for Honduras, providing stylized guidelines that can serve as a roadmap for a serious 
adjustment program formulation. Final conclusions of the study as a whole and 
recommendations are offered in section 5.  
5.2 TOWARDS A NEW AGENDA FOR HONDURAN AGRICULTURE: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
It is well known that formulating the agricultural agenda for both developed and 
developing countries has become more difficult over the last few decades. The 
multifunctional view of agriculture implies an increase in the scope of the products and 
services this sector provides and therefore the broader set of goals that agricultural policy 
must pursue. Today, agriculture is seen not only as a source of economic growth, but also 
as a way of living for the majority of the rural population, as a steward of the valuable 
endowment of natural resources, and as a key pathway out of poverty, particularly for the 
rural poor (World Bank 2007c). 
Evidence from around the world shows the potential of agriculture as an engine for 
economic growth in the early development process. Countries once highly dependent on 
agriculture such as Thailand and Brazil have diversified away from agriculture and 
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achieved significant economic growth and reduction in rural and urban poverty rates. Still 
agriculture offers promising opportunities to foster economic growth in these countries, 
such as specialization in high-value agricultural products for the domestic and 
international markets. On the other hand, there is also evidence on the failures to achieve 
sustained agricultural growth. The productivity of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
remained low and fairly stagnant for decades, and no progress has been made on the 
reduction of poverty, which still remains close to 50 percent (World Bank 2007c).     
For most developing countries, achieving a sustainable growth of agriculture demands 
concerted action from different levels of government at the national and regional levels, 
the private sector, and from international donors and development organizations. For the 
particular case of Honduras, it will require numerous changes at the public level to 
increase accountability, make a more efficient use of public funds, and generate the 
political legitimacy needed to make tough decisions in the face of strong opposition from 
vested groups. 
A precondition for agricultural and, for that matter, economic growth as a whole, is a 
stable macroeconomic environment. Like most Latin American nations, Honduras has 
historically struggled with increasing budget deficits, inflation, and unemployment rates.  
The Honduran government had make significant adjustments in its expenditures over the 
last few years to maintain a stable macroeconomic environment while at the same time 
satisfying the demands of powerful sectors of society in an attempt to control social 
unrest. According to experts from the World Bank and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and The Caribbean (ECLAC), the upward pressure on public expenditures 
is primarily a consequence of three factors, namely, (1) the poor performance of state-
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own enterprises, primarily the national electric and phone companies, which have run 
significant deficits over the last several years, (2) the increasing cost of the public labor 
force, primarily in the education and health sectors, and (3) the increasing cost of 
subsidies on services such as electricity and transportation, exacerbated by the latest 
upward trend in fuel prices. With limited latitude to increase taxes 66
There is no doubt that investment in human capital is crucial for the future well-being of 
the society, and that is the reason why education and health have always accounted for a 
, and with donations 
being undermined by high levels of corruption, the only feasible alternative for Honduras 
to maintain a balanced budget is to improve the efficiency in the use of the scarce public 
resources (World Bank 2007a, Gomez-Sabaini 2003, 2006).  
Foreign lenders such as the World Bank, the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration, and several governments have written off the external debt that Honduras 
maintained with them conditional on those funds to be used on the fight against poverty 
(Secretaria de Finanzas 2007). Nevertheless, the government has cut expenditures in 
areas such as poverty reduction and public investment over the last few years in order to 
keep the deficit under control (World Bank 2007a).  
Still, for the government to achieve the goals of (1) maintaining a high level of economic 
growth, (2) reducing income inequality, and (3) strengthening the fight against poverty, 
significant reform is needed to control the growth in expenses and, arguably more 
important, make more efficient use of public funds. 
                                                 
66 For Honduras, Gomez-Sabaini (2006) estimates a steady increasing trend in the tax pressure (tax revenue 
/ GDP) from 16.8 percent in 1995 up to 18.2 percent in 2004. These estimates might be biased upward due 
to the underestimation of the GDP. Re-estimating these figures using the new macroeconomic estimates 
generated by the Central Bank of Honduras, reveals that, on average, the tax pressure for the 2000-05 
period was around 13.7 percent, still slightly higher than the average for Latin America.     
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significant share of the budget. However, there is also little doubt among analysts that 
more than just larger budgets are needed to get the payoff out of that investment. 
Honduras devotes much more resources (13 percent of its GDP in 2004) to salaries and 
wages than any other Latin American nation (regional average of 6.1 percent of GDP in 
2004), most of which goes to pay the salaries of teachers and healthcare workers. 
Meanwhile, Honduras ranks 17th among 23 Latin American countries with regard to the 
efficiency in education, and just above the regional mean when it comes to the efficiency 
in the healthcare system 67
Policy reform to improve the investment climate is crucial to stimulate domestic and 
foreign investment. Despite the recent success in attracting foreign direct investment
 (Herrera and Pang 2004). Furthermore, public salaries in 
Honduras are estimated to be 88 percent larger than those paid by the private sector, 
which undermines the idea that public employees are underpaid relative to the rest of the 
society (World Bank 2007a). The poor performances in education and to a lesser extent 
healthcare are among the main reasons explaining the poor efficiency of public spending 
in Honduras.    
68
                                                 
67 The authors estimate the efficiency in education using a Production Possibility Frontier estimated using 
the data envelopment analysis approach. Both input and output-oriented efficiency in public education and 
health services are estimated. There are eight output indicator in education referring to primary and 
secondary enrollment, average years of schooling, first and second level completion rates, and literacy rates 
among youth. There are four output indicators for health referring to life expectancy at birth, DPT 
immunization, measles immunization and the disability-adjusted life expectancy index. For more 
information on these estimates, see Herrera and Pang (2004), and Annex A in World Bank (2007b).    
68 The Central Bank of Honduras estimates that FDI represented an average of 2 percent of the GDP during 
the 1990s, and increased to 3.5 percent during the 2000-02 period (Banco Central de Honduras 2004). 
According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and The Caribbean (2008b), FDI amounted to 
roughly 8 percent of the GDP during the 2005-07 period. 
, 
Honduras still has significant work ahead to encourage further expansion of investment, 
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specifically when it comes to offering better protection to investors, enforcing contracts, 
and lowering the start-up costs of business 69
The new administration of President Zelaya has also taken steps towards tackling the 
historical problem of corruption
.  
70, but its actions so far have been ambiguous. After 
strong bargaining and significant compromises 71
                                                 
69 The World Bank “doing-business index” ranks Honduras 134 among 181 countries in 2008. 
Decomposing the index we find areas such as enforcing contracts, paying taxes, protecting investors, and 
employing workers, in which Honduras ranks among the 20 worst nations to do business. Honduras 
performs very well with regard to accessing credit (25th), and performs around the mean with regard to 
dealing with construction permits (70th) and registering property (85th). See 
 between civil society and international 
organizations one the one hand and members of Congress on the other, Honduras passed 
the Transparency Law in 2006, aimed at increasing accountability in the management of 
public funds. The law is administered by the new Access to Public Information Institute 
(IAIP for its initials in Spanish). However, it is questionable whether this institute will 
administer the law fairly, primarily because the appointment procedure for the three 
commissioners in charge of administering the institution is subject to political favoritism. 
Furthermore, still too many funds are exempted from public disclosure with the approval 
of IAIP, which constitutes a violation of the Transparency Law as well as other 
international treaties on corruption to which Honduras is a signatory. All in all, the 
perception among the civil society is that despite the actions taken by the government, 
too much latitude still exists for corruption to continue unabated (Consejo Nacional 
Anticorrupcion 2007).  
http://www.doingbusiness.com.       
70 According to the corruption perception index estimated by Transparency International, Honduras ranks 
very low in terms of transparency (high in terms of corruption), actually in the 132nd place among 180 
nations worldwide, and 26th among 32 Latin American nations in 2008. http://www.transparency.org.     
71 A strong source of disagreement between Congress and advocacy groups was the treatment of previous 
administrative acts. Finally, the new Transparency Law does not contemplate the investigation of previous 
administrations.  
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The government has also taken a proactive role to increase its legitimacy by approving 
the Civil Participation Law (Ley de Participacion Ciudadana) in 2006 with the goal of 
improving the participation of civil society in the policymaking process. Still, despite this 
effort, participation 72
However, the public perception on corruption has not been altered much by the initiatives 
of the government cited above. Allegations of corruption in the Attorney General’s 
Office in favor of powerful politicians and strong economic groups, the inaction of the 
government before these accusations, and the latter threats and acts of violence against 
some of the district attorneys involved in the strike are just contributing to the skepticism 
 remains extremely low, and constitutes a real threat to the 
democratic process (Coleman and Argueta 2008). 
Despite the poor guarantees offered to political opponents and the limitations regarding 
freedom of speech, grassroots organizations are contributing to the fight against 
corruption mainly through monitoring of the policymaking process and engaging in the 
formulation of policy proposals. The participation of these grassroots groups is seen as 
one option to reform governance through higher participation of civil society in 
policymaking. Increasing the participation of civil society in policymaking can prove 
effective to diminish the capture of the government by strong interest groups, not only by 
countering the pressure of historically vested interest groups, but also by increasing the 
legitimacy of public institutions, currently so depreciated in Honduras (Coleman and 
Argueta 2008).  
                                                 
72 The America’s Barometer survey measures civil society participation as the share of respondents that 
report (1) participation in local government meetings; (2) making demands before the local government; (3) 
participation in civil society organizations (e.g., church, parent’s association at school, community 
development meeting) .     
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of the public about the willingness of seriously tackling corruption (Coleman and Argueta 
2008).      
5.2.1 LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENDA SETTING 
By design, the institutional framework in Honduras grants legislative power to the 
Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, the Judicial Branch, and the National Electoral 
Tribunal. However, the evidence regarding legislative activity highlights the dominant 
role of the President in the policy making process 73. The subordination of the Legislature 
to the will of the Executive has led some analysts to categorize the Honduran Congress as 
a marginal legislature, with modest policy-making power and little support from political 
elites. New evidence, however, call into question this categorization, for Legislatures 
have been found to play a larger part in policy making than previously expected (Taylor-
Robinson and Diaz 1999). Furthermore, an analysis of the legislative-sponsored 
legislation highlights the dominant role of Congress leaders, that is, members of the 
Board of Directors, in the policy making process 74
There has never been a divided government in the democratic history of Honduras. 
Analysts have proposed alternative explanations for this behavior. Calix (2001) argues 
that the electoral system has greatly contributed to this behavior, given that until 1997 
presidential and legislative elections were fused, that is, voting for a presidential 
.  
                                                 
73 Taylor-Robinson and Diaz (1999) found that no less than 66 percent of the bills passed into law annually 
during the period 1990-97 were initiated by the Executive Branch, and in 1992, a peak of 81 percent of the 
bills passed into law were initiated by the President. Ajenjo (2004) reports that 62 percent of the bills 
passed into law during the period 1997-2001 were sponsored by the President; furthermore, this author 
reports that roughly two thirds of the laws sponsored by the Executive branch were approved during the 
first half of the presidential period.  
74 Taylor-Robinson and Diaz (1999) found that 67 percent of the legislative-sponsored proposals enacted 
into law during the period 1990-97 were initiated by Congress leaders; on the other hand, only 23 percent 
of the legislative-sponsored proposals that died in commission were initiated by Congress leaders.  
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candidate implied voting also for his/her congressmen. Furthermore, the ballot did not 
include the names of the congressmen, whose designation was done ad-hoc by party 
authorities after the election (Taylor-Robinson 2006). This system led to similar electoral 
results at both the executive and legislative levels and to a great subordination of 
legislators to party authorities, which consequently resulted in the hegemony of one 
political force and one ideology in government. Another aspect of the electoral system 
blamed for the dominance of unified governments is the fact that presidential and 
legislative elections are both held the same day. This feature is believed to enhance the 
role of the president, spreading the intentions to vote at the presidential level to the 
legislative election. 
Against the expectations derived from political science theories about the role of 
institutional design, the proportional representation system used in Honduras has not 
proven effective in promoting a multiple-party system (Calix 2001). Despite the growing 
importance of three minority political parties in the last two electoral cycles, the two 
leading parties, namely, the Liberal and National parties, continue to dominate the 
political arena 75
Since 2001, the party controlling the Executive Branch has no absolute majority in 
Congress. This composition of the Legislature has the potential to create a divided 
. According to Taylor-Robinson (2006), the two leading, conservative, 
pro-elite parties maintain their dominance through parochialism, primarily among poor, 
rural communities.  
                                                 
75 Argueta (2007) estimates that the number of effective political parties has remained close to 2 up to the 
1997 election, and has increased to 2.4 in the latest 2005 election, which indicates only a slight move to a 
multi-party system. The author argues that changes in the electoral system introduced in 1997 might be the 
main reason behind the increase in the effective number of political parties.   
 170 
 
 
government 76
Another relevant feature of the Honduran legislative process is the relevance of priority 
relative to ordinary policy initiatives
. However, reality indicates that the ideological differences between the 
three minority parties and the main opposition party, that is, the National Party, make the 
conformation of an opposing coalition highly unlikely (Ajenjo 2007). 
77
Some changes in electoral regulations implemented in 2005 might contribute to a more 
proactive role of Congress and new channels through which interest groups might 
permeate Congress. For instance, starting in 2005 voters cast their votes for particular 
legislators within a party of their choice, thus transferring the power of selecting 
. Priority initiatives call for more expedite 
legislative processes; according to analysts, priority initiatives are prone to be subject to 
less public exposure and hence can be used to the benefit of the proponent (Ajenjo, 
2004). 
All in all, the constitutional and procedural characteristics of the Honduran Legislative 
highlight the dominant role of the President and, to a lesser extent, Congress leaders, and 
the limited channels through which the preferences of the public can reach the relevant 
legislative agenda. Interests groups with enough lobbying power to affect the agenda of 
the President and Congress leaders are in a prime position to achieve their policy goals 
relative to other interest groups.  
                                                 
76 The current Legislature is composed as follows: 62 representatives from the Liberal Party (the same party 
that controls the Executive Branch); 55 representatives from the National Party; 5 representatives from the 
Democratic Unification Party; 4 representatives from the Christian Democratic Party of Honduras; and 2 
representatives from the Innovation and Unity Party.  
77 Ninety four percent of the laws enacted in Honduras during the 1997-01 period were priority initiatives, 
and 62 percent of these priority initiatives were sponsored by the Executive Branch. This implies that the 
use of this categorization of policy proposals is not exclusive of the President, and that legislators also 
engage in the use of priority initiatives (Ajenjo, 2004).  
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particular legislators away from party authorities. This change in the institutional 
framework is expected to generate a stronger relationship between congressmen and 
society, and a more independent behavior of congressmen vis-à-vis party authorities 
(Taylor-Robinson, 2006). To date, however, there is no clear evidence on a change in 
legislative behavior.   
Hence, reaching the Presidential agenda is still crucial for a proposal to have high 
chances of serious policy consideration. So the relevant question is who sets the 
Presidential agenda in Honduras. As previously said, the current administration 
sponsored the Civil Participation Law with the goal of improving the participation of 
civil society in the policy making process. This law creates new channels through which 
the organized civil society can place their demands to local and national authorities. 
However, these measures by themselves would likely be insufficient to enhance the 
participation of society in the policy making process; complementary measures are 
needed to develop the interest of civil society to participate in the policy making process 
(Coleman and Argueta, 2008).   
5.3 TOWARDS A NEW AGENDA FOR HONDURAN AGRICULTURE: MAIN FEATURES           
The World Bank and other development organizations are pushing for a new agricultural 
agenda for developing countries aimed at fostering economic growth and alleviating 
poverty. The guidelines provided by these initiatives, drawn primarily from the successes 
and failures of countries worldwide, emphasize the work in seven particular areas, 
namely, (1) improving price incentives, (2) enhancing the quantity and quality of public 
investment, (3) making product markets work better, (4) facilitating access to financial 
services and reduce the exposure to unsecured risks, (5) enhancing the performance of 
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producer organizations, (6) promoting innovation through science and technology, and 
(7) making agriculture more sustainable (World Bank 2007c). 
Analysts agree on the importance that interest groups and institutions have when it comes 
to explaining certain policy outcomes. Economists and others alike have long realized the 
existence of political markets that distort policy outcomes away from those forecasted 
based on social welfare objectives (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis, 2002, Baldwin 1989, 
Hillman 1982). Policymaking can be simply understood as a bargaining process engaged 
by politicians and interest groups and played within the rules set by the relevant political 
institutions. Politicians might pursue different goals, such as remaining in power, 
favoring their constituencies, or improving the overall welfare of the country; they can 
also employ alternative strategies or policies to achieve them. Interest groups might also 
pursue different economic and social goals, such as demanding public action to fight 
poverty or, more often, simply improving the welfare of group members. The exchange 
might involve votes, jobs, money, or other forms of political support. Institutions have a 
significant role in setting the rules that constrain the actions of the players; but the 
institutional framework has also the potential to affect the goals of the players (e.g., 
reelection, disclosure of information), the size of the prize at stake (e.g., total budget), 
and the number of players involved (e.g., cost of entry for new groups).  
The political power of organizations is primarily a function of their ability to act 
collectively (overcoming the costs of organization and free-riding) and the resources at 
their disposal for political purposes (Olson 1965). The cost of organization is believed to 
vary inversely with the number of members in the group, their geographic dispersion, and 
constrained access to information. Collective action problems are usually exacerbated 
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also by the unequal distribution of endowments among group members, which might lead 
to intra-group differences in interests and magnitudes of the benefits/costs from a given 
policy outcome that yield differences in group member commitments to a given cause 78
Some ways to improve the transmission of price incentives to farmers are the removal of 
policies biased against agriculture (e.g., taxation of agricultural exports and protection of 
imports), improvements in market infrastructure, institutions, and support services. For 
different reasons, developing countries have historically taxed agriculture. Despite the 
decreasing bias against agriculture observed worldwide, agriculture in developing 
countries can still perceive sizeable gains from the removal of trade barriers in developed 
and developing nations. In the particular case of Honduras, and as measured by the 
pattern of trade tariffs, there is no evidence of a bias against agriculture. The government 
applies no export tariffs on any product, including agricultural goods, and maintains low 
import tariffs on most products employed as inputs in agricultural production; 
furthermore, it maintains significant protection on few agricultural products. Information 
on the pervasiveness of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in Honduras is scarce, but the evidence 
suggests that the schedule of NTBs maintained actually grant extra-protection to some 
Honduran agricultural sectors. It is a fact that Honduras maintains a number of sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures in products such as poultry, potatoes, and dairy, whose 
rationale have been questioned in multilateral and, most intensively, in regional forums. 
Central American partners have raised several complaints over the last several years 
.  
                                                 
78 In some instances, heterogeneity among group members might actually help overcome the problems of 
collective action. Such might be the case of large farmers that, given the endowments of resources owned, 
are exposed to lose significantly from a given policy outcome, and are consequently willing to take a 
proactive role in organizing group action.   
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about the trade-distorting effects and poor scientific grounds of some of the measures 
maintained by Honduras (Tovar-Diaz 2006). 
From a distributional point of view, Honduras has improved the quality of rural spending, 
moving from largely providing private goods to investing in rural infrastructure and 
social assistance. Public spending on rural infrastructure accounts for over half of total 
public spending in rural areas. However, the evidence is clear in that the Honduran 
government has for long time underfunded agriculture. This is not different to what has 
been observed across developing, agricultural-based countries worldwide. The 
information in Table 5.1 below indicates that while the Honduran government has 
devoted a normal share of its budget to rural areas relative to the Latin American region, 
it has vastly underfunded the rural sector relative to its economic importance compared to 
the regional standard. More recent information indicates a further deterioration in the 
agricultural budget; on average, funds for agriculture 79
                                                 
79 This includes the public budget of the Secretary of Agriculture plus the budgets of the decentralized 
Agricultural Science and Technology Direction (DICTA), the National Direction of Sustainable Rural 
Development (DINADERS), and the National Fund for Sustainable Rural Development (FONADERS). 
 as a share of total government 
spending decreased to an average 2.5 percent since 2006 (Secretaria de Finanzas 2008, 
Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico 2007b).  
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Table 5.1. Relative measures of agricultural support granted to agriculture in Honduras and 
Latin America 
PERIOD  RURAL EXPENDITURE  IAO 2 
  Honduras Latina America  Honduras  Latin America 
  PI RI 3 SA 4 Total5 Total1  1   
1985-90  58.1% 37.3% 4.6% 4.3% 7.7%  0.15 1.02 
1991-95  27.2% 56.2% 16.6% 6.74 6.5%  0.12 0.82 
1996-01  29.2% 57.9% 13.0% 9.2% 5.9%  0.19 0.71 
Source: Soto-Baquero, Santos-Rocha and Ortega 2006. 
1 Expressed as a percentage of total public expenditures. 2 Index of agricultural orientation. It is estimated 
as the ratio of the share of agricultural expenditures in total public expenditure to the share of agricultural 
GDP in total GDP. An index of 1 indicates that the government is giving the sector the same importance in 
the budget allocation that it has in the economy.  3 share of expenditure on programs that promote 
production relative to total rural expenditure. 4 share of expenditure on rural infrastructure relative to total 
rural expenditure. 5 share of expenditure on social assistance programs relative to total rural expenditure. 
 
Improving investment in rural infrastructure entails (1) coordinated action among 
agricultural institutions as well as across other areas of government and civil society to 
improve the bargaining power of the sector and to expand the agricultural budget (e.g., 
achieving a larger allocation of the public budget, or expanding the inflow of funds from 
international donors), (2) the prioritization in the allocation of the agricultural budget in 
areas with high economic and social returns, and (3) improving the conditions for an 
expansion of private investment in rural infrastructure. The evidence worldwide shows 
that high rates of returns might be achievable from investing in agricultural research and 
development (Alston et al 2000); yet public investment in agricultural R&D proved 
insufficient to improve the productivity of agriculture, and plummeted since structural 
adjustments were made in the early 1990s (SICTA 2007). For instance, the budget of the 
Agricultural Science and Technology Direction (DICTA for its initials in Spanish), in 
charge of most of the agricultural R&D, accounted for only 6 percent and 3 percent of 
total agricultural expenditure in 2004 and 2005, respectively (Serna 2007). Estimations 
based on information from the Secretary of Finance indicate that this share remained low 
at 6.5 percent for the period 2006-2008 (Secretaria de Finanzas 2008). Most producers of 
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staples, primarily corn and beans, receive no technical assistance and continue to use very 
outdated production technologies that yield very low productivity levels and endanger the 
sustainability of the resources (e.g., deforestation and tilling on hillsides without enough 
use of fertilizer).     
In an environment of shrinking public resources, it is imperative to ensure the 
participation of the private sector in the provision of certain services, and R&D and rural 
infrastructure (e.g., irrigation) can be areas of particular interest. The initiatives under the 
Central American Agricultural Policy 80
                                                 
80 Honduras, along with other six nations from the region, are cooperating within the framework of PACA 
towards creating more integrated agricultural markets that could spark sustainable agricultural development 
in the region by creating more favorable conditions for private and public investment in agriculture, 
particularly regarding research and development, encouraging the adoption of new management strategies 
to achieve economies of scale and gain competitiveness, and to increase the bargaining power of the region 
in agricultural forums. PACA is also envisioned to spark regional cooperation and action in other areas not 
directly under the umbrella of the ministries of agriculture but that are closely associated with the fate of 
agriculture, such as movement of factors of production and development of rural infrastructure (Consejo 
Agropecuario Centroamericano 2007).  
 
 (PACA for its initials in Spanish) can prove 
fruitful by expanding the potential market for new technologies and allowing for 
economies of scale in R&D. It is also important to foster international cooperation in this 
area as well, and work closer with domestic research and education institutions such as 
the Pan-American Agricultural School (EAP for its initials in Spanish) and the Honduran 
Foundation for Agricultural Research (FHIA for its initials in Spanish). Delegating 
research and development activities to specialized independent organizations can prove 
cost-efficient, and can contribute to the transparency in the management of the 
agricultural budget. Extension is also crucial to improve the productivity of Honduran 
staple agriculture. The evidence suggests a significant gap between the technologies 
currently available in Honduras for the production of basic grains, and the technology 
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employed (SICTA 2007). This points to the relevance of improving extension services 
and overcoming the financial constraints of farmers; new investment in R&D will be 
profitable only conditional on the innovation being adopted by producers.    
The potential gains from improvements in the quality of institutions relate to the quality 
in the allocation of the budget and the potential expansion of the budget to be allocated. 
Corruption in Honduras has significant social, economic, and political costs. The 
Anticorruption Board estimates that the misallocation of public funds due to corruption 
has slowed economic growth lately by some 2 percentage points; even more important 
might be the direct costs of corruption, which are estimated to have reduced the public 
budget by an amount equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP (Consejo Nacional Anticorrupcion 
2007). These estimates do not account for the missed opportunities in investment and 
cooperation that corruption might have generated. All in all, it is imperative for Honduras 
to improve the transparency in the management of resources to achieve sustainable 
economic growth, better governance, and social stability.  
Farmers have expressed their concerns about the lack of agricultural credit. Private banks 
have reduced the share of their agricultural portfolios significantly, and public banks have 
not allocated enough funds to finance agriculture for over a decade. The high risk of 
agricultural production, the lack of assets that could serve as collateral, and a culture of 
no repayment on loans are cited as the main reasons behind the lack of financial 
resources serving this sector (Villalobos, Deugd and Ochoa 2006). These characteristics 
are far more common among small farmers and, to a less extent, among medium size 
farmers, than among large commercial farmers. This explains why only a few large farms 
account for most of the agricultural credit received from formal private and public banks 
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(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2007). Small farmers have relied primarily on informal 
financial institutions such as input suppliers, wholesalers, and truckers. The lack of 
bargaining power of most small farmers leads to a high cost of credit; furthermore, this 
type of financing is always very short term, which constrains the use of these funds for 
intermediate and long-term productive investment. Cooperatives have devoted more 
funds to agriculture than private and public banks over the last several years. However, 
there is also a trend towards abandoning agriculture and moving to serve the urban 
population (Villalobos, Deugd and Ochoa 2006). The number of microfinance institutions 
has increased significantly after Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras in 1998; there are more 
than 3,000 microfinance institutions operating in Honduras, and these are usually the only 
source of financing in remote rural areas. The agricultural loans they offer are always 
short term, and are commonly used for purchasing inputs rather than investment. Many 
microfinance institutions have benefited from the Basic Grain National Plan (PNGB for 
its initials in Spanish) implemented in 2006. As part of the PNGB, the Technological 
Stamp program (BT for its initials in Spanish) contemplates the distribution of seeds and 
fertilizer for up to 0.7 hectares among some 80,000 eligible farmers conditional on 
repayment after harvest. Some 200 microfinance institutions are in charge of 
administering the BT program, and the funds collected from farmers are kept as new 
assets for future services.  
The discussion in the paragraph above highlights the difficult task that lays ahead to 
improve financial services to agriculture, particularly to smallholder farming. It will 
require coordinated action among public and private institutions to articulate actions 
aimed at lowering the production and market risks, increasing the guarantees, and 
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creating the economic incentives for formal financial institutions to extend their services 
to agriculture. Some proposals include (1) lowering the reserve account for banks 
offering credit lines to agriculture, (2) lowering reserve requirements on unsecured 
credits, namely, those offered without assets as collateral, and (3) increasing the interest 
rate cap placed by the Central Bank to account for the higher cost of operation incurred in 
reaching out to the agricultural sector (Villalobos, Deugd and Ochoa 2006). It is also 
imperative to speed up the release of land titles but, more importantly, to advance in the 
implementation of the agrarian reform. In reference to solving the problem of unequal 
access to land, the World Bank (2007c) states that, 
 “As long as such fundamental conflicts - often threatening people’s lives – 
remain unresolved, using agriculture for development remains a distant goal.” (p. 
246).   
 
Increasing the power and representativeness of farm organizations is essential to mobilize 
support for agriculture and contribute to the formulation of better policies. As commented 
above, substantial changes at all levels of government are needed to improve governance 
and participatory policymaking. But significant changes are needed within agriculture to 
(1) strengthen its lobbying position vis-à-vis other powerful sectors outside agriculture, 
and (2) increase the efficiency in the allocation of resources by overcoming the power of 
politically enfranchised agricultural groups. Previous experiences in other nations show 
some ways of improving the empowerment of disadvantaged rural groups such as 
smallholder farmers, so numerous in Honduras. One of the best practices to promote 
empowerment of small farmers is through the creation of sustainable cooperation. 
Cooperative association has the potential of raising the economic and political power of 
small farmers. It has proven to be one way for small farmers to reap the benefits of 
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globalization and the associated changes in the food supply system (e.g., increasing 
importance of supermarkets and differentiated products). Smallholders who have 
succeeded as suppliers for supermarkets have generally overcome these obstacles by 
forging cooperatives or enrolling in out-grower schemes, and previous experiences show 
that the government can play a significant role in fostering these arrangements 81
The formulation of agricultural policies and programs must be professionalized. Inputs 
from domestic and international think tanks must be considered when designing 
agricultural policies and programs. Too often programs are implemented based on 
inadequate scientific and empirical evidence about the linkages between the applied 
intervention and the goals to be achieved. It is also important to socialize the proposals in 
 (Food 
and Agriculture Organization 2004). Furthermore, the changes in food markets in 
Honduras (e.g., rapid expansion of supermarkets) and its proximity to the largest market 
in the world (and consequently, relatively low cost of transportation) make the 
opportunity cost of non-cooperation even higher. Initiatives such as Honduras Compite, 
aimed at easing investment by providing technical assistance to prospective investors, are 
good steps to secure a higher level of investment, but more efforts will be needed to 
guarantee that benefits from these programs can spread to small farmers. Previous 
experiences also point to the importance of promoting these multi-sector enterprises 
while avoiding the capture of the government by private interests (World Bank 2007c). 
                                                 
81 In Zambia, for instance, the government partnered with small farmers, agro-processors, input suppliers, 
and the largest supermarket chain to secure the supply of high-value vegetables at the required sanitary 
standard and in a timely manner. Similar examples are found in Mexico, where cooperation among small 
vegetable family farms led to product differentiation and significant penetration in the U.S. market, which 
has increased over 5 times the average income of the associated farm households (Food and Agriculture 
Organization 2004).      
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order to identify potential problems related to incomplete or erroneous understanding of a 
given situation, as well as to raise awareness and increase political support for the 
initiative. It is also crucial for policies to incorporate evaluation tools and a clear 
benchmark for accountability. This feature, commonly absent in agricultural programs 
worldwide, is key to being able to assess the appropriateness of the program for the 
problem at hand, and to correct the course of action (e.g., modifying the program or 
eliminating it altogether) in the event that predetermined outcomes are not being 
achieved. 
The Secretary of Agriculture, as expressed in the 2004 Strategic Plan for the Agricultural 
Sector (PESA for its initials in Spanish) has decided to engage in significant institutional 
reform aimed at increasing the efficiency in the use of the resources and becoming more 
attentive to the demands of stakeholders. The plan also advocates for improvements in 
the design of programs that better serve the national policy goals, which would 
potentially provide a good opportunity for policy analysts to increase their contributions 
to the policy process. For the most part, the strategy provides broad guidelines in 
different areas of interest (e.g., competitiveness and quality and supply chain integration), 
but does not advance into the specific desirable characteristics of particular programs. 
This gives enormous flexibility for the proposal of adjustment programs, and increases 
the opportunity of selecting the alternative that best fits a specific scenario.       
5.4 POLICY PROCESS: DESIGNING ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS FOR THE BASIC GRAIN 
SECTOR 
The Honduran basic grain sector is one of the largest employers in rural areas; it is 
estimated that basic grains represent the main activity for roughly 350,000 farmers 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2007), and employ indirectly (counting indirect job 
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creation plus dependents) more than 1.5 million people out of a total population estimated 
at 7.2 million. Furthermore, the areas where basic grains are produced are among the 
poorest in the country (Secretaria de Industria y Comercio 2003).  
The basic grain sector is characterized by the heterogeneity among farmers regarding 
access to land, technology, capital, and consequently, productivity and competitiveness. 
For instance, data from the last two production years 2006 and 2007 show that the 
average corn farm planted just 1 hectare and obtained only 2 mt per hectare; however, 
when corn farms are disaggregated, we find a large number of subsistence farms, 
primarily located on the hillsides, whose acreage and yields are well below the national 
average, and commercial farms, operating primarily in valleys and having more resources 
at their disposal (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2007). Among commercial farms, the 
differences in endowments and technologies are significant as well. While large 
commercial farms operate an average of 14 hectares and obtain yields roughly three times 
higher than the national average, small commercial farms operate on average 2 hectares 
and obtain an average yield of 1 mt per hectare, below the national average (Escuela 
Agricola Panamericana 2004). The same characteristics apply to the bean sector as well, 
since in fact most bean farms incorporate corn in their annual rotations. Rice farms, 
though not associated in production with corn and bean farms, are also characterized by 
high heterogeneity. Based on information for the year 2004, 30 percent of rice farms, 
those adopting better production management practices, operate an average of 16 
hectares, and account for 88 percent of the total rice acreage and 93 percent of total rice 
output. The remaining 70 percent of rice farms operate on average only 1 hectare, 
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obtaining average-yields equal to a third of those obtained by large farms (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica 2004).  
The removal of import barriers to staples coming from the U.S. negotiated in DR-
CAFTA, along with the expiration of the purchase agreements between corn and rice 
farms and the processing industry 82
Others share the same concerns regarding the fate of basic grain agriculture. According to 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, there is a high probability that commercial farms 
as well as a some segments of family farms, more precisely those more capitalized and 
connected to the markets, will be able to adjust and reap the benefits of free trade. 
, is likely to put downward pressure on domestic 
market prices. At the farm level, lower output prices would lower the profitability of 
those farms producing primarily basic grains, likely reducing the income of those 
operating at high costs to levels insufficient to afford the basic needs of the household. 
These high cost, primarily but not exclusively subsistence, farms, face severe on-farm 
constraints, such as insufficient access to credit, and poor human and social (networking) 
capital, as well as off-farm limitations, such as poor infrastructure and low human capital 
available in rural areas, that limit their chances of adapting to the new, more competitive 
market conditions. Without appropriate public intervention, DR-CAFTA, instead of 
becoming the source of new and better opportunities for basic grain farmers and the rural 
communities where these activities prevail, is likely to impose a burden that will lead to 
the collapse of numerous farm businesses, endangering the subsistence of rural 
communities, and increasing rural poverty and rural-urban migration. 
                                                 
82 Every year since 1999, organized farmers and the food processing industry negotiate the reference prices 
and volumes that the latter will purchase from the former. Based on the volumes purchased domestically, 
import rights are granted to food processing industries properly register to import.  
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However, a large number of family farms, primarily those with severe resource 
constraints, will likely be forced out of agriculture, and either migrate to urban areas or 
even other countries, or be employed in the rural area (Soto-Baquero, Rogriguez-Fazzone 
and Falcioni 2007). Public policy should then create the conditions for these changes to 
be facilitated, namely, giving farmers with potential to compete the help necessary to 
reorganize their production process, and giving those farmers forced (by market forces) 
to abandon the agricultural production activity, the skills and information needed to 
relocate and secure a better source of income.  
In what follows, I will discuss the design of adjustment programs for the basic grain 
sector of Honduras following to some extent the traditional linear policy development 
model 83
5.4.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 in that the analysis will start with the definition of the problem, followed by a 
discussion of the feasibility of previous programs employed worldwide to address similar 
problems, and discussing the agenda setting strategy and implementation variables that 
should be considered to improve the odds of the proposal in the Honduran policy arena.   
Clearly defining interconnected public problems is increasingly difficult; yet, problem 
definition is crucial in guiding and framing solutions. Carefully drafting and socializing 
the definition of a problem is the first step towards successful policy formulation. 
Political scientists have for long stressed the importance of this enterprise. According to 
Rochefort and Cobb (1994), 
                                                 
83 The traditional linear policy development model can be represented as follows: problem definition  
agenda setting  policy formulation  policy implementation  policy evaluation.  
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“as a political discourse, the function of problem definition is at once to explain, 
to describe, to recommend, and, above all, to persuade” (p.15).  
 
The way in which an issue is defined into a problem may influence (1) the type of 
politicking that will develop around it; (2) its fate in the agenda of the relevant political 
institutions; and (3) the probability of achieving a desirable outcome. Furthermore, 
alternative definitions of the same problem have different probabilities of advancing in 
the agenda of particular institutions; put differently, institutions have selection principles 
that are satisfied to varying degrees by alternative problem definitions (Rochefort and 
Cobb 1994).  
It is not the intent of this section to provide a broad discussion on problem definition 
theory; instead, the goal is primarily to advance but one definition considered appropriate 
that would shape the discussion that follows, that is: “The increase in market competition 
resulting from the full-implementation of DR-CAFTA will put downward pressure on 
market prices for basic grains, benefiting those that are net consumers of these staples, 
but worsening the welfare of those households whose income depends greatly on these 
activities and that have severe limitations to adapt to the new market conditions. This 
new market condition would likely have a negative ripple effect on rural poverty in areas 
with already low social indicators.” 
An important step after defining a problem is the proper definition of the desirable 
outcome/s or the vision of the policy. Interconnected public problems are rarely solved 
completely; it is important to have this in mind particularly when designing the 
evaluation procedure and defining the target outcome (Luke 1998). One desirable narrow 
outcome to pursue for the particular problem defined in the previous paragraph could be 
to achieve a certain degree of compensation (which can be specified explicitly in the 
 186 
 
 
policy) in the income of basic grain farmers in the short to medium term, that is, 
throughout the life of the adjustment program. Another more comprehensive and 
preferable outcome, and actually the one chosen to guide the policy process in this study, 
is to help all agents in the basic grain supply chain secure a higher level of income 
through the acquisition of technologies and human capital, the expansion of the market, 
and improvement in the workings of factor and output markets.         
The interconnected nature of public problems such as the one defined here implies that 
there are seldom, if ever, quick fixes. They usually require concerted action from 
different levels of government in close association with private and civil society 
organizations to tackle specific issues contributing to the overarching problem. 
Sometimes, issues are both a symptom and a cause of other problems, which expands the 
boundaries of the policy analysis to other areas never expected (Luke 1998).   
5.4.2 FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS            
According to the World Bank (2007c), the feasibility of programs must be assessed on 
three grounds, namely, political, administrative, and financial or economic.  
First, a program must be politically feasible for it to have an opportunity for serious 
consideration in the political agenda. Political feasibility in the political economy 
framework discussed in the previous section implies finding or maximizing the number 
of policymakers in each of the relevant policy arenas willing to champion the proposal, 
while at the same time avoiding (to the extent possible) confrontation with powerful, 
politically vested interest groups. The political feasibility of a proposal depends on 
several factors such as (1) the characteristics of the problem (e.g., causality, severity, 
proximity) (Rochefort and Cobb 1994); (2) the leadership of advocates (both in favor of 
and opposition to the proposal) (Luke 1998); (3) the size and social perception of the 
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supporting as well as opposing coalitions as well as the cultural strategy of agenda setting 
and denial (Cobb and Ross 1997); and (4) the institutional framework (e.g., 
accountability of policymakers, reelection, and seniority system). 
Administrative feasibility relates to the capacity of the agencies in charge, either public, 
semi-public, or private, to implement the policy and programs effectively. The nature of 
the problem being addressed by any given policy defines to a large extent the urgency for 
action. Policies and programs designed to address problems that require urgent, short-
term public intervention must be designed taking serious consideration of the installed 
administrative capabilities. Some expertise and resources can be acquired in the short 
term, but a policy formulated without properly addressing the administrative limitations 
is likely to generate poor outcomes. Less urgent problems allow more for time to 
overcome the administrative limitations; human and capital resources can be improved to 
achieve the level of expertise required to administer a given policy or program.  
Finally, the fate of a policy proposal depends on its economic and financial feasibility, 
that is, whether or not it makes economic sense to invest in any given area, and whether 
or not the government would be able to finance such an enterprise. In a world of severely 
limited economic resources such as that of most governments in developing countries, it 
is crucial to use public resources wisely. However, many times programs that are superior 
from a social-welfare point of view are financially unfeasible (political feasibility aside). 
The goal of policy advocates should be to find financially feasible programs that provide 
the largest social-welfare improvements. 
An important dimension apparently taken as granted by the World Bank can be called 
“technical” feasibility; that is, selecting specific policy tools that are appropriate to 
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address the specific problem at hand. Based on Luke (1998), I would argue that technical 
feasibility can be disaggregated into (1) the appropriateness of the causality model 
considered; and (2) the appropriateness of the policy tools selected to achieve the desired 
outcomes conditional on the causality model selected. The interconnected nature of 
public problems might lead to an overwhelming number of causality models to be 
considered. However, to the extent possible, policy analysts should assess the validity of 
these causality models and propose strategies accordingly. All in all, policies designed 
with these feasibility analyses in mind are likely to fare better in the policy arena.  
5.4.3 REVIEW OF ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS 
Many countries worldwide have already faced the same dilemma when it comes to free 
trade: how to work towards improving social welfare while at the same time easing the 
transition of those agents standing to lose from the policy reform. Following is a brief 
discussion of some of the most common strategies employed. 
5.4.3.1  Decoupled Payment Programs 
Decoupled payment (DP) programs 84
                                                 
84 Decoupled payments are defined as lump-sum income transfers to farm operators that do not depend on 
current production, factor use, or commodity prices (Burfisher and Hopkins 2003) 
 have been used in general to compensate farmers 
for a decrease in income caused by changes in agricultural policies. For instance, the U.S. 
introduced the Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) program in 1996 in an attempt to 
increase the market-orientation of U.S. agriculture while still providing significant 
support to agriculture in compliance with the regulation of the newly-implemented World 
Trade Organization. The European Union also implemented the Single Farm Payment 
(SFP) program in 2003 as part of a significant reform of the Common Agricultural 
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Policy. Turkey and Mexico are examples of developing countries administering DP 
programs, and the challenges they encountered in the implementation and administration 
of these programs can prove very helpful for this analysis.     
In all cases, the basis for program qualification has been historical land usage, in some 
cases conditional on the previous historical enrollment in other programs (U.S.’s PFC and 
European Union’s SFP programs). While tenants are eligible to receive payments, the 
benefits commonly accrue directly or indirectly (through higher renting costs) to 
landlords.  
The evidence shows that DP programs are good for protecting the income of recipients, 
but that employing them to promote the reallocation of resources is questionable. The 
latest evaluation of Mexico’s DP program Procampo finds that the program accounts for 
20 percent of the total expenditure of eligible farm households, thus serving to achieve 
the primary goal for which the program was implemented. The program has resulted in 
significantly higher levels of consumption among recipients relative to the control group 
(Yunez-Naude 2007). U.S.’s PFC program transfers amounted to an average of 9 percent 
of net farm income over 1996-2001, which also shows the efficiency of DP programs as 
an income-stabilization intervention (Burfisher and Hopkins 2003). A preliminary 
assessment of the DP program in Turkey suggests that it compensated the income of 
recipients for about half of the decrease in income resulting from agricultural reform 
(World Bank 2004). However, the evidence is clear in that Procampo has had no effects 
on resource reallocation (Yunez-Naude 2007). Furthermore, the low distorting feature of 
DP programs has been questioned on the grounds that they encourage resources to remain 
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in production in eligible sectors rather than moving according to market forces (Baffes 
and De Gorter 2005).   
The evidence shows that the distribution of DP funds is skewed towards larger units since 
payments are based on historical production. For instance, in 2003 1.5 percent of the 5.2 
million farm holdings participating in the SFP program received 27 percent of the 
transfers, while 76 percent of farm holdings, all characterized as small, received only 16 
percent of total program transfers (Schmid, Sinabell and Hofreither 2006). In the U.S., 
commercial farms (those with more than $250,000 in annual sales) were fewer, around 10 
percent of participant farms, but accounted for over half of the PFC payments in 2001 
(Burfisher and Hopkins 2003). In Mexico, an evaluation of Procampo based on 
information from 2005 shows that the distribution of program benefits is highly unequal, 
with 3 percent of the largest farmers receiving over 30 percent of the transfers, and 60 
percent of the transfers going to only 30 percent of the recipients 85
1. Good historical records on land ownership and use, which are required to 
determine program eligibility. This represented a problem in Turkey and Mexico, 
where no detailed statistics existed. Pilot projects had to be implemented to 
determine the best way of generating the records needed.     
 (Yunez-Naude 2007).     
Previous experiences suggest that administering decoupled payment programs demands a 
high level of administrative capabilities as well as financial resources (Baffes and De 
Gorter 2005). It entails having:  
                                                 
85 The Gini coefficient estimated considering the transfers of the program is 0.6.  
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2. Institutional capabilities to deliver the services, which in the case of staple crops 
in developing countries usually imply reaching out eligible recipients in remote 
areas where agricultural agencies have no permanent presence; 
3. Significant financial resources to transfer amounts that could have desirable 
multiplicative effects.        
At first sight, it seems reasonable to consider DP programs as a viable option that could 
help compensate basic grain farmers in Honduras for the potential losses of income 
generated by DR-CAFTA. However, assessing the technical feasibility of DP programs, 
the conclusion is that too many requirements must be satisfied for the program to truly 
ameliorate the problem. Assuming a DP program will have a long-lasting positive income 
effect among recipients implies making many other implicit assumption such as that (1) 
the funds will be large enough so as to stimulate a level of investment that would have a 
significant impact in the productivity of the farm; (2) farmers will actually invest these 
funds and do not use them to improve current consumption profiles; and (3) recipients, 
well aware of what the future holds for them and the temporal nature of these payments, 
decide to invest these funds in human capital so as to increase their chances to secure a 
good income in other activities, either in or outside agriculture. These assumptions, to 
cite only some, do not stand before the evidence presented above, particularly the 
evidence coming from developing countries.  
Besides the technical infeasibility, a DP program for the Honduran basic grain sector 
would likely not stand the financial feasibility. A simple exercise can serve as an 
example. Let us assume that the target income effect of a DP program to fully offset the 
decrease in income of basic grain households is set at 5 percent (that is, that income of 
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basic grain producers will decrease only 5 percent as a result of the changes brought 
about by DR-CAFTA relative to a counterfactual). Let us also assume that the 
administrative cost of a program like this will be roughly the same that the estimated for 
Mexico’s Procampo, roughly 3 percent of the program transfers 86
A DP program also seems unfeasible from an administrative point of view. To cite just 
some of the problems readily observable, Honduras does not have a good record of land 
use, and as previously commented above, many farmers, primarily smallholders, have no 
property titles. The National Institute of Statistics (INE for its initials in Spanish) 
. Based on the income 
of the representative basic grain household estimated in the Social Accounting Matrix 
developed for this study, the cost of the program would amount to 30 percent of the total 
public expenditure on agriculture or 48 percent of the total budget of the Secretary of 
Agriculture over the last three years. When the administrative cost of the program is 
assumed at 10 percent of the transfers, the total cost rises to 35 percent and 51 percent of 
the total budget allocated to agriculture and the total budget of the Secretary of 
Agriculture in 2006-08. Finally, if we set the target income effect of the program at 10 
percent, and its administrative cost at 10 percent of total program transfers, then the cost 
of the program would be 75 percent of the annual total agricultural budget and 109 
percent of the annual average budget of the Secretary of Agriculture over the last three 
years. Committing such a large share of the budget to provide a private good that has a 
questionable technical feasibility could actually worsen the situation for basic grain and 
other agricultural agents, by depriving the already low provision of other services. 
                                                 
86 This administrative cost is actually considered low compared to the costs estimated in other countries 
(Yunez-Naude 2007) 
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conducts a survey among basic grain producers twice a year to collect basic information 
on production, but has no record on the entire population of basic grain producers. INE 
has the human resources and expertise to conduct a detailed census of the basic grain 
population, but creating an exhaustive record of production would entail investing 
significant resources.  
Finally, assessing the political feasibility of DP programs is more ambiguous. It entails 
assessing the mobilization of interest groups that a proposal like this might generate. At 
first sight, it seems reasonable to expect that large basic grain farmers might have greater 
incentives to lobby for a DP program based on the large benefits they might obtain. How 
strong the opposition from other agricultural interests outside the basic grain sector might 
be is unknown, and would depend on the services that will be sacrificed to implement the 
DP program. In the extreme case that the program might actually dry out most of the 
budget allocated to agriculture, the political feasibility seems at best slim.   
5.4.3.2 Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have proliferated among Latin American 
nations lately. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Honduras are but some of the 
countries using them for different purposes. CCT programs in the region have been used 
with the goal of reducing current poverty and breaking the inter-generational poverty 
cycle by improving human capital, primarily through improving access to education and 
health services for the youth, and training programs for the working-age population. 
These programs entail the transfer of certain amounts of money conditional on families 
achieving certain predetermined objectives (World Bank 2005). Eligibility to CCT 
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programs is usually related with the presence of children in poor households in the 
selected areas of influence.  
In Latin America, CCTs are not administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, but usually 
fall under the umbrella of other ministries such as the Ministry of Planning in Chile, or 
other decentralized agencies such as the Family Allowances Program (PRAF for its 
initials in Spanish) in Honduras. 
The fact that PRAF has evolved since its early stages to become a centerpiece in the fight 
against poverty in Honduras serves as evidence of its administrative, financial, and 
political feasibility. The experience of PRAF in Honduras indicates that many constraints 
that hindered the realization of the program objectives have been overcome. The 
institutional capabilities have improved since the early stages of PRAF, more particularly 
in areas such as targeting procedure (more transparent and better focused), transparency 
in the management of funds (transfers through the formal banking system), human and 
social capital of administrators, and information systems. Despite its shortcomings in 
achieving some specific goals, which resulted in strong political opposition during some 
periods, today the political power of PRAF is well established (Moore, 2008). PRAF 
itself is highly-politicized; the high employee turnover rates after elections are evidence 
of it 87
                                                 
87 All PRAF personnel were laid off after the 2002 elections. After the 2005 elections, all but 5 PRAF 
employees were laid off once again (Moore, 2008).   
. This characteristic undermines the creation of administrative memory and the 
achievement of a more efficient administration of the program. Financially, the program 
has had a significant cost, and has been financed primarily through external loans. 
Spending of PRAF represented 20 percent of the total anti-poverty spending in Honduras 
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between 1992 and 1997. The Inter-American Development Bank reports the difficulties 
of the Secretary of Finance to fulfill the budgetary commitments towards PRAF-II in 
2005, which resulted in delays in payments and hindered the achievement of the program 
objectives (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). Nevertheless, given that the 
program is well established within the Honduran Poverty Reduction Strategy, and 
provided the importance that the program might have in achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals, international donors have maintained their financial support to the 
program, despite the fact that the outcomes of the PRAF program have been marginal so 
far (Moore, 2008).     
The brief discussion in this section serves simply as an introduction to one of the most 
popular intervention tools employed to alleviate poverty in the Latin American region. 
The relevance for the case at hand is that poverty is highly predominant in the areas 
where basic grain production occurs, and actually affects many small basic grain farmers 
and wage workers. It is imperative that the government of Honduras and international 
donors continue allocating resources into the CCT programs currently administered by 
PRAF, and to take advantage of the expertise acquired by PRAF over the almost 20 years 
of existence. The Secretary of Agriculture must work closely with PRAF and other 
agencies to guarantee that their interventions complement each other and reach the target 
population, in this case farmers and wage workers in the basic grain sector, in a timely 
and sufficient manner.     
5.4.3.3 Technical Assistance Programs 
There is a large variety of technical assistance programs that an exhaustive discussion 
would require a study by itself. Thus, the discussion here briefly focuses on what has 
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been and is being done in Honduras regarding technical assistance, and what are some 
guidelines drawn from other experiences worldwide that could prove helpful to 
strengthen these programs in Honduras. 
The Farmer Training and Development program (EDA for its initials in Spanish) has 
operated in Honduras since 2006. Financed by the Millennium Challenge Account and 
administered by a consortium conformed by a private agribusiness company (FINTRAC 
Incorporated), the Pan-American School of Agriculture and the Honduran Foundation for 
Agricultural Research (FHIA for its initials in Spanish), this program has the overarching 
goal of improving the income level and sustainability of some 8,000 target farmers 
(roughly 15,000 hectares, which indicates that participants are predominantly 
smallholders) by providing technical assistance in the production of high-value 
vegetables 88
Regarding marketing, the program entails (1) facilitating the interaction between farmers 
and wholesalers or final retailers, (2) promoting production by contract, (3) coordinating 
production to guarantee a more stable supply throughout the year, and (4) improving 
access to marketing information. With regard to production, EDA contemplates the 
training of farmers in areas such as soil management, input use, pest control, as well as 
the introduction of types and improved varieties of vegetables. The program also 
promotes good management practices such as record keeping and management of 
pesticides and other chemicals. Finally, the other two areas of interest are post-harvest 
handling and financial management. EDA trains farmers and workers about good 
handling practices of the products so as to minimize quantity and quality losses. 
.  
                                                 
88 Information on the EDA program can be found at http://www.hondurasag.org  
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Regarding financial management, the program teaches farmers basic notions about how 
to prepare a budget or estimate potential profits, and assists them in the preparation of 
credit forms. 
Twenty five agronomists work for EDA, and each serves some 25 leading farmers. In 
turn, these leading farmers are the link to some 10 to 15 beneficiary farmers. All in all, 
then, each agronomist has influence on 250 to 325 farmers. Leading farmers are in charge 
of mobilizing beneficiary farmers, transmitting program information, and facilitating 
their farms for demonstrative activities conducted weekly by the agronomists.  
Eligibility to the program was conditional on the size of the farm (up to 50 hectares), the 
technological level employed (the requirement was to have a low technology), the access 
to reliable sources of water to implement irrigation, the participation in other technical 
assistance programs, and the willingness to provide farm-level information to the 
program managers as well as facilitating the use of the farms for demonstrative purposes 
(for leading farmers). Although no systematic evaluation of the benefits of the program 
has been conducted, a large number of success stories allow us to infer that the program 
is generating benefits for recipients (Farmer Training and Development Program 2008). 
On the downside, the cost of the program is high. Some L. 565 million is being allocated 
to the EDA program in 2008, which represents roughly 63 percent of the total budget of 
the Secretary of Agriculture. This implies that carrying an EDA-type of program that 
could reach at least smallholder farming currently producing basic grains is financially 
unfeasible, at least with the level of public funds devoted to agriculture over the last 
several years. Alternative sources of financing must be secured in order for a program 
like EDA to be implemented at a larger scale. 
 198 
 
 
Another important plan with some technical assistance component is the PNGB. This 
plan has been implemented in 2006 with the overarching goal of improving the 
productivity and competitiveness of the basic grain sector and reducing the dependency 
on imports, thus increasing food security (Food and Agriculture Organization 2008). The 
plan includes the Technological Stamp program (BT for its initials in Spanish), which 
contemplates the provision of inputs at subsidized prices, and the strengthening of several 
microfinance institutions serving small farmers and the poor. The Corn National Plan is 
another component of the PNGB, and contemplates the provision of technical assistance 
to corn producers, for which some 140 agronomists have been hired and some L 30 
million allocated annually to that end.  
To date there is no scientific evaluation of the PNGB. The national output data shows a 
significant increase in the production of basic grains over the last 4 years, but to what 
extent the increase was caused by the program remains unknown. Evaluation projects are 
currently being negotiated that could give some idea about the impact of the program on 
different outcome variables of interest. Some of the components of the PNGB, more 
precisely, the capitalization of microfinance institutions, the higher investment in 
infrastructure (primarily storage facilities), and the technical assistance granted to 
producers are desirable and likely to improve the economic sustainability of the sector. 
However, given the limited resources devoted to technical assistance (only 140 
agronomists for the whole basic grain sector), it is highly questionable that the technical 
assistance would make a difference, and it is not clear how this assistance is being 
provided. The subsidy component of the program is questionable, though. Allocation of 
subsidies must be managed apolitically, and measures must be taken to avoid creating 
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dependency on them (World Bank 2007c). Furthermore, subsidies might deter private 
input suppliers from entering the market, thus making the sustainability in the use of 
inputs less likely. The government, rather than substituting for private entrepreneurship, 
must encourage it, concentrating its efforts on increasing the technical capabilities of 
farmers to realize the benefits of achieving higher technological levels. 
5.5 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSAL 
Good program formulation calls for the identification of the most relevant problems 
facing the target population. As expressed in the Agricultural National Roundtable (MAN 
for its initials in Spanish), there is significant heterogeneity among basic grain farmers 
with regard to what they perceive as the dominant problems. Table 2.3, re-introduced 
below, enumerates the most relevant problems identified by the agents of the basic grain 
supply chain.  
The heterogeneity of the target group also requires flexibility in the programs to reach 
recipients with the right set of interventions. Different groups of farmers in different 
regions have particular needs that have to be addressed for a program to succeed, and 
programs must account for them and allow flexibility in the implementation so as to 
increase the odds of achieving the desired outcome. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the most effective solutions are those developed 
from the bottom-up, that is, from the needs of recipients, and not imposed by the 
government (Soto-Baquero, Rogriguez-Fazzone and Falcioni 2007). This approach is 
also desirable to improve the legitimacy of agricultural programs, an important aspect 
when it comes to assessing the political feasibility of a proposal. 
Finally, it is important for the new proposal to benefit from the accumulated experiences 
in administering other related programs. Challenges and successes with the 
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administration of established programs must be taken into consideration when designing 
the new proposal to reduce the likelihood of a failure. 
Table 5.2. Most relevant problems affecting the different agents throughout the agricultural 
supply chains. 
Small farmers 
• Outdated production and storage technology that limits both their 
productivity and quality of production. 
• Limited financial resources needed to adopt better production 
technologies. 
• Limited access to market information. 
• Poor infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and irrigation. 
• High cost of services, such as electricity, and inputs. 
Medium and large-size 
farmers 
• Outdated production and post-harvest technology that limits primarily 
their productivity and, to some extent, the quality of production. 
• Poor infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and irrigation. 
• High cost of services, such as electricity, and inputs. 
Wholesaler 
• Poor quality of product, which constrains the marketing opportunities 
for these products.  
• Poor infrastructure, primarily roads, which increases transaction costs. 
Processor 
• Poor quality of product and high price due to inefficiencies in previous 
stages of the supply chain, which lowers the competitiveness of the 
sector. 
• Limited financial resources needed to adopt better processing 
technologies. 
• High cost of inputs, such as electricity. 
Final retailer 2) Poor quality of domestic products, which at similar prices cannot 
compete with higher-quality imports from other countries. 
Source: Sanders, Ramirez, and Morazan (2006). 
A severe limitation to program design in Honduras is the lack of information 
representative at the sectoral level, particularly regarding income strategies. The impact 
of a reduction in the market price of basic grains as a result of the full implementation of 
DR-CAFTA on the economic welfare of farm households will depend on the weight of 
basic grains both as a source of income and expenditures, as well as on the flexibility of 
households to adjust their production and consumption strategies in light of changes in 
the relative price of products. The lack of reliable information greatly undermines 
program design, primarily when it comes to defining program focalization (definition of 
inclusion/exclusion conditions) and the magnitude of the compensation.    
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The review of current public interventions reveals the limited emphasis on technical 
assistance in areas such as production technology and administration. Honduras has 
revealed comparative advantages in the production of numerous fruits and vegetables vis-
à-vis its larger trading partners, that is, the U.S. (Monge-Gonzalez, 2004). At the same 
time, the U.S. corn and rice industries have shown to be more competitive than the 
Honduran corn and rice industries in the Honduran market (Secretaria de Industria y 
Comercio, 2003).  
Based on the above, the proposed intervention, rather than encouraging factor fixity in 
basic grain production, must promote the diversification of production away from low-
value basic grains into higher-value crops. An expansion of production in this direction 
will require significant efforts to create new markets or expand existing domestic and 
overseas markets.  
Furthermore, the review also reveals the limited efforts made with regard to empowering 
farmers; promoting farmers’ association is one way to improve their efficiency in 
production as well as their market leverage, more importantly in the presence of 
imperfect input and output markets.  
The evidence gathered leads me to support a policy with three major components: (1) a 
flexible technical assistance program with a back-loaded cost-share scheme through 
which farmers will be responsible for the total cost of the service by the end of the 
program; and (2) two financing programs aimed at improving the supply of short-term 
and medium-term credit to basic grain agriculture. 
The primary objectives of the proposed policy are:  
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1) With regard to economic welfare, the goal is to at least double the income derived 
from on-farm production through a combination of higher productivity of basic 
grains, and diversification of production to include high-value products such as 
fruits and vegetables. For basic grains specifically, the goal is to increase their 
productivity by at least 25 percent by the end of the first stage of the program 
(year 5) through the use of better quality of seeds and higher input levels, and the 
adoption of better production practices promoted by the program. 
2) Regarding farm administration, the program pursues the goals of creating good 
record-keeping habits (e.g., production, finances), and training farmers in the 
preparation of simple cost-benefit analyses to evaluate production alternatives.  
3) Regarding the sustainable use of natural resources, the goals of the program are to 
eliminate burning practices for weed control, promote the use of low tillage 
practices and levels, and employ good practices in the handling of inputs, 
particularly pesticides.  
4) With regard to empowerment, the goal of the program is to encourage the 
association among producers as a way to improve their bargaining power in the 
relevant input and output markets as well as to lower production costs through the 
promotion of cost-sharing practices in the use of production assets. 
5) Regarding the strengthening of agricultural financial markets, the goal of the 
program is twofold: (1) to improve the supply of short and medium-term 
agricultural loans, and (2) endowing local financial institutions in order to ensure 
a better provision of agricultural financing services in the long run. 
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In the three sections that follow, a description and a financial assessment of the specific 
programs is presented.       
5.5.1 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
The program as envisioned follows to some extent the design used in the EDA program. 
It relies significantly on (1) the extension capabilities of agronomists to serve as the 
nexus between the information supplied by the research community (e.g., Secretary of 
Agriculture, Pan-American Agricultural School, FHIA, the National School of 
Agriculture, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture) and the 
farmers, and (2) the leadership skills and willingness to participate of leading farmers.  
The program will have two stages. The first stage, envisioned to last 5 years, involves the 
full subsidization of technical assistance for all farm segments, that is, small, 
intermediate, and large farms. The second stage, also envisioned to last 5 years, 
introduces a cost-sharing scheme that would gradually transfer the cost of technical 
assistance to producers. This is the approach used, for instance, by the Rural Change 
program in Argentina, and has been proven successful to increase the technical level of 
small farmers with low dropout rates (Albanesi, et al. 2002).   
The size of farm groups will to a great extent determine the cost of the program. It is 
clear that the more the resources that can be devoted to farmers the better the results that 
might accrue. However, fiscal constraints increase the unfeasibility of working with small 
groups of farmers. The financial assessment of the program presented in Table 5.3 below 
considers three alternatives sizes, namely, 10, 15, and 20 members. 
 The proposal calls for a minimum of 2 visits a month to each group of farmers. To the 
extent possible, agronomists will be hired full time (hiring in a part-time basis will be 
considered in the event that the geographical distribution of groups does not require full 
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time dedication) on an annual basis, with automatic extension of the contract conditional 
on the performance of the groups and the feedback from farmers. Agronomists will be 
required to visit two groups a day on average (this implies that agronomists must have at 
least 3 hours to interact with the group in every visit), distributing the visits to specific 
groups as evenly as possible through the month. Agronomists will meet with program 
administrators once a month, where they will receive training and transmit the concerns 
they identify as relevant based on the interaction with farmers. Thus, the program is 
flexible in that it allows for the technical service provided by the program to adjust to the 
demands expressed by stakeholders; this process will take place within certain guidelines 
defined at the outset by the program administrators. 
Agronomists will transfer their knowledge to farmers primarily through on-farm 
demonstrations. Written technical material will be prepared by administrators using 
simple language for farmers to keep the relevant information for consultation.  
Agronomists must also fill out a form on a monthly basis aimed at assessing the progress 
of each group, and are encouraged to provide additional comments if necessary regarding 
member participation. The use of a harmonized form for all groups would ease the 
evaluation of the program, and also make an efficient use of the agronomists’ time.  
Beside agronomists, an open line of communication between farmers and program 
administrators must be maintained to serve as a check point on the performance of the 
agronomists; some alternative ways of communication are microfinance institutions and 
local governments involved with the program, as well as direct contacts between leading 
farmers and top administrators. 
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The program is envisioned as flexible with regard to the production that should be carried 
out by members. Although eligibility to the program is conditional on the production of 
basic grains, the program is decoupled, meaning that farmers will have the freedom of 
reallocating their resources into other production activities without risking their benefits 
from the program. As previously shown, the evidence suggest that misinformation about 
the decouple nature of the Procampo program in Mexico has contributed to the low 
impact of this program on factor reallocation; consequently, agronomists must explain the 
features of this program carefully to avoid misinformation about the decoupled nature of 
it.  
To the extent possible, the program must have a requirement regarding the homogeneity 
of group members with regard to the production being carried out and the technologies 
employed. The assumption here is that the more homogeneous the group is, the more 
likely farmers are affected by the same problems and would then have a relatively 
homogeneous demand for technical assistance. The experience with Cambio Rural in 
Argentina identifies the heterogeneity among members as the main cause of group 
failures (Albanesi, et al. 2002).  
Following is a cost-benefit analysis of the technical assistance program for small as well 
as intermediate and large basic grain households. The assessment is performed for a 
sample of 56,000 (approximately 20 percent of the population of basic grain households) 
based on the following assumptions: 
1) The technical assistance program extent 10 years. The cost of the service is fully 
absorbed by the government during the first five years. For small farms, the cost-
sharing scheme (the percentage absorbed by farmers) from year 6 to year 10 is: 
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10%, 25%, 45%, 70%, and 100%; for intermediate and large farms the cost-
sharing scheme is: 10%, 30%, 60%, 90%, and 100%. 
2) Agronomists working full time advice 22 farm groups (estimation based on 22 
working days a month). Their income is estimated to be 20 percent higher than 
the salary that the Secretary of Agriculture pays to agronomists working for the 
Basic Grains National Plan, plus a Christmas bonus equivalent to a full monthly 
income 89
3) The administrative cost of the program has a triangular distribution with a mean 
value equivalent to 20 percent of the cost of agronomists, and a minimum and 
maximum value equivalent to 4 percent and 36 percent of the expenses on 
agronomists. 
. Additionally, agronomists can claim up to 25 percent of their income 
for expenses related to the program, such as fuel and vehicle maintenance. These 
benefits are believed to be good incentives to ensure agronomists’ commitment to 
the program. 
4) The program’s benefits to farm households, expressed as a percentage of current 
on-farm income, have a triangular probability distribution with a minimum, mean, 
and maximum value of 75 percent, 100 percent, and 110 percent. Data on on-farm 
income by farm category (namely, small, intermediate, and large) comes from 
Jansen et al (2007). 
                                                 
89 The Christmas bonus is provided to all workers, either in the private or public sector, and is usually 
equivalent to an extra monthly salary. Hence, it is included in the estimation of the program cost. 
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5) Benefits are assumed to be perceived fully starting on year 5 of the program, and 
to be sustained for 15 years, that is, 10 beyond the span of the program 90
6) The program is financed through concessional loans following the terms implied 
by the Fund for Special Operations (FSO) offered by the Inter-American 
Development Bank. The FSO implies a 10-year grace period, a 40-year maturity 
term, and a 0.25-percent annual interest rate.  
. Other 
potential benefits of the program, such as improving the management of natural 
resources, and the potential creation of off-farm jobs related to the increase in 
commercial activities in rural areas, are not accounted for given the lack of 
reliable forecasts on expected outcomes. 
7) The discount rate used to estimate the net present value of the program is the 
interest rate charged by the FSO, namely, 0.25 percent a year. 
Table 5.3 below shows the financial results of the technical assistance program. The 
simulation entails 500 runs for each of the three group sizes, and accounts for the 
probability distribution of administrative costs as well as expected program benefits.  
The simulation results suggest that the cost of a program like the one proposed here will 
vary significantly depending on the group size adopted. Designing a program with small 
group sizes, namely 10 members, will cost an average of L 146 million a year for 10 
years, with an estimated present value of program cost equal to L 1,446 million. 
                                                 
90 This is a conservative estimation of benefits. Assuming that the increase in on-farm income can be 
sustained indefinitely would imply estimating the value of the program benefits as a perpetuity, which will 
yield a much lower cost/benefit ratio. 
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Doubling the size of the groups reduces the number of agronomists and the 
administrative cost by half 91
                                                 
91 In this exercise, the administrative cost is estimated as a percentage of, and consequently it changes 
proportionally to, the cost of hiring agronomists.   
.  
The results also imply that the proposed technical assistance program will be a good 
public investment. Its estimated net present value averages L 5,270 million with a group 
size of 10 farmers, and increases up to L 5,993 million with a group size of 20 farmers. 
The annual net flows of the program (not shown here) indicate that expenses more than 
offset benefits during the first stage of the program (first 5 years), and that this 
relationship reverts thereafter. The internal rate of return of investing in the program 
varies from a low of 39 percent to a high of 62 percent, which also indicates the high 
returns that could be achieved by investing in technical assistance to basic grain farmers. 
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Table 5.3. Financial assessment of the technical assistance program (L million) 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: TOTAL 
 Mean (90% Confidence Interval) 
 Group Size: 10 Group Size: 15 Group Size: 20 
Present value of program cost 1,446 (1,356 – 1,536) 
964 
(904 – 1,024) 
723 
(678 – 768) 
Present value of program returns 6,716 (6,004 – 7,311) 
6,716 
(6,004 – 7,311) 
6,716 
(6,004 – 7,311) 
Net Present Value of program 5,270 (4,528 – 5,880) 
5,752 
(5,035 – 6,360) 
5,993 
(5,277 – 6,593) 
Internal Rate of Return 39% (36% - 43%) 
52% 
(48% - 55%) 
62% 
(57% - 65%) 
Cost-Benefit ratio 0.22 (0.19 – 0.24) 
0.14 
(0.13 – 0.16) 
0.11 
(0.10 – 0.12) 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR SMALL BASIC GRAIN FARMERS 
 Mean (90% Confidence Interval) 
 Group Size: 10 Group Size: 15 Group Size: 20 
Present value of program cost 723 (657 – 789) 
482 
(438 – 526) 
362 
(328 – 395) 
Present value of program returns 1,997 (1,724 – 2,228) 
1,997 
(1,724 – 2,228) 
1,997 
(1,724 – 2,228) 
Net Present Value of program 1,274 (1,000 – 1,496) 
1,515 
(1,241 – 1,735) 
1,635 
(1,362 – 1,857) 
Internal Rate of Return 25% (21% - 29%) 
36% 
(31% - 40%) 
44% 
(39% - 49%) 
Cost-Benefit ratio 0.36 (0.31 – 0.43) 
0.24 
(0.21 – 0.28) 
0.18 
(0.16 – 0.21) 
 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR INTERMEDIATE AND LARGE BASIC GRAIN FARMERS 
 Mean (90% Confidence Interval) 
 Group Size: 10 Group Size: 15 Group Size: 20 
Present value of program cost 723 (657 – 789) 
482 
(438 – 526) 
362 
(328 – 395) 
Present value of program returns 4,719 (4,074 – 5,266) 
4,719 
(4,074 – 5,266) 
4,719 
(4,074 – 5,266) 
Net Present Value of program 3,996 (3,325 – 4,543) 
4,237 
(3,568 – 4,780) 
4,358 
(3,693 – 4,904) 
Internal Rate of Return 50% (44% - 54%) 
63% 
(58% - 69%) 
74% 
(68% - 80%) 
Cost-Benefit ratio 0.15 (0.13 – 0.18) 
0.10 
(0.09 – 0.12) 
0.08 
(0.07 – 0.09) 
    
5.5.2 SHORT-TERM AGRICULTURAL FINANCING PROGRAM 
Farm households have severe financial limitations to acquire the appropriate level of 
input, primarily fertilizers and high-quality seeds, so as to increase the productivity of 
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land devoted to basic grain production. Limitations are more stringent among small and 
intermediate farms vis-à-vis large farms.  
Thus, the proposal must contemplate a mechanism to facilitate input access without 
becoming a full subsidy that could create farmers’ dependency on the program and hinder 
the development of private input markets. In this regard, the recommendation of this 
proposal is to implement a financing program with the goals of facilitating short-term 
financing that could generate higher input usage rates, and endowing local financial 
institutions with sufficient amounts of capital that could ensure better access to credit for 
basic grain farmers beyond the span of the program.  
As envisioned, the short-term agricultural financing program will channel resources 
through local financial institutions (e.g., microfinance institutions), which in turn will 
grant short-term (e.g., 6 months) loans to eligible farmers at a subsidized interest rate for 
the purchase of inputs. Unlike the Technological Stamp (BT for its initials in Spanish) 
program, the program being proposed here does not subsidize the price of inputs, but 
rather the interest rate on the short-term loans used to purchase inputs at ongoing market 
prices. Furthermore, the program advanced here does not restrict the supply of inputs to 
specific businesses, but rather leaves the decision to choose a supplier entirely up to 
farmers. The experience with the BT program implemented since 2006 indicates that 
input markets do not exist in many rural areas. To overcome this limitation, the program 
must consider the provision of basic inputs through selected local institutions, most likely 
the same microfinance institutions administering the program at the local level 92
                                                 
92 This approach is prone to be permeated by corruption and political favoritism, and should be avoided to 
the extent possible without affecting farmers’ decision about input use. 
.   
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The interest rate on short-term loans will converge to the prevailing interest rates in the 
local market as the program advances. The provision of inputs at market prices and the 
partial subsidization of the interest rates with a convergence towards the prevailing 
interest rate in the local market are measures intended to avoid distortions in input 
markets that could obstruct the transition to competitive markets once the program is 
discontinued. Loans will be granted for the short term (e.g., microfinance institutions 
usually lend for up to 6 months), and must be paid at a certain, pre-determined period 
after harvest.  
During the first year of the program, these loans will be granted to eligible farmers to 
purchase inputs for up to 50 percent of the land they operate. The amount of the loan will 
be estimated assuming a usage rate of up to 200 pounds of urea and 50 pounds of 
improved corn seed per hectare, although the funds can be used for the purchase of other 
inputs used to produce basic grains as well as other crops of interest such as fruits and 
vegetables. These usage rates are higher than those actually employed by the BT 
program, and are believed to be more appropriate, potentially allowing for significant 
improvements in the productivity of basic grains (conditional on improvements in other 
aspects of production such as timely planting, weed and pest control, and harvest and 
post-harvest handling of the production, on which the technical assistance must focus). 
Starting in the second year of the program, farmers’ eligibility for these loans will be 
subject to presenting a stylized production plan developed by administrators and filled 
out by farmers and agronomists. This requirement is seen as a necessary condition for 
farmers to be interested and start applying the basic knowledge on farm administration 
they will acquire through the technical assistance program. Furthermore, the production 
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plan will serve financial institutions to guide their decision and assess the risks of 
granting these short-term loans to avoid excessive defaults of agricultural loans.  
Table 5.4 below shows the results of a simulation of the short-term financing program for 
an initial phase encompassing 56,000 basic grain farmers. The two stochastic variables 
considered are: 
1. The administrative cost of the program, which is assumed to have a triangular 
probability distribution with a minimum, mean, and maximum values of 5 
percent, 7.5 percent, and 10 percent of the total available credit, respectively. 
2. The lending time per year, which is also assumed to have a triangular probability 
distribution with a minimum, mean, and maximum values of 8 months, 10 
months, and 12 months, respectively.  
The simulation results indicate that the starting cost of implementing the program will 
average L 799 million (USD 42 million). However, in order to maintain the monetary 
value of the program constant throughout the implementation period, further annual 
investment in the program will be needed. The total revenue generated by the program 
will be large enough to cover the financial cost of the program (either to repay the trust in 
10 instead of 25 years, or to free up these financial resources for an expansion of the 
program), and to generate significant extra earnings. However, the program will likely 
yield negative net cash flows during the first 4 years; the assumption made in this regard 
is that the extra capital needed during the first 4 years, estimated at L 32 million, is 
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accounted for in the initial external loan requested to finance the program (e.g., 
Petrocaribe 93
                                                 
93 Petrocaribe is an Accord of Energy Cooperation signed in March 2008 between Honduras and 
Venezuela, and represents a new source of financing for Honduras. Briefly stated, the government of 
Honduras might retain up to 50 percent of the total oil purchases from Venezuela in a trust, which will be 
used primarily for investment projects in areas such as energy and agriculture.   
).  
The short-term financing program represents a good investment option to be pursued. 
The net present value and the internal rate of return of the program are estimated at L 
2,003 million and 77 percent, respectively. The program is also expected to yield a 
desirable cost-benefit ratio of 0.51, meaning that for each dollar invested the benefit 
almost double.  
Such a large positive financial assessment of the program is the result of lending at the 
relatively high but yet subsidized interest rates, and paying a relatively low interest rate 
on trust funds. 
Finally, Table 5.4 below shows that the net present value of the extra earnings generated 
by the program will average L 1,905 million. The proposal calls for these earnings to be 
retained by local financial institutions, thus increasing their capital endowments and 
improving access to credit beyond the span of the program. 
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Table 5.4. Financial assessment of the short-term agricultural financing program. 
STYLIZED FEATURES OF THE PROGRAM 
Magnitude of the intervention 
The monetary equivalent of 200 lb of urea and 50 lb of 
improved corn seed per hectare, up to 50 percent of the 
operated acreage or 15 hectares, whichever the lowest. 
 
Cost Urea / 100 lb L 643 a  
Cost improved corn seed / 50 lb L 609 a  
Annual adjustment rate 11.75% b  
   
Number of small farms in the program 28,000  
Average area subject to financing 2 ha c  
Number of intermediate and large farms in the 
program 28,000  
Average area subject to financing 12 ha d  
   
Program duration 10 years  
   
PROGRAM FINANCING TERMS 
Reference interest rate on agricultural loans 25%  
Proposed scheme of interest rate discount Year 1 and 2: 40%; year 3 and 4: 30%; year 5 and 6: 20%; year 7, 8, and 9: 10%, year 10: 0%. 
SOURCE OF PROGRAM FINANCING (reference: Petrocaribe) 
Grace period (years) 2  
Annual interest rate 1%  
Maturity term (years) 25  
FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAM f 
 Mean 90% Confidence Interval 
Net Present Value of program (L million) 2,003  (1,779 – 2,227) 
Internal Rate of Return 77%  (55% - 93%) 
Cost – Benefit Ratio 0.51 (0.48 – 0.53) 
Present value of extra earnings (L million) 1,905 (1,729 – 2,086) 
a. Average wholesale price from November 2007 to October 2008. Source: Secretary of Agriculture. 
b. Corresponds to the average annual inflation rate for the period 2000-2007. Source: Economic 
Commission for Latin American and The Caribbean 2008a. 
c. Estimated from the weighted average acreage of basic grain farms operating less than 3.5 hectares. 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (see Appendix Table 1). 
d. Estimated from the weighted average acreage of basic grain farms operating more than 3.5 hectares. 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (see Appendix Table 1). 
e. This ratio accounts for inefficiencies in the use of capital available for lending, which are assumed to 
average 25 percent of the potential return to capital.   
f. The discount rate equals the annual interest rate of levied on Petrocaribe funds, namely, 1 percent. 
 
5.5.3 MEDIUM -TERM AGRICULTURAL FINANCING PROGRAM 
The short-term agricultural financing program described above will have the potential for 
improving the input usage rate and, consequently, the productivity of basic grain farms. 
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However, short-term financing limits investment decisions to production inputs, having 
limited or no impact on other longer-term production investments such as leveling, 
irrigation, and purchase of equipment. Productive on-farm investment will likely interact 
positively with the technical assistance and short-term financing interventions, increasing 
the odds of achieving the goals set by the particular programs and, overall, the established 
goals of the entire intervention being proposed here. 
Hence, it is important to facilitate access to credit that could be used for productive on-
farm investment. The proposal calls for the provision of medium-term loans (up to 5 
year) at competitive interest rates (e.g., 10 percent interest rate employed by the National 
Agricultural Development Bank on long-term agricultural loans). The proposal supports 
the involvement of commercial banks such as BANHCAFE in the administration of the 
program to the extent possible. Taking advantage of the installed capabilities of 
commercial banks with significant presence in rural areas will likely result in lower 
administration costs; furthermore, it will lower the initial investment needed to build up 
the administrative capabilities of alternative financial institutions (e.g., microfinance 
institutions). However, there are many regions that are not covered by the services of 
commercial banks, and it is there where microfinance institutions must play a relevant 
role in administering this program, and where program administrators must focus their 
efforts to transfer the administrative capabilities needed for the proper administration of 
the medium-term financing program. 
Table 5.5 below presents a financial assessment of the program. The stochastic variables 
considered in this simulation are (1) capital turnover, and (2) administrative costs. The 
simulation is performed under the following highly stylized assumptions: 
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1. Capital turnover, or which is the same, the number of times that money is lent 
during the duration of the program, has a triangular probability distribution with 
minimum, mean, and maximum values of 1, 1.5, and 2. It is important to know 
that the maximum possible turnover given the duration of the program (15 years) 
and the maturity term of loans (5 years) is 3. 
2. Administrative costs have a triangular probability distribution with a minimum, 
mean, and maximum values of 3 percent, 5 percent, and 7 percent of the value of 
the loans granted. 
3. The program starts with an endowment of L 1,120 million, equivalent to L 20,000 
per farmer. 
4. The annual interest rate on these loans is at 10 percent (equivalent to that applied 
by the National Agricultural Development Bank on similar loans). 
5. The program is financed through an external loan granted in similar terms to those 
implied by Petrocaribe (that is, a two-year grace period, a 1-percent annual 
interest rate, and a 25-year maturity term). 
6. Since the flow of benefits depends on the unknown schedule of loans, the 
estimation performed here is conservative, assuming that the benefits of the 
program are received in three installments, two of them equivalent to 25 percent 
of total revenues and accrued in years 5 and 10, and the third installment 
equivalent to 50 percent of total program revenues and accrued in year 15. 
7. The cost flow of the program is estimated following the terms of Petrocaribe, 
assuming the trust is fully paid by the end of the program. The administrative cost 
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is spread in equal annual installments throughout the entire duration of the 
program. 
The simulation results show the good returns that could accrue from investing in a 
medium-term financing program. The simulation gives us high confidence that the 
investment will yield a positive and significant net present value and internal rate of 
return. The results also lead us to be highly confident that program benefits will exceed 
costs by at least 37 percent.  
Since the estimation assumes that the trust will be fully paid by the end of the program, 
the trust funds, which have a maturity term of 25 years, can be employed to expand the 
program or be used for other public investment purposes.  
This simulation, although highly stylized, shows the potential economic benefits that 
could accrue from investing in this type of program. It is important to notice that the 
assessment considers the financial benefits of the program from the point of view of the 
lender, and does not account for partial benefits that farmers might obtain from the 
program, such as higher productivity, lower production risk, or conservation of natural 
resources.  
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Table 5.5. Financial assessment of the medium-term agricultural financing program. 
STYLIZED FEATURES OF THE PROGRAM 
Magnitude of the intervention Total value of the trust sufficient to provide a L20,000 loan simultaneously to all participating farmers (56,000) 
 
Administration of the program Commercial banks and microfinance institutions under the supervision of program administrators 
   
Initial investment (L million) 1,120  
Program duration 15 years  
   
PROGRAM FINANCING TERMS 
Reference interest rate on medium-term 
agricultural loans 10%  
SOURCE OF PROGRAM FINANCING (reference: Petrocaribe) 
Grace period (years) 2  
Annual interest rate 1%  
Maturity term (years) 25  
FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAM a 
 Mean 90% Confidence Interval 
Net Present Value of program (L million) 1,223  (432 – 2,025) 
Internal Rate of Return 74%  (48% - 103%) 
Cost – Benefit Ratio 0.55 (0.37 – 0.73) 
a. Discount rate: 1%. 
 
 
The analysis in the previous three sections provides a rough idea of the costs and benefits 
that a policy like the one being proposed here might imply. The inclusion of probability 
distributions on key variables is appropriate given the difficulty of assessing their 
magnitude with precision, and adds a valuable dimension to the assessment. 
5.5.4 IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL FEATURES OF THE PROPOSAL    
As explained above, the proposal calls for an initial stage encompassing 20 percent of the 
total population of basic grain households. Clear eligibility rules as to what constitutes a 
basic grain household and which households are to be included in the sample subject to 
the intervention and in the control group (not subject to the intervention, but subject to 
interview and consultation by evaluators) must be established and preferably agreed upon 
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among the relevant stakeholders, limiting to the extent possible the room for subjectivity 
in the determination of the eligibility.  
Ideally, eligibility must be conditional exclusively on qualifying as a basic grain farmer 
over the period taken as reference. What constitutes a basic grain farmer and what will be 
the reference period are aspects that must be agreed upon among stakeholders 
participating in the formulation of the policy. Ideally there must be no other conditions 
for eligibility. Unfortunately, reality dictates that it is highly difficult and costly to reach 
out to the entire population of basic grain farmers. These are some of the reasons why 
interventions such as the BT program reach out only to those farmers that are organized 
locally. On way of improving the coverage of the program while at the same continue 
reaching out through local organization will be subsidizing the membership cost of 
joining a local institution such as a cooperative or a microfinance institution.   
It is crucial to realize the importance of clearly defining the eligibility rules and to invest 
resources in reaching out to the eligible population. In the Honduran context, it is likely 
to require significant human and economic resources to maximize the inclusion of 
eligible recipients and at the same time minimize the leakages. The experiences of 
Turkey and Mexico in their implementation of DP programs shows the particular 
challenges that defining eligibility among staple producers in developing countries might 
represent (Baffes and De Gorter 2005).   
The technical assistance program must allow for the participation of land-owners, 
tenants, and wage-workers, but with some restrictions. If for a given piece of land both 
the owner and the tenant are interested in participating, they will count as one group 
member so as to maximize the effective land upon which the program has influence. 
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Wage-workers will be allowed to participate in the technical assistance program so that 
they can acquire the training offered to farmers and thus increase their human capital and, 
presumably, their mobility. However wage-workers will not count as a member for the 
sake of defining the size of the group, and they must not exceed the number of basic grain 
farmers in any group, to ensure that the technical assistance program actually operates on 
a significant endowment of production resources. Only those qualifying as members in 
the group must share the cost of the technical assistance as groups mature.  
Identification of farmers with characteristics that could make them leading farmers is 
crucial to the success of the policy, particularly the technical assistance program. For this, 
all the available sources of information and expertise must be consulted. As previously 
said, INE maintains an updated list of basic grain farmers with their general production 
characteristics (e.g., area planted, input use, and allocation of production), and surveys 
these farmers twice a year.  
Furthermore, numerous medium and large-size basic grain farmers belong to certain farm 
organizations such as the Basic Grain Producer Association (PROGRANO for its initials 
in Spanish) and the Honduran Rice Producer Association. Beyond the relevant 
information these organizations can provide about basic grain farmers, their involvement 
in the formulation of the program would greatly help in the design and legitimization of 
the program, thus improving the technical and political feasibility of the proposal. 
Eligible recipients should have the option of forming their groups, or otherwise letting 
administrators define the groups. The eligibility of a group would be based primarily on 
farmers’ resources and proximity to the property of the leading farmer.  
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5.5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE PROPOSAL    
As can be inferred from the previous four sections, the interventions being proposed are 
aimed primarily at improving the human resources of farmers and farm workers, and 
strengthening the agricultural financial system directly in the short and medium term, and 
indirectly in the long run through the capitalization of local financial institutions. 
However, actions in many other areas are needed for the policy to achieve its intended 
goals. For instance, it will be necessary to improve the workings of output markets by 
encouraging the participation of and competition among wholesalers, processors, and 
retailers. In aggregate, they all stand to gain from a more prosperous agricultural sector. 
All these agents have complained about the quality of agricultural staples, and the policy 
being proposed here is expected to generate positive changes in that regard.  
It would be desirable that retailers and processors could engage in contracts with farmers, 
particularly smallholders, for the purchase of their production; furthermore, granting 
incentives to encourage private entrepreneurship in rural areas must be considered. For 
instance, technical assistance to processors might help them overcome some limitations 
in their processing capacities. Moreover, tax breaks to wholesalers, retailers, and 
processors must also be considered and assessed. The feasibility of tax break concessions 
must be carefully analyzed with revenue authorities, since it might result in more than 
proportional administrative costs for the Income Executive Directorate. Furthermore, this 
goes against the recommendations by experts about the changes needed in the Honduran 
tax system (Gomez-Sabaini 2003, World Bank 2007a).  
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The stylized proposal advanced here is intended to serve as a road map for serious policy 
formulation. Several details of the policy must necessarily be settled with the 
participation of relevant stakeholders, which will increase the legitimacy and strengthen 
the political feasibility of the proposal. Furthermore, by accounting for the policy 
prescriptions being endorsed by important donors and agricultural organizations such as 
the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization, we are increasing the odds 
of obtaining the transfers of fresh funds needed to start the program. Securing new 
resources for the program would raise less opposition among those groups that have 
captured the budget allocation process. However, this should not deter progress in terms 
of transparency, accountability and, overall, fighting corruption. Advances in this regard 
would likely free up resources that would enable the scale up of the services offered by 
the government.  
The back-loaded nature of the concessions on basic grains under DR-CAFTA allows for 
some time to experiment before the full force of higher competition is felt. This does not 
mean that actions are not urgently needed; what it means is that the time should be used 
wisely to design and implement programs that effectively address the problem at hand 
conditional on the fiscal constraints in which policymaking in developing countries 
commonly occurs. Quick fixes applied at the national level would likely use up the 
budget, crowding out investment, and generating at best minor long-lasting effects.  
The set of interventions being proposed here have the potential of generating long-lasting 
changes in the structure of production, the technical skills of farmers and wage workers 
involved in basic grain agriculture, and most importantly, in the welfare of basic grain 
households.  
 223 
 
 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The Honduran economy has undergone significant changes over the last two decades. It 
opened itself to world trade significantly in the 1990s, going from having the largest level 
of protection in the region to the lowest level in just five years. Aggregate exports and 
imports have increased steadily since then; significant changes in the composition of 
trade flows evidence a large reallocation of resources to exploit the comparative 
advantages of this economy, primarily with respect to the two largest world markets, 
namely, the U.S. and the European Union.  
The importance of agriculture as a generator of value added decreased significantly since 
the early 1990s, and that of other sectors such as textiles and apparels and tourism rose 
remarkably. The evidence also shows that Honduras has relocated resources within 
agriculture as well, primarily to reap the benefits of comparative advantages in some 
particular high-value sectors such as fruits and vegetables and palm oil.  
Despite all of these positive changes, the economy grew slowly, and most social 
indicators worsened. Natural disasters such as Hurricane Mitch and high levels of 
corruption are but some of the factors related to the poor performance. The lack of 
opportunities in this economy has forced massive international immigration; jobs 
overseas were the way out of poverty and insecurity for hundreds of thousands of 
Hondurans.  
Higher rates of economic growth have been achieved over the last four years relative to 
that observed during the 1990s and early 2000s. However, these rates are comparable to 
only the average regional performance. Social indicators have been resistant to improve, 
corruption continues at high levels, and the credibility of public institutions is among the 
lowest in the region and the world. After more than 25 years of experiencing continuous 
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democracy, the Honduran population maintains such low expectations about its political 
system that the nation is classified at high risk with regard to democratic values. 
For Honduras to have a shot at achieving some of the Millennium Development Goals, 
economic growth rates should be at least sustained at the levels observed over the last 
three years, and inefficiencies in the use of public resources must be reduced 
significantly.  
DR-CAFTA, signed in 2004 and passed into law in 2006, has been seen as a new 
opportunity for Honduras to continue its economic transformation, deepening the 
integration with its major trading partner and the largest market in the world. The 
agreement also raises expectations about its impact on institutional reforms, so much 
needed in Honduras. At the same time, DR-CAFTA is seen as a threat to some sectors, 
particularly traditional staple agriculture. Basic grains, namely, corn, beans, rice, and 
sorghum, are considered sensitive, and have received significant protection. The special 
treatment relates to the relevance of the basic grain sector as a major employer and as a 
contributor to the food security of the population.  
Previous studies estimate a small but positive impact of the agreement on the economic 
activity in Honduras. However, these studies also suggest the potential negative impacts 
that the agreement might have on particular households depending to a large extent on 
basic grains as a source of income.  
A new assessment was conducted in this study employing a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium, arguably the most sophisticated technique for the analysis of economy-wide 
changes in economic policies. The model was adjusted to the extent possible to better 
reflect the conditions prevailing in the Honduran economy. A new social accounting 
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matrix was constructed for this study that depicts the state of the Honduran economy as 
of 2004, and utilized to calibrate the model. The agreement was specified to reflect the 
impact of trade tariff removal done according to the schemes negotiated in the agreement; 
modeling limitations impeded the specification of the impact of the agreement on rules of 
origins, an issue particularly relevant for the textile and apparel sector, the most dynamic 
economic activity in the Honduran economy. 
The findings of this study suggest a marginal negative impact of DR-CAFTA on the 
performance of the Honduran economy over the span of the implementation period, that 
is, 2007-2026. The same marginal impact is estimated for the activity of the basic grain 
sector and the income of the representative basic grain household. Hence, this study finds 
no support for the hypothesis that DR-CAFTA would benefit the Honduran economy as a 
whole while at the same time worsen significantly the situation of those depending to a 
large extent on basic grains for their subsistence. 
The quantitative assessment performed in this study also assesses the potential spillover 
effects of DR-CAFTA on investment and technology, two areas where evidence suggests 
a positive relationship. These results from these highly stylized assessments actually 
show the potentially large benefits that might accrue from these spillovers, and stress the 
importance of directing efforts into these areas. 
The fact that the evidence generated in this study is not sufficient to reject the null 
hypothesis driving the quantitative assessment should not deter us from generating the 
type of policies that could efficiently facilitate the transition of once highly protected 
economic sectors into more competitive markets. In this last chapter, I engage in an 
analysis of the political and economic conditions in which agriculture operates, the policy 
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guidelines driving agricultural policy in Honduras, and the guidelines being advocated by 
development institutions with a stake in agriculture.  
With these variables in mind, I evaluated alternative  approaches and propose a new 
policy that could better serve to address the overarching problem, that is, “The increase in 
market competition resulting from the full-implementation of DR-CAFTA will put 
downward pressure on market prices for basic grains, benefiting those that are net 
consumers of these staples, but worsening the welfare of those households whose income 
depends greatly on these activities and that have severe limitations to adapt to the new 
market conditions. This new market conditions would likely have a negative ripple effect 
on rural poverty in areas with already low social indicators.”  
The desirable outcome from the intervention to be proposed is to “help all agents in the 
basic grain supply chain secure a higher level of income through the acquisition of 
technologies and human capital, the expansion of the market, and improvement in the 
workings of factor and output markets.” 
The analysis of previous interventions and their feasibility for the Honduran context as 
well as the desirable guidelines promoted by development institutions and supported by 
the Secretary of Agriculture lead me to propose a policy with three main components, 
namely, a technical assistance program, and a short-term and a medium-term financing 
programs, as the best way to achieve the desired outcome. The proposal is highly stylized 
but highlights the main features to be introduced; many details on the formulation and 
implementation should be settled before taking the proposal for serious consideration. 
Nevertheless, the proposal presented in this chapter along with the information gathered 
for and generated by this study can serve as a good road map towards the design of a 
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formal policy proposal suitable for serious consideration. If these findings can serve to 
that end, the efforts of this study will be of value.
 228 
 
 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ajenjo, N. "Honduras: Nuevo Gobierno Liberal con la Misma Agenda Política. " Revista 
de Ciencia Política, Volumen Especial, 2007:165-181.  
—. "El Papel y la Función de Los Parlamentos Centroamericanos: Cuatro Casos 
Comparados. " America Latina Hoy 38, 2004:125-139.  
Albanesi, R., et al. A Cuatro Años de Cambio Rural. Zavalla, Argentina: Centro de 
Estudios para el Desarrollo; Facultad de Ciencias Agrarias; Univ. Nacional de 
Rosario, 2002. 
Alcala, F., and A. Ciccone. "Trade and Productivity." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 119(2), 2004: 613-646. 
Alston, J., C. Chang-Kang, M. Marra, P. Pardey, and T. Wyatt. "A Meta-Analysis of 
Rates of return to Agricultural R&D: Ex Pede Herculem?. " Washington D.C.: 
Internationl Food Policy Research Institute, 2000. 
Argueta, J.. "The Importance of Rational Voters for Electoral Accountability in Highly 
Institutionalized Party Systems." Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science, 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007. 
Arias, D. Agricultural Support Policies and Programs in Central America and 
Dominican Republic in Light of Trade Liberalization. Economic and Sector Study 
Series, Washington D.C.: Inter-American development Bank, 2007. 
Armington, P. A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production. 
IMF Staff Papers No. 16, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969. 
Baffes, J., and H. De Gorter. Disciplining Agricultural Support Through Decoupling. 
Policy Research Working Paper 3533, Washington D.C.: Wolrd Bank, 2005. 
Baier, S., G. Dwyer, and R. Tamura. How Important are Capital and Total Factor 
Productivity for Economic Growth? Working Paper 2002-2a, Atlanta, GA: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2002. 
Baldwin, R. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy." The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 3(4), 1989: 119-135. 
Banco Central de Honduras. "Consideraciones sobre las Remesas Familiares Enviadas a 
Honduras." Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 2007a. 
—. "Mejoramiento y Actualizacion de las Estadisticas Macroeconomicas de Honduras." 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 2007b. 
—. "Inversion Extranjera Directa en Honduras: Periodo 1993-2003." Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, 2004. 
 229 
 
 
Burfisher, M., and J. Hopkins. Decoupled Payments: Household Income Transfers in 
Contemporary U.S. Agriculture. Report No 822, Market and Trade Economic 
Division, Economic Research Service, USDA, 2003. 
Bussolo, M., and D. Medvedev. Challenges to MDG Achievement in Low Income 
Countries: Lessons from Ghana and Honduras. Policy Research Working Paper 
No 4383, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2007. 
Calix, A. Caracterizacion y Analisis del Sistema Electoral en Honduras. Serie Politicas e 
Instituciones, Documento de Trabajo No 4, Tegucigalpa, Honduras: FIDE-PNUD, 
2001. 
Cobb, R., and M. Ross. Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial: Avoidance, Attack, and 
Redefinition. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997. 
Coelli, T, and D. Prasada-Rao. "Total Factor Productivity Growth in Agriculture: a 
Malmquist Index Analysis of 93 Countries, 1980-2000." Agricultural Economics 
32(1), 2005: 115-34. 
Cogneau, D., and A. Robilliard. Growth, Distribution, and Poverty in Madagascar: 
Learning from a Microsimulation Model in a General Equilibrium Framework. 
TMD Discussion Paper No. 61, Washington D.C.: International Food Policy 
Research Institute, 2000. 
Coleman, K., and J. Argueta. Political Culture, Governance, and Democracy in 
Honduras 2008. Latin American Public Opinion Project. Vanderbilt University, 
2008. 
Consejo Agropecuario Centroamericano. "Politica Agricola Centroamericana 2008-2017: 
Una Agricultura Competitiva e Integrada para un Mundo Global." San Jose, Costa 
Rica, 2007. 
Consejo Nacional Anticorrupcion. "Informe Nacional de Transparencia. Hacia un 
Sistema Nacional de Integridad." Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 2007. 
Cuesta, J. The 1997 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Honduras. Draft, The Hague: 
Institute of Social Studies, 2004. 
Cuevas, A., M. Messmacher, and A. Werner. Macroeconomic Synchronization between 
Mexico and its NAFTA Partners. Mimeo, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002. 
Davis, B., S. Handa, M. Ruiz, M. Stampini, and P. Winters. Conditionality and the 
Impact of Program Design on Household Welfare: Comparing two Diverse Cash 
Transfer Programs in Rural Mexico. Working Paper No. 02-10, FAO - ESA, 
2002. 
De Ferranti, D, G. Perry, F. Ferreira, and M. Walton. Desigualdad en America Latina y 
El Caribe: Ruptura con la Historia? Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2003. 
 230 
 
 
Deaton, A, and J. Muellbauer. Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
Deaton, A. The Analysis of Household Surveys. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997. 
Deng, Z, R. Falvey, and A. Blake. "Productivity Spillover of Foreign Direct Investment: 
A Computable General Equilibrium Model of China." Presented in the 11th 
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis. Helsinki, Finland, 2008. 
Dimaranan, B., R. McDougall, and T. Hertel. "Behavioral Parameters." In Global Trade, 
Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 6 Database, by B. Dimaranan. West 
Lafayette: Global Trade Analysis Project, Purdue University , 2006. 
Direccion Ejecutiva de Ingresos. "Recaudacion Anual y Origen de los Ingresos 
Tributarios del Gobierno Central." 2006. 
Dixon, P., and M. Rimmer. Forecasting and Policy Analysis with a Dynamic CGE Model 
of Australia. Preliminary Working Paper No OP-90, Clayton, Australia: Impact 
Project, Monash University, 1998. 
Dixon, P., B. Parmenter, J. Sutton, and D. Vincent. ORANI: A Multisectoral Model for 
the Australian Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982. 
Dollar, D. "Otward-Oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: 
Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85 ." Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 1992: 523-544. 
Doyle, E., and I. Martinez-Zarzoso. Relating Productivity and Trade 1980-2000: A 
Chicken and Egg Analysis. Goettingen, Germany: Ibero-America Institute for 
Economic Research, 2006. 
Durand-Morat, A., and E. Wailes. RICEFLOW: A Spatial Equilibrium Model of World 
Rice Trade. Staff Paper SP 02 2003, Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Agribusiness, Division of Agriculture, University of Arkansas, 2003. 
Economic Commission for Latin American and The Caribbean. CEPALSTAT: Latin 
American and The Caribbean Statistics. 
http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=1&idTema=1&
idIndicador=49&idioma=e (accessed June 2008a). 
—. "Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and The Caribbean, 2007." Santiago de 
Chile, 2008b. 
El Heraldo. "Mas de 44,000 Hondureños han sido Deportados de EEUU." El Heraldo, 
September 15, 2008. 
 231 
 
 
Escuela Agricola Panamericana. Diagnostico de la Cadena Agroalimentaria de Maiz en 
Honduras. Tegucigalpa, 2004. 
Farmer Training and Development Program. http://www.hondurasag.org/index.asp 
(accessed October 2008). 
Falk, M. Realidad y Perspectivas del Sector Rural en Honduras. Coleccion Cuadernos de 
Desarrollo Humano Sostenible No 9, Tegucigalpa: PNUD, 2003. 
Fields, G. Distribution and Development: A New Look at the Developing World. 
Cambridge, Mass. and London, UK: Russell Sage Foundation and the MIT Press, 
2001. 
Food and Agriculture Organization. Seguimiento de la Aplicacion del Plan de Accion de 
la Cumbre Mundial sobre Alimentacion. Mimeo, United Nations, 2008. 
Food and Agriculture Organization. The State of Food Insecurity in the World . Rome, 
Italy: United Nations, 2004. 
Francois, J., and H. Hall. "Partial Equilibrium Modeling." In Applied Methods for Trade 
Policy Analysis, by J. Francois and K. Reinert, 122-55. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Francois, J., and K. Reinert. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Francois, J., B. McDonald, and H. Nordstrom. "Capital Accumulation in Applied Trade 
Models." In Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis, by J Francois and K. 
Reinert, 364-382. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Fuller, F., E. Wailes, and H. Djunaidi. Revised Arkansas Global Rice Model. Staff 
General SP 01 2003, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, 
Division of Agriculture, University of Arkansas, 2003. 
Fundacion Hondurena de Investigacion Agricola. Noticias de la FHIA: Tecnicos y 
Productores Conocen Innovaciones en la Produccion de Vegetales Orientales en 
Honduras. San Pedro Sula: FHIA, 2007. 
Georges, P. Modeling the Removal of NAFTA Rules of Origin: A Computable General 
Equilibrium Analysis. Working Paper 2007-06, Ottawa, Canada: Canadian 
Department of Finance, 2007. 
Gobierno de Honduras. Politica de Estado para el Sector Agroalimentario y el medio 
Rural de Honduras 2004-2021. Tegucigalpa, 2004. 
Gomez-Sabaini, J. "Evolucion y Situacion Tributaria Actual en America Latina:Una 
Serie de Temas para la Discusion." In Tributacion en America Latina: En Busca 
 232 
 
 
de una Nueva Agenda de Reformas, by Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 39-123. Santiago de Chile: United Nations, 2006. 
—. Honduras: Hacia un Sitema Tributario mas Transparente y Diversificado . Serie de 
Estudios Economicos y Sectoriales RE2-03-013, Washington D.C.: Inter-
American Development bank, 2003. 
Herrera, S., and Pang, G. (2004). Efficiency of Public Spending in Developing Countries: 
An Efficiency Frontier Approach. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Hertel, T. Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Hertel, T., and J. Reimer. Predicting the Poverty Impacts of Trade Reform. Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3444, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2004. 
Hertel, T., D. Hummels, M. Ivanic, and R. Keeney. How Confident Can We Be in CGE 
Assessments of Free Trade Agreements? Working Paper No 26, West Lafayette, 
IN: Global Trade Analysis Project, 2003. 
Hertel, T., J. Horridge, and K. Pearson. Mending the Family Tree: A Reconciliation of the 
Linearization and Levels Schools of CGE Modeling. Impact Project Preliminary 
Working Paper IP-54, Melbourne: The University of Melbourne, 1991. 
Hicks, J. The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1942. 
Hillman, A. "Declining Industriesand Political-Support Protectionist Motives." The 
American Economic Review, 72(5), 1982: 1180-1187. 
Ianchovichina, E., and R. McDougall. Theoretical Structure of Dynamic GTAP. GTAP 
Technical Paper No. 17, Global Trade Analysis Project, 2000. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Encuesta Agropecuaria Basica Noviembre 2004. 
Tegucigalpa, 2004. 
—. Encuesta Agropecuaria Basica Noviembre 2007. Tegucigalpa, 2007. 
Inter-American Development Bank. Informe de Terminacion de Proyecto: Programa de 
Asignacion Familiar, Fase II. Washington D.C., 2006. 
Jansen, H., J. Pender, A. Damon, and R. Schipper. Politicas de Desarrollo Rural y Uso 
Sostenible de la Tierra en las Zonas de Laderas de Honduras. Informe de 
Investigacion 147, Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute, 2007. 
King, B. "What is a SAM?" In Social Accounting Matrices: A Basis for Planning, by G. 
Pyatt and J. Round, 17-51. Washington D.C.: World bank, 1985. 
 233 
 
 
Lainez, G., N. Diaz-Estrada, J. Jimenez-Morga, R. Falk, M. Reyes, E. Machuca-Castillo, 
and A. Vasquez. "Manejo Sostenible del Bono Tecnologico Productivo: 
Sistematizacion del caso Erandique, Lempira." Tegucigalpa, Honduras: SAG-
FIDAMERICA, 2007. 
Lederman, D., G. Perry, and R. Suescun. Trade Structure, Trade Policy, and Economic 
Policy Options in Central America. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2002. 
Lejour, A., and R. Nahuis. "R&D Spillovers and Growth: Specialization Matters." 
Review of International Economics 13(5), 2005: 927-944. 
Lizardo, M, J. Navarro, and E. Suazo. "Honduras: Application of a CGE Model." North 
American Journal of Economics and Finance 10, 1999: 149-68. 
Lofgren, H., R. Harris, S. Robinson, M. Thomas, and M. El-SAid. A Standard 
Computable Genral Equilibrium (CGE) Model in GAMS. Microcomputers in 
Policy Research No 5, Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute, 2001. 
Luke, J. Catalytic Leadership. Strategies for and Interconnected World. San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998. 
McCulloch, N. The Impact of Structural Reform on Poverty: A Simple Methodology with 
Extensions. U.K.: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2002. 
McDougall, R. A New Regional Household Demand System for GTAP. Technical Paper 
No. 20, Revision 1, Global Trade Analysis Project, 2003. 
Meade, J., and R. Stone. National Income and Expenditure. London: Bowes & Bowes, 
1940. 
Monge-González, Ricardo. Impacto del CAFTA sobre las Ventajas Comparativas de 
Centroamerica. Guatemala: ASIES, 2004. 
Moore, C. Assessing Honduras’ CCT Programme PRAF, Programa de Asignacion 
Familiar: Expected and Unexpected Realities. Country Study No. 15, Brasilia: 
International Poverty Center-UNDP, 2008. 
Morley, S. Liberacion Comercial en el Marco del CAFTA: Analisis del Tratado con 
Especial Referencia a la Agricultura y a los Pequeños Agricultores en 
Centroamerica. Working paper No. 19, Washington D.C.: RUTA-IFPRI, 2006. 
Morley, S., E. Nakasone, and V. Piñeiro. The Impact of CAFTA on Employment, 
Production, and Poverty in Honduras. Discussion Paper 00748, Washington 
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2008. 
 234 
 
 
Nielsen, C. Social Accounting Matrices for Vietnam 1996 and 1997. TMD Discussion 
Paper No. 86, Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 
2002. 
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
OXFAM. "El Arroz que se Quemo en el DR-CAFTA." Oxfam America. November 2004. 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/es/noticias/publicaciones/research_paper.2005-05-
06.9900046597/arroz_cafta_web.pdf (accessed April 2008). 
Pyatt, G. "A SAM Approach to Modeling." Journal of Policy Modeling 10(3), 1988: 327-
352. 
Rawlings, L., and G. Rubio. Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programs: Lessons from Latin America. Policy research Working Paper Series 
No. 3119, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2003. 
Reinert, K., and D. Rolland-Holst. "Social Accounting Matrices." In Applied Methods for 
Trade Policy Analysis, by J. Francois and K. Reinert, 94-121. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Robinson, S., A. Cattaneo, and M. El-Said. "Updating and Estimating a Social 
Accounting Matrix using Cross Entropy Methods." Economic Systems research 
13(1), 2001: 47-64. 
Rochefort, D., and R. Cobb. The Politics of Problem Definition. Shaping the Policy 
Agenda. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994. 
Rodriguez, F., and D. Rodrik. Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to 
the Cross-National Evidence. Working Paper 7081, Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1999. 
Rosegrant, M., T. Sulser, C. Ringler, S. Cline, and S. Msangi. International model for 
Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT): Distributed 
Verion 1.0. Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2005. 
Rutherford, T., D. Tarr, and O. Shepotylo. "Household and Poverty Effects from Russia's 
Accession to WTO." Paper Presented at the Empirical Trade Analysis 
Conference. Washington D.C., 2003. 
Sachs, J., and A. Warner. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration." 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995: 1-118. 
Sadoulet, E., A. de Janvry, and B. Davis. "Cash Transfer Programs with Income 
Multipliers: PROCAMPO in Mexico." World Development 29(6), 2001: 1043-56. 
 235 
 
 
Sanchez, M. Matriz de Contabilidad Social 2002 de Costa Rica, y los Fundamentos 
Metodologicos de su Construccion . Estudios y Perspectivas No. 47, Mexico D.F.: 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006. 
Sanders, A, A. Ramirez, and L. Morazan. Cadenas Agricolas en Honduras. Escuela 
Agricola Panamericana, 2006. 
Schaffer, W. Regional Impact Models. Mimeo, Regional Research Institute, University of 
West Virginia, 1999. 
Schmid, E., F. Sinabell, and M. Hofreither. Direct Payments of the CAP - Distribution 
Across Farm Holdings in the EU and effects on Farm Household Incomes in 
Austria. Discussion Paper DP-19-2006, Vienna, Austria: Department of 
Economics and Social Sciences, University of Natural resources and Applied Life 
Sciences, 2006. 
Schmitz, A., W. Furtan, and K. Baylis. Agricultural Policy, Agribusiness, and Rent-
Seeking Behaviour. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002. 
Secretaria de Finanzas. "Cuenta Financiera de la Administracion Central." Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, 2008. 
—. "Informe de Deuda Publica: 4to Trimestre." Tegucigalpa, 2007. 
Secretaria de Industria y Comercio. "Indicadores y Medicion de Sensibilidad de los 
Productos Agroalimentarios." Mimeo. Tegucigalpa, 2003. 
Secretaria de Integracion Economica de Centroamerica. Sistema de Estadisticas de 
Comercio de Centroamerica. 2008. 
http://estadisticas.sieca.org.gt/siecadb/menu.asp?Idioma=Esp (último acceso: June 
de 2008). 
Serna, Braulio. Tendencias, Desafios, y Temas Estrategicos del Desarrollo 
Agropecuario. Serie Estudios y Perspectivas No 70, Mexico D.F.: CEPAL, 2007. 
SICTA. Mapeo de las Cadenas Agroalimentarias de Maiz Blanco y Frijol en 
Centroamerica. Managua, Nicaragua: Instituto Interamericano de Cooperacion 
para la Agricultura, 2007. 
Soto-Baquero, F., J. Santos-Rocha, and J. Ortega. "Desarrollo Rural en los Paises de 
America Latina y El Caribe: El Rol de las Politicas Publicas." In Politicas 
Publicas y Desarrollo Rural en America Latina y El Caribe: El Papel del Gasto 
Publico, by F. Soto Baquero, J. Santos Rocha and J. Ortega, 14-32. Santiago de 
Chile: Food and Agriculture Organization, 2006. 
Soto-Baquero, F., M. Rogriguez-Fazzone, and C. Falcioni. Politicas para la Agricultura 
Familiar en America Latina y El Caribe. Santiago de Chile: Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2007. 
 236 
 
 
Stone, R. A Computable Model of Economic Growth. Cambridge: Chapman & Hall, 
1962. 
Stone, R. "Foreword." In Social Accounting for Development Planning with Special 
Reference to Sri Lanka, by G. Pyatt and A. Roe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977. 
Stone, R. "Social Accounting Aggregation and Invariance." Economie Appliquee 2, 1949: 
26-45. 
Taylor-Robinson, M. "La Politica Hondurena y las Elecciones de 2005." Revista de 
Ciencia Politica 26(1), 2006: 114-124. 
Taylor-Robinson, M, and C. Diaz. "Who Gets Legislation Passed in a Marginal 
Legislature and is the Label Marginal Legislature Still Appropriate? A Study of 
the Honduran Congress." Comparative Political Studies 32(5), 1999: 589-625. 
Taylor, J., A. Junez Naude, N. Jesurun-Clements, E. Baumeister, A. Sanders, and J. Bran. 
Los Posibles Efectos de la Liberacion Comercial en los Hogares Rurales 
Centroamericanos a Partir de un Modelo Desagregado para la Economia Rural: 
El Caso de Honduras . Serie de Estudios Economicos y Sectoriales RE2-06-013, 
Washington D.C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2006. 
Taylor, J., G. Dyer, and A. Yunez-Naude. "Disaggregated Rural Economywide Models 
for Policy Analysis." World Development 33(10), 2005: 1671-1688. 
Thorbecke, E. "Towards a Stochastic Social Accounting Matrix for Modelling." 
Economic Systems research 15(2), 2003: 185-96. 
Thurlow, J. A Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model for South Africa: 
Extending the Static IFPRI Model. Working Paper 1-2004, Trade and Industrial 
policy Strategies, 2004. 
Tovar-Diaz, C. Medidas Sanitarias y Fitosanitarias y Obstaculos Tecnicos al Comercio. 
Informe sobre Honduras y Nicaragua. Serie de Estudios Economicos y 
Sectoriales RE2-06-016, Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 
2006. 
Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico. Estimacion del Impacto del DR-CAFTA en el Bienestar de los 
Hogares. Working Paper, Tegucigalpa: Secretaria de Estado del Despacho 
Presidencial, 2005. 
—. Estrategia para la Reduccion de la Pobreza. Informe de Avance de la ERP 2006, 
Tegucigalpa: Gobierno de Honduras, 2007a. 
—. Estrategia para la Reduccion de la Pobreza. Informe de Avance de la ERP 2007, 
Tegucigalpa: Gobierno de Honduras, 2007b. 
 237 
 
 
United Nations Development Program. Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 
2006. San Jose, Costa Rica: UNDP Honduras, 2006. 
Varian, H. Microeconomic Analysis. Third Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 
1992. 
Villalobos, I., M. Deugd, and D. Ochoa. Politicas Publicas y Servicios Financieros 
Rurales en Honduras. RUTA-IFAD-SERFIRURAL, 2006. 
Vos, R., L. Taylor, and R. Paes de Barros. Economic Liberalization, Distribution, and 
Poverty: Latin America in the 1990s. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2002. 
Winters, L. "Trade, Trade Policy, and Poverty: What are the Links." World Economy 
25(9), 2000: 1339-67. 
Wobst, P. A 1992 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Tanzania. TMD Discussion paper 
No. 30 , Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1998. 
World Bank. "Honduras: Public Expenditure Review Volume 1." Public Expenditure 
review No. 39251, Washington D.C., 2007a. 
—. "Honduras: Public Expenditure Review Volume 2." Public Expenditure review No. 
39251, Washington D.C., 2007b. 
—. World Development Report 2008. Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2007c. 
—. "DR-CAFTA: Challenges and Opportunities for Central America." Policy Research 
Working Paper No 32953, Washington D.C., 2005. 
—. Turkey: A Review of the Impact of the Reform of Agricultural Sector Liberalization. 
Washington D.C.: Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector 
Unit, Europe and Central Asian Region , 2004. 
—. "Income Support Program in Turkey and Mexico and Agricultural Reform in New 
Zealand." Draft Case Studies, Washington D.C., 2003. 
World Trade Organization. "Trade Policy Review: Honduras." Geneva, Switzerland, 
2003. 
Yunez-Naude, A. Mexico: Politicas Compensatorias para la Agricultura Familiar frente 
a los Impactos de los TLC. Proyecto GCP/RLA/152/IAB, Mexico D.F.: El 
Colegio de Mexico, 2007. 
 238 
Appendix Table 1. Number of producers by size of operation and their allocation of production, 2006-2007 
FARM SIZE 
PRODUCERS  TOTAL AREA 
PRODUCTION 
ALLOCATION 
NO. %  PLANTED HARVESTED CONSUMPTION LOSSES TRADE TOTAL 
TOTAL           
size < 1.5 ha 142,852  37.7%  19.7% 20.0% 12.7% 74.0% 0.5% 25.5% 100.0% 
1.5 ha < size < 3.5 ha 116,266  30.7%  30.0% 29.4% 18.6% 59.4% 0.7% 39.8% 100.0% 
3.5 ha < size < 7 ha 45,417  12.0%  14.2% 13.6% 9.6% 50.5% 0.3% 49.1% 100.0% 
7 ha < size < 14 ha 30,360  8.0%  10.1% 10.1% 7.9% 45.0% 0.1% 54.9% 100.0% 
14 ha < size < 35 ha 29,729  7.9%  13.9% 14.1% 11.7% 33.4% 0.1% 66.5% 100.0% 
35 ha < size 13,896  3.7%  12.1% 12.7% 39.5% 12.4% 0.0% 87.6% 100.0% 
  378,520  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0%     
MAIZE           
size < 1.5 ha  120,225  38.4%  19.7% 19.8% 13.5% 74.9% 0.5% 24.6% 100.0% 
    1.5 ha < size < 3.5 ha  95,974  30.7%  30.1% 29.6% 19.9% 59.3% 0.8% 39.9% 100.0% 
3.5 ha < size < 7 ha  36,708  11.7%  13.9% 13.2% 10.0% 51.4% 0.3% 48.2% 100.0% 
7 ha < size < 14 ha  24,947  8.0%  10.1% 10.2% 8.5% 45.3% 0.1% 54.6% 100.0% 
14 ha < size < 35 ha  23,816  7.6%  14.2% 14.5% 12.4% 34.2% 0.1% 65.7% 100.0% 
35 ha < size  11,120  3.6%  12.0% 12.6% 35.7% 15.0% 0.0% 85.0% 100.0% 
  312,791  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0%     
BEANS           
size < 1.5 ha  13,676  33.8%  22.3% 24.2% 22.6% 53.3% 0.0% 46.7% 100.0% 
1.5 ha < size < 3.5 ha  11,767  29.1%  27.0% 25.4% 22.1% 56.5% 0.0% 43.5% 100.0% 
3.5 ha < size < 7 ha 5,116  12.7%  15.5% 16.6% 15.4% 45.9% 0.2% 53.9% 100.0% 
7 ha < size < 14 ha 3,361  8.3%  8.6% 8.7% 7.8% 52.7% 0.0% 47.3% 100.0% 
14 ha < size < 35 ha 4,305  10.7%  15.5% 13.7% 11.1% 41.5% 0.0% 58.5% 100.0% 
35 ha < size 2,186  5.4%  11.1% 11.4% 21.0% 24.2% 0.0% 75.8% 100.0% 
 40,411  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0%     
7.   A
PPEN
D
IC
ES 
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Appendix Table 1. Continued 
FARM SIZE 
PRODUCERS  TOTAL AREA 
PRODUCTION 
ALLOCATION 
NO. %  PLANTED HARVESTED CONSUMPTION LOSSES TRADE TOTAL 
RICE           
size < 1.5 ha 456  23.0%  3.9% 3.6% 2.9% 25.7% 0.0% 74.3% 100.0% 
1.5 ha < size < 3.5 ha 610  30.8%  10.7% 10.8% 9.9% 10.0% 0.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
3.5 ha < size < 7 ha  357  18.0%  13.5% 13.4% 15.6% 3.7% 0.4% 95.9% 100.0% 
7 ha < size < 14 ha  326  16.5%  11.7% 11.5% 10.5% 2.7% 0.0% 97.3% 100.0% 
14 ha < size < 35 ha  158  8.0%  13.8% 13.8% 13.6% 2.4% 0.0% 97.6% 100.0% 
35 ha < size  75  3.8%  46.5% 47.0% 47.5% 1.8% 0.0% 98.2% 100.0% 
  1,983  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0%     
SORGHUM           
size < 1.5 ha 8,496  36.4%  20.8% 21.7% 5.1% 80.6% 0.4% 19.0% 100.0% 
1.5 ha < size < 3.5 ha 7,915  33.9%  35.3% 34.9% 7.5% 78.6% 0.0% 21.4% 100.0% 
3.5 ha < size < 7 ha 3,235  13.9%  17.2% 16.2% 3.3% 79.4% 0.0% 20.6% 100.0% 
7 ha < size < 14 ha 1,725  7.4%  10.6% 10.4% 1.9% 77.9% 0.0% 22.1% 100.0% 
14 ha < size < 35 ha 1,449  6.2%  8.4% 8.6% 4.7% 27.9% 0.0% 72.1% 100.0% 
35 ha < size 515  2.2%  7.8% 8.3% 77.6% 1.8% 0.0% 98.2% 100.0% 
 23,335  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0%     
Source: own estimations based on information from INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2007, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2006). 
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Appendix Table 2. Main limitations cited by members of the basic grain supply chains 
AREAS OF INTEREST BEANS CORN RICE 
MARKET AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
1. Poor social capital of small farms, which among other things leads to 
their exclusion from sectoral purchase agreements X X X 
2. Poor human capital of farmers and agricultural workers X X X 
3. Asymmetries in output and input market information, and insufficient 
information on post-harvest and storage techniques X X  
4. Limitations of farmers to add more value to their production, primarily 
because of insufficient options when it comes to selling their output X X  
5. Insufficient on-farm infrastructure for post-harvest management  X X 
6. Poor production technologies and high cost of loans   X X 
7. The lack of drying facilities in many production areas, which decreases 
the quality and, consequently, the value of production.  X  
8. The considerable distance from the production to processing areas, which 
increases the transaction costs   X 
9. No processing of sub-products that could add value to the supply chain X  X 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Changing political environment that undermines the organization of 
agricultural business in the long run    X 
2. Inefficient bureaucracy that leads to high transaction costs and 
overlapping activities X   
3. Inadequate capacity of municipalities and local governments to identify 
the problems of local supply chains X   
4. Inadequate capacity of municipalities and local governments to 
administer agricultural development programs X   
FINANCING 
1. Hurricane Mitch in 1998 seriously damaged the financial profile of many 
farmers, and increased the cost of agricultural credit due to the rise in 
risk associated with agriculture 
X X  
2. High level of indebtedness of farmers in general, and corn farmers in 
particular, which might result in the collapse of the sector if the 
government and private banks do not redefine the terms of these credits. 
 X  
3. Insufficient funds available for financing agricultural production X X X 
4. Lack of incentives to expand the services offered by non-traditional 
financial institutions X   
5. The assets eligible to be placed as collateral are undervalued by financial 
institutions, which consequently limits the access to credit X X X 
6. Increased risk associated with trade liberalization, which further 
constraints the availability of funds   X 
7. Interest rates are too high relative to the returns of agriculture.   X X X 
RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. Insufficient coverage of irrigation systems X X X 
2. Insufficient network of rural routes that constrain the ability of farmers 
to move their production to the markets. Truckers take advantage of this 
situation, thus gaining market power to the detriment of producers 
X X  
3. Insufficient drying and storage facilities   X 
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Appendix Table 2. Continued 
AREAS OF INTEREST BEANS CORN RICE 
RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE, CONTINUED 
4. Insufficient coverage of basic services such as electricity and phone 
isolates producers, thus making them all the most dependent on truckers 
and other middlemen.  
X X  
5. The above also leads to the misinformation of farmers about public and 
private initiatives of interest. X X  
PROMOTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND PRODUCTION DIVERSIFICATION 
1. Lack of professionals in rural areas to help farmers improve their 
economic results.  X X  
2. Lack of investment in services such as soil labs, breeding programs, 
research in the management of agrochemicals, weed control, etc. X X X 
3. Insufficient supply of quality seeds with desirable agronomical and 
market characteristics that can expand the market for Honduran staples X   
SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 
1. Lack of information regarding the use and certification of agrochemicals.  X X X 
SUSTAINABILITY OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
1. Inadequate management of soils in hillside production, which leads to the 
rapid loss of fertility.  X  
2. Advance of the agricultural frontier that endangers the sustainability of 
areas previously covered with forest.  X  
3. Inadequate management of water resources (which, among other things, 
leads to flooding, destruction of crops and infrastructure)  X X 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
1. Insufficient provision and poor quality of rural education X X X 
2. Lack of agricultural training X X X 
Source: National Agricultural Roundtable. 
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Appendix Table 3. Honduras: Competitiveness of agricultural and food exports to the U.S. (1990-
2004) 
PRODUCTS 
CHANGE IN MARKET 
SHARE 
CHANGE IN MARKET 
SIZE 
PRODUCT 
CLASSIFICATION 
Agricultural Products    
Live animals -0.106 -0.141 Retreat product 
Fresh and frozen beef -1.013 -0.117 Retreat product 
Live fish 0.129 -0.302 Falling stars 
Dairy and honey -0.002 -0.004 Falling stars 
Other animal products 0.012 0.004 Rising stars 
Plants and flowers -0.114 0.004 Missed opportunities 
Beans and vegetables 0.127 0.003 Rising stars 
Edible fruits -3.791 -0.094 Retreat product 
Coffee, tea, and spices -0.575 -0.246 Retreat product 
Cereals na -0.009 Undefined 
Oil seeds -0.058 -0.036 Retreat product 
Food Products    
Milling products na 0.013 Undefined 
Sugar and sweeteners  -0.473 -0.124 Retreat product 
Processed beans, fruits, 
and vegetables 0.173 -0.204 Falling stars 
Alcoholic beverages 0.009 0.013 Rising stars 
Cocoa and its derivatives -0.088 -0.047 Retreat product 
Tobacco 3.542 -0.078 Falling stars 
Timber products -0.142 0.517 Missed opportunities 
Retreat products: losing competitiveness in stagnant sectors; Missed opportunities: losing 
competitiveness in growing sectors; Rising stars: gaining competitiveness in growing sectors; Falling 
stars: gaining competitiveness in stagnant sectors.  
Source: Serna 2007. 
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Appendix Table 4. Honduras: short-list of agricultural and food export products with revealed 
comparative advantages in other foreign markets but the U.S. 
PRODUCTS HS CODE 
EXPORTS (USD 1,000) 
WORLD U.S. 
Whip cream 04022900 567 0 
Muenster cheese 04069020 285 0 
Fresh and frozen tomatoes 07020000 5,512 0 
Beans  
07082000 358 4 
07102200 459 435 
07133190 628 3 
Almonds 08021200 265 0 
Fresh plantains  08030011 111,956 97,041 
Passion fruit 08109030 163 0 
Coffee 
09011120 262 0 
09011130 181,945 21,958 
Cinnamon  09061000 51 0 
Palm oil 15119090 13,851 0 
Sweeteners  17021900 486 0 
Cocoa and its derivatives 
18031000 205 0 
18050000 905 0 
Juices 20094900 1,050 218 
Tomato juice 20095000 259 0 
Ketchup 21032000 8,749 10 
Tobacco 
24012020 3,073 0 
24013010 520 0 
Source: Monge-González 2004 
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Appendix Table 5. Measures to transform the agricultural and food sectors of Honduras 
1. COMPETITIVENESS AND QUALITY 
1.1. MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
1.1.1. DOMESTIC MARKET  
GOAL  Create a more clear and stable regulatory framework as a first step towards improving the 
efficiency of production 
LINES OF ACTION 
3) Implementation of temporary price stabilization programs to protect the domestic market from 
a sudden rise in imports (safeguard measures) or unfair competition (anti-dumping measures).   
4) Enhancing the efficiency of domestic markets by increasing its transparency; promoting the 
creation of wholesale markets at the municipal level; investing in infrastructure, primarily 
roads and storage facilities; improving the efficiency in the use of the public storage facilities; 
developing clear standards of weight and quality to make transactions more transparent, and 
improving the market information service.    
5) Redefinition of food aid policies to avoid undesirable and unintended distortions in the 
domestic market. 
6) Continuation of purchase agreements for basic grains between producers and the processing 
industry.  
1.1.2. EXPORT MARKET  
GOAL  Create the conditions for the expansion of foreign markets for Honduran products 
LINES OF ACTION 
7) Continuing with the process of economic integration at the regional and multilateral levels. 
8) Strengthening the negotiating skills of the Secretary of Agriculture (SAG) in regional and 
multilateral rounds.  
9) Creation of agricultural attachés in relevant foreign markets in order to improve the 
knowledge about market opportunities and to promote Honduran agricultural products.  
10) Creation of the Fund for the Promotion of Agricultural Products, financed by the SAG, with 
the goal of promoting Honduran products overseas.   
11) Strengthening the market information system of the SAG through INFOAGRO. 
12) Simplifying the application process for export rights.   
1.2. SANITARY MEASURES AND FOOD SAFETY 
GOAL  Secure a better quality of products that would enable Honduran products to access world 
markets, as well as to offer high quality domestic products in the domestic market 
LINES OF ACTION 
13) Strengthening the enforcement of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Law.  
14) Improving the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) protocols throughout the supply chain. 
15) Promoting the harmonization of SPS protocols in the Central American region. 
16) Signing the new Seed Law to strengthen intellectual property rights, thus facilitating access to 
high-quality seeds and improving productivity. 
17) Strengthening the procedures for inspection and authorization of food processing industries. 
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Appendix Table 5. Continued 
2. PRODUCTION INCENTIVES AND SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION 
2.1. INCENTIVES TO TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, DIVERSIFICATION OF PRODUCTION, AND GENERATION 
OF VALUE ADDED 
GOAL  Promote policies aimed at improving the investment in research and development as well as 
access to technology for a sustainable and more productive agriculture 
LINES OF ACTION 
18) Creation of the National System of Agricultural Innovation and Technology Transfer 
(SNITTA for its initials in Spanish) as a forum for interaction of public and private interests 
for the definition of research priorities and management of funds available for that purpose.  
19) Creation of the National Center for Innovation in Food and Agriculture (CENITA for its 
initials in Spanish), dependent on the SAG, with the goal of developing the human skills and 
infrastructure necessary for public agricultural research.   
20) Assessing the comparative advantages of the different regions and their limitations in order to 
allocate research and extension funds more efficiently.  
2.2. EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
GOAL  Improve the skills of the labor force available for the agriculture and food sector 
LINES OF ACTION 
21) Developing training programs for professionals and producers.  
22) Adapting the curricula at all levels of education so that the contents are useful and reflect the 
needs in each region.  
23) Creating the forums for the interaction of agents involved in rural education and training 
programs. 
2.3. RURAL AND AGRICULTURAL FINANCING, PROMOTION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT  
GOAL  Increase the supply of capital to finance agriculture and facilitate the access to these 
resources 
LINES OF ACTION 
24) Increasing the availability and efficiency in the allocation of public funds devoted to finance 
agricultural production.   
25) Developing the proper regulatory system so as to encourage the participation of private 
financial institutions in agricultural capital markets.    
26) Strengthening the risk management tools available so as to offer more guarantees to, and 
encourage the participation of, private financial institutions.   
27) Increasing the funds for production activities of small farms granted through the Sustainable 
Rural Development National Project (PRONADERS for its initials in Spanish)  
28) Subsidizing the cost of agricultural insurance to encourage their adoption and lower the risks 
of agricultural production. 
29) Formulating mechanisms to reduce the interest rate on agricultural loans.  
30) Designing a strategy to encourage foreign direct investment in agriculture. 
31) Strengthening the National Bank of Agricultural Development (BANADESA for its initials in 
Spanish) and  the National Fund for Production and Housing (FONAPROVI for its initials in 
Spanish), both institutionally and economically, to provide better public financial services to 
the agricultural sector. 
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Appendix Table 5. Continued 
2.4. RURAL  INFRASTRUCTURE AND IRRIGATION 
2.4.1. IRRIGATION  
 
GOAL  Expand the irrigation system to incorporate 40,000 hectares by 2005 
LINES OF ACTION 
32) Creation of the National Service of Rural Infrastructure and Irrigation (SENINFRA for its 
initials in Spanish), in charge of guiding and coordinating actions related to rural 
infrastructure and irrigation systems. 
33) Formulation of the Irrigation and Drainage National Plan, with the goal of developing feasible 
irrigation projects.   
34) Implementation of irrigation projects based on their social and economic returns.   
35) Encouraging private investment in irrigation through the granting of investment subsidies. 
2.4.2. RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
GOAL  Accelerate public investment in rural infrastructure 
LINES OF ACTION 
36) Encouraging the use of SENINFRA as a forum where the different agencies in charge of 
public infrastructure could interact and coordinate their actions towards the development of 
proper conditions for agricultural production.   
2.5. NATURAL RESOURCE SUSTAINABILITY  
GOAL  Manage natural resources, particularly forestry and water, in ways that provide economic 
benefits while ensuring their sustainability 
LINES OF ACTION 
37) The Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment (SERNA for its initials in Spanish) will 
initiate a review of the laws and regulations regarding natural resources to ensure their 
enforcement and compatibility with the new production processes and environmental 
standards. 
38) Designing the National Strategy for Sustainable Management of Water Basins, in charge of 
evaluating the current conditions of numerous basins, and taking the steps towards recovering 
the productive capacity, primarily of those that present a high level of degradation. 
39) Creating mechanisms that promote a sustainable management of resources. 
40) Strengthening the enforcement of laws and regulations against illegal management of the 
rainforest.  
41) Reviewing the allocation of public land titles to landless farmers, avoiding the allocation of 
land in protected areas.      
2.6. ACCESS TO LAND, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL EQUITY  
GOAL  Solve the problem of private property rights and unequal access t land   
LINES OF ACTION 
42) Strengthening the regulatory framework by formulating the National Land Policy.   
43) Improving the conditions for the development of land markets. 
44) Facilitating access to land for small farmers through guarantees and/or subsidies provided by 
the government.  
45) Encouraging the development of new agricultural land through the concession of tax 
incentives to private investors.  
Source: Government of Honduras 2004. 
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Appendix Table 6. Description of the macro-SAM of Honduras for the year 2004 
 
PRODUCTION  DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS  TAXES 
 
ACT PROD LAB CAP  HOU GOV ENTR  PR-TX S-TX 
Activities 
 
Production 
  
 
   
   
Products Intermediate consumption    
 Final 
consumption 
Final 
consumption  
   
Labor Value added 
   
 
   
   
Capital Value added 
   
 
   
   
Households 
  
Domestic 
transfers  
 
 
Net transfers Operating surplus 
   
Government 
    
 
   
 Tax 
revenue 
Tax 
revenue 
Enterprises 
   
Domestic 
Transfers 
 
 
Net Transfers 
 
   
Production tax Production tax 
   
 
   
   
Sales tax 
 
Sales tax 
  
 
   
   
Import tariff 
 
Import tariff 
  
 
   
   
Export tariff 
 
Export tariff 
  
 
   
   
Income tax 
    
 Income tax 
 
Income tax    
Dis. Margins domestic  Margins      
 
 
  
Dis. Margins exports  Margins      
 
 
  
Dis. Margins imports  Margins      
 
 
  
S-I 
    
 Savings Savings Savings    
Rest of the World 
 
Imports (c.i.f) Transfer to ROW 
Transfer to 
ROW 
 
 
Transfer to 
ROW 
Transfer to 
ROW 
   
Total Gross output Domestic absorption Labor cost 
Capital 
cost 
 Household 
expenditure 
Government 
expenditure 
Enterprise 
expenditure 
 Tax 
revenue 
Tax 
revenue 
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Appendix Table 6. Continued. 
 
TAXES  DISTRIBUTION MARGINS 
   
 
M-TR X-TR I-TX  DM-D DM-X DM-M S-I ROW TOTAL 
Activities        
  
Production value 
Products     Margins Demand 
Margins 
Demand 
Margins 
Demand 
Gross capital 
formation Exports (f.o.b.) Aggregate demand 
Labor        
 
Compensation from 
ROW 
Aggregate labor 
income 
Capital        
 
Compensation from 
ROW 
Aggregate capital 
income 
Households        
 
Transfers from 
ROW Household income 
Government Tax revenue 
Tax 
revenue 
Tax 
revenue      
Transfers from 
ROW Government revenue 
Enterprises        
 
Transfers from 
ROW Enterprise income 
Production tax        
  
Production tax 
revenue 
Sales tax        
  
Sales tax revenue 
Import tariff        
  
Import tariff revenue 
Export tariff        
  
Export tariff revenue 
Income tax        
  
Income tax revenue 
Dis. Margins domestic        
  
Distribution margins 
Dis. Margins exports        
  
Distribution margins 
Dis. Margins imports        
  
Distribution margins 
S-I        
 
Capital inflow Total savings 
Rest of the World        Capital outflow 
 
Payments to ROW 
Total Tax revenue 
Tax 
revenue 
Tax 
revenue  
Margins 
demand 
Margins 
demand 
Margins 
demand Total investment 
Payments from 
ROW 
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Appendix Table 7. The 2004 Macro-SAM for Honduras (million Lempiras)  
   
 FACTORS  DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS  TAXES  DISTRIB. MARGINS   
 
ACT PROD  LAB CAP  HOU GOV ENTR  PR-TX S-TX M-TR X-TR I-TX  DM-D DM-X DM-M S-I ROW 
ACT 
 
328,393                    
PROD 181,283 
 
    130,459 13,202         20,233 7,299 6,889 47,912 94,357 
LAB 72,273 
 
                  567 
CAP 72,165 
 
                  1,049 
HOU 
  
 72,534   33 9,025 41,161            20,717 
GOV 
  
     2,222 0  2,672 12,448 1,801 148 8,829      1,436 
ENTR 
  
  63,616   265 27,404            2,395 
PR-TX 2,672 
 
                   
S-TX 
 
12,448                    
M-TR 
 
1,801                    
X-TR 
 
148                    
I-TX 
  
    1,452 0 7,377             
DM-D 
 
20,233                    
DM-X 
 
7,299                    
DM-M 
 
6,889                    
S-I 
  
    11,526 4,495 17,733           9,403 14,431 
ROW 
 
124,423  306 9,598  0 346 5           273  
TOTAL 328,393 501,634  72,840 73,214  143,470 29,555 93,680  2,672 12,448 1,801 148 8,829  20,233 7,299 6,889 57,588 134,953 
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Appendix Table 8. Sets defined in the CGE model 
ACT: activities 
CAPACT: activities producing capital goods 
CONACT: activities producing consumption goods 
COM: commodities CT: commodities used as inputs by transaction service sector 
FAC: factors of 
production 
FM: mobile factors of production 
FSUP: factors with supply 
function 
FNSUP: factors with fixed 
supply 
FS: sluggish factors of production 
FSUP: factors with supply 
function 
FNSUP: factors with fixed 
supply 
ID : domestic institutions 
IDNG: domestic non-government 
institutions 
HOU: households 
ENT: enterprises 
GOV: government  
REG : other regions 
 
Appendix Table 9. Parameters in the CGE model 
PARAMETERS DESCRIPTION 
EXOGENOUS 
 Elasticity of substitution among factors of production in the value-added nest 
 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate inputs in intermediates nest 
 Elasticity of transformation between domestic and export markets  
 Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 
 Elasticity of substitution among destinations of exports 
 Elasticity of substitution among sources of imports 
 Elasticity of transformation for sluggish factors of production  Own-price elasticity of factor supply   CDE income parameter   CDE substitution parameter 
 Utility from the consumption of traded composite (set to 1 at the baseline) 
 Utility from the consumption of non-traded composite (set to 1 at the baseline) 
 Utility from savings (set to 1 at the baseline) 
ENDOGENOUS 
 Allen partial elasticity of substitution by household  
 Income elasticity of demand for commodity c by household 
 Uncompensated own-price elasticity of demand by household 
 Elasticity of expenditure on traded composite with respect to utility by household 
 Elasticity of total expenditure with respect to utility by household 
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Appendix Table 10. List of equations included in the CGE model 
ACTIVITY LEVEL NEST 
1)                                                                                                                                                                                                         2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
VALUE-ADDED AND INTERMEDIATES NESTS 
3)  
4)                                                                                                                     
5)                                                                                                             6)                                                                                
7)                                                                                                                                                            
COMMODITY PRODUCTION BY ACTIVITY 8)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 9)                                                                                                                                                                                   
AGGREGATION FUNCTION FOR TRADED COMMODITIES 
10)                                                                                                                                                            11)                                                                                                                                                     
ALLOCATION OF DOMESTIC COMMODITIES 
12)                                                                                                                                                                                               13)                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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Appendix Table 10. Continued 
EXPORT SUPPLY 
14)                                                                                                                                                            15)                                                                                                                                                                                                 
COMPOSITE COMMODITY PRODUCTION 
16)                                                                                                                                                                                          17)                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
SOURCING OF IMPORTS 
18)                                                                                                                                                    19)                                                                                                                                                                                      
FACTOR SUPPLY 
20)                                                                                                                                                                                          21)                                                                                                                                                                                22)                                                                                                                                                                                                       
TRANSACTION SERVICES 
23)   24)   25)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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Appendix Table 10. Continued 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX EQUATION 26)    
DETERMINATION OF FACTOR INCOME 
27)                                                                                                                                                                                           28)                                                                                                    
29)                                                                                   
DISTRIBUTION OF FACTOR INCOME 
30)                                                                                                                                                                                             31)                                                                                                                                                                                                      32)                                                                                                                                                                             33)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
INCOME OF DOMESTIC, NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
34)                                                                                                                                                                                                                         35)                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
36)                       37)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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Appendix Table 10. Continued 
EXPENDITURE OF DOMESTIC, NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
38)                                                                                                                                                                                                                     39)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 40)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 41) –                                                                                                                                                                                                         
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND SYSTEM 
SUB-UTILITY FROM SELF-CONSUMPTION 
42)                                                                                                                                                                     43)                                                                                                                                                                                  44)                                                                                                                                                                             
45)                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
SUB-UTILITY FROM TRADED COMMODITIES 46)                                                                                                                                                                                                                             47)                                                                                                                                                       48)                                                                                                                                                                                                            49)                                                                                                                                                                                      
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Appendix Table 10. Continued 
REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD 
Budget Allocation 
50)                                                                                                                                                                                    51)                                                                                                                                                                                                                52)                                                                                                                                                                                                               53)                                                                                            54)                                                                                                                                                                                           55)                                                                                                                                                                         56)                                                                                                                                                                                                     57)                                                                                                                                                                                                    58)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD 
Aggregate Utility 
59)                                                                                                      60)                                                                         
61)                                                   
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Appendix Table 10. Continued 
GOVERNMENT REVENUES  
62)                                                                                                                                                                                                                  63)            
                     
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
64)                                                                                                                                                                                                           65)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
66)                                                                                                                                                                                                                   67)    
PRICE LINKAGES 68)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      69)                                                                                                                                                                      70)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   71)                                                                                                       72)                                                                                                                                                                                        73)                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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Appendix Table 10. Continued 
PRICE LINKAGES. CONTINUED 74)                                                                                                 75)                                                                                                                                                                                                                              76)                                                                                                                                                                                                 
ENDOGENOUS TAX RATES 77)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               78)                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
MICROECONOMIC CLOSURES 
79)                                                                                                                                                                                                     
80)                                                                                                                                                                                                      81)                                                                        82)                                       83)                                                                                                                                               
84)                                                                                                                                                                                     85)                                                                                                                                                                                    
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Appendix Table 10. Continued 
MACROECONOMIC CLOSURES 
86)            
87)  
88) -  
89) -  90)    
91)  
92)  
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION  
93)  
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Appendix Table 11. Definition, estimation, and updates of the values used for the calibration of the model 
IDENTIFICATION DEFINITION ESTIMATION 
READ DIRECTLY FROM THE SAM 
VTCAM(c,a) Market value of consumption good c produced by activity a that is traded ptoa(c,a)*qtoa(c,a) 
VHCAHM(a,c,h) Market value of consumption good c produced by activity a consumed by household h ptoa(c,a)*qntah(a,c,h) 
VFAA(f,a) Firm value of factor of production f used by activity a 
pfa(f,c) * qf(f,c) for sluggish factors 
pf(f)*qf(f,c)  for mobile factors 
VIAA(c,a) Firm value of intermediate input c used by activity a pq(c) * qint(c,a)  
VEWF(c,r) Value of exports of commodity c to region r valued at world prices (in foreign currency) pewf(c,r) * qed(c,r) 
VEWD(c,r) Value of exports of commodity c to region r valued at world prices (in domestic currency) pewd(c,r) * xr * qed(c,r) 
VEBD(c,r) Value of exports of commodity c to region r valued at border prices  pebd(c,r) * qed(c,r) 
VEMD(c,r) Value of exports of commodity c to region r valued at domestic market prices pepd(c,r) * qed(c,r) 
VDH(c,h)  Value of consumption of composite commodity c by household h pq(c) * qqh(h,c) 
VDGOV(c)  Value of consumption of composite commodity c by government pq(c) * qg(c) 
VDTRP(c)  Value of consumption of composite commodity c by transaction services pq(c) * qtd(c) 
VMMS(c,r) Value of imports of commodity c from region r valued at domestic market prices pmms(c,r) * qms(c,r) 
VMBS(c,r) Value of imports of commodity c from region r valued at border prices pmbs(c,r) * qms(c,r) 
VMWS(c,r) Value of imports of commodity c from region r valued at world prices (in domestic currency) pmws(c,r) * xr * qms(c,r) 
VMWF(c,r) Value of imports of commodity c from region r valued at world prices (in foreign currency) pmwf(c,r) * qms(c,r) 
VDM(c) Value of domestic sales of domestically-produced commodity c valued at market prices pdm(c) * qd(c) 
VRTFF(f,r)  Value of regional transfers to factor of production f from region r (in foreign currency) rtff(f,r) 
VRTFS(f,r)  Value of regional transfers to factor of production f from region r (in domestic currency) rtfd(f,r) 
VFTDI(i,f)  Income of factor of production f transferred to domestic non-government institution i yfi(i,f) 
VFTRF(f,r)  Income of factor of production f transferred to region r (in foreign currency) ftrf(f,r) 
VFTRD(f,r)  Income of factor of production f transferred to region r, (in domestic currency) ftrd(f,r) 
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Appendix Table 11. Continued 
IDENTIFICATION DEFINITION ESTIMATION 
READ DIRECTLY FROM THE SAM 
VTII(i,j)  Income transfer from domestic non-government institution j to i trii(i,j) 
VTGI(i)  Income transfer from government to domestic non-government institution i gtdii(i) 
VRTDIF(i,r)  Income transfer from region r to domestic institution i, (in foreign currency) 
rtif(i,r) ∀ i∈ IDNG 
 rtgovf(r) for GOV 
VRTDI(i,r)  Income transfer from region r to domestic institution i, (in domestic currency) 
rtid(i,r) ∀ i∈ IDNG 
 rtgovd(r) for GOV 
NYIDNG(i)   Net income of domestic non-government institution i  yn(i) 
FORSAV(r)   Foreign savings of region r  fsav(r) * xr 
VDEP   Value of capital depreciation  pcgds * gfs(“f_cap”) 
ESTIMATED IN THE MODEL FROM THE READS ABOVE 
VFA(a) Aggregate value of factors of production used by activity a Sum{f, FAC, VFAA(f,a)} 
VIA(a) Aggregate value of intermediate inputs used by activity a Sum{c,COM, VIAA(c,a)} 
VAP(a) Value of output of activity a at producer price VFA(a) + VIA(a) 
VCAM(c,a) Market value of consumption good c produced by activity a  VTCAM(c,a) + Sum{h,HOU, VHCAHM(a,c,h)} 
VAM(a) Market value of output of activity a  Sum{c,COM, VCAM(c,a)} 
VTOM(c) Market value of consumption good c that is traded Sum{a,CONACT, VTCAM(c,a)} 
VEM(c) Aggregate value of exports of commodity c valued at domestic market prices Sum{r, REG, VEMD(c,r)} 
VDS(c) Value of domestic sales of domestic commodity c valued at wholesaler prices VTOM(c) – VEM(c) 
VFS(f) Value of endowment of factor of production f at supplier price Sum{a, ACT, VFAA(f,a)} 
VMM(c) Aggregate value of imports of commodity c valued at domestic market prices Sum{r, REG, VMMS(c,r)} 
VQS(c) Value of composite commodity c valued at supply prices VMM(c) + VDM(c) 
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Appendix Table 11. Continued 
IDENTIFICATION DEFINITION ESTIMATION 
VQD(c) Value of composite commodity c valued at demand prices Sum{c,COM, VIAA(c,a)} + Sum{h,HOU, VDH(c,h)} + VDGOV(c) + VDTRP(c) 
VDTS  Total value of demand by transaction services Sum{c, COM, VDTRP(c)} 
VTFDCH(c) Value of final demand for composite commodity c by households Sum{h, HOU, VDH(c,h)} 
VTFDH  Value of total final demand by households Sum{c, COM, VTFDCH(c)}  
VRTF(f)  Aggregate value of regional transfers to factor of production f Sum{r, REG, VRTFS(f,r) 
FACINC(f)  Gross income of factor of production f VFS(f) + VRTF(f) 
VFTD(f)  Aggregate income of factor f transferred to domestic non-government institutions Sum{i, IDNG, VFTDI(i,f)} 
VFTR(f)  Aggregate income of factor f transferred to other regions Sum{r, REG, VFTRD(f,r)} 
GYIDNG(i)   Gross income of domestic non-government institution i  
Sum{f, FAC, VFTDI(i,f)} + Sum{j, IDNG, 
VTII(i,j)} + Sum{r, REG, VRTDI(i,r)} + 
VTGI(i)  
UTILBUD(h) Budget available for utility maximization by household h NYIDNG(h) - Sum{j, IDNG, VTII(i,j)} + Sum{r, REG, VDITR(i,r)} 
ENTSAV(e) Savings of enterprises NYIDNG(e) - Sum{j, IDNG, VTII(i,e)} + Sum{r, REG, VDITR(e,r)} 
VNTH(h)  Total expenditure on non-traded commodities by household h Sum{c,COM, a, CONACT, VHCAHM(a,c,h)} 
VTH(h)  Total expenditure on tradable commodities by household h Sum{c,COM,VDH(c,h)} 
HOUSAV(h) Value of savings by household h UTILBUD(h) – VNTH(h) – VTH(h) 
GROSSINV Gross investment Sum{c, COM, VIAA(c, ”cgds”)} 
NETINV Net investment GROSSINV - VDEP 
VOM(c) Market value of commodity c VTOM(c) + Sum{h,HOU,  a, CONACT, VHCAHM(a,c,h)} 
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Appendix Table 11. Continued 
IDENTIFICATION DEFINITION ESTIMATION 
GOVREV   Total government revenue 
Sum{a,CONACT, VAM(a) – VAP(a)} + Sum{c,COM, VQD(c) - 
VQS(c)} + 
Sum{i,IDNG, GYIDNG(i) - NYIDNG(i)} + Sum{c,COM, 
Sum[r,REG, VEWD(c,r) - VEBD(c,r)]} +  
Sum{c,COM, Sum[r,REG, VMBS(c,r) - VMWS(c,r)]} + Sum{r,REG, 
VRTDI("gov",r)} 
GOVEXP   Current expenditure of government  Sum{c, COM, VDGOV(c)}+ Sum{i, IDNG, VTGI(i)}+ Sum{r, REG, VDITR(“gov”,r)}  
GOVSAV   Government savings  GOVREV - GOVEXP 
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Appendix Table 12. List of shocks applied to assess the impact of DR-CAFTA 
PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO IMPORT TARIFF 
REDUCTION 
YEARS OF DR-CAFTA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CORN 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -8.3% -8.3% -8.3% -8.3% 
2. RICE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
3.BEANS -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% 
4. WHEAT -59.8% -10.1% -10.1% -10.1% -10.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
5. TUBERS -99.5% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6. BANANA -57.7% -5.6% -5.6% -5.6% -5.6% -3.9% -3.9% -3.9% -3.9% -3.9% 
7. OTHER FRUITS AND NUTS -54.6% -6.6% -6.6% -6.6% -6.6% -3.8% -3.8% -3.8% -3.8% -3.8% 
8. OILSEEDS -83.3% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% 
9. LIVE PLANTS -23.8% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% 
11. TOBACCO RAW -25.5% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -5.8% -5.8% -5.8% -5.8% 
12. OTHER CROPS -29.4% -8.2% -8.2% -8.2% -8.2% -3.4% -3.4% -3.4% -3.4% -3.4% 
13. LIVE ANIMALS -21.6% -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% 
14. OTHER ANIMALS -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% 
15. WOOD -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% -10.0% 
16. FISH RAW -34.6% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% 
17. METALS -61.2% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% 
18. MINERALS EXCEPT METALS -44.4% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% 
19. PROCESSED MEAT -13.4% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% -6.5% 
20. PROCESSED FISH -85.6% -1.9% -1.9% -1.9% -1.9% -1.1% -1.1% -1.1% -1.1% -1.1% 
21. PROCESSED FRUITS -81.1% -2.6% -2.6% -2.6% -2.6% -1.4% -1.4% -1.4% -1.4% -1.4% 
22. ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE OIL -47.7% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.5% -4.4% -4.4% -4.4% -4.4% -4.4% 
23. DAIRY PRODUCTS -30.8% -6.9% -6.9% -6.9% -6.9% -6.8% -6.8% -6.8% -6.8% -6.8% 
24. MILLING PRODUCTS -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% 
25. BAKERY PRODUCTS -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% 
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Appendix Table 12. Continued 
PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO IMPORT TARIFF 
REDUCTION 
YEARS OF DR-CAFTA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
26. PROCESSED SUGAR -86.5% -1.9% -2.1% -2.1% -2.1% -0.9% -1.1% -1.1% -1.1% -1.1% 
27. CACAO -79.0% -3.7% -3.9% -3.9% -3.9% -0.9% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% 
28. PROCESSED FOOD -86.5% -1.7% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% -1.3% -1.3% -1.3% -1.3% -1.3% 
29. BEVERAGES -66.3% -4.5% -4.6% -4.6% -4.6% -2.9% -3.1% -3.1% -3.1% -3.1% 
30. PROCESSED TOBACCO -100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
31. TEXTILES AND APPARELS -100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
32. OTHER PRODUCTS -93.3% -1.3% -1.3% -1.3% -1.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% 
33. PRODUCTS FROM PETROLEUM -83.3% -2.9% -2.9% -2.9% -2.9% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% 
34. CHEMICAL PRODUCTS -80.0% -1.6% -2.2% -2.2% -2.2% -1.7% -2.5% -2.5% -2.5% -2.5% 
35. MACHINERY -65.8% -2.6% -3.6% -3.6% -3.6% -3.1% -4.4% -4.4% -4.4% -4.4% 
PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO IMPORT TARIFF 
REDUCTION 
YEARS OF DR-CAFTA 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. CORN -13.4% -13.4% -13.4% -13.4% -13.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2. RICE -8.3% -8.3% -8.3% -8.3% -16.8% -16.8% -16.8% -16.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
3.BEANS -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
4. WHEAT 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
5. TUBERS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6. BANANA 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7. OTHER FRUITS AND NUTS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8. OILSEEDS -1.2% -1.2% -1.1% -1.1% -1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9. LIVE PLANTS -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% -5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
11. TOBACCO RAW -5.8% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% 
12. OTHER CROPS -3.5% -3.4% -3.4% -3.4% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
13. LIVE ANIMALS -2.8% -2.8% -2.1% -2.1% -2.3% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
14. OTHER ANIMALS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Appendix Table 12. Continued 
PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO IMPORT TARIFF 
REDUCTION 
YEARS OF DR-CAFTA 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
15. WOOD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
16. FISH RAW -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% -4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
17. METALS -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% -2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
18. MINERALS EXCEPT METALS -4.3% -4.3% -2.1% -2.1% -2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
19. PROCESSED MEAT -6.4% -6.4% -5.1% -5.1% -5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
20. PROCESSED FISH -0.4% -0.4% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
21. PROCESSED FRUITS -0.4% -0.4% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
22. ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE OIL -2.4% -2.4% -2.4% -2.4% -2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
23. DAIRY PRODUCTS -1.4% -1.4% -1.4% -1.4% -1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
24. MILLING PRODUCTS -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
25. BAKERY PRODUCTS -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% -6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
26. PROCESSED SUGAR 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
27. CACAO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
28. PROCESSED FOOD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
29. BEVERAGES 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
30. PROCESSED TOBACCO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
31. TEXTILES AND APPARELS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
32. OTHER PRODUCTS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
33. PRODUCTS FROM PETROLEUM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
34. CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
35. MACHINERY 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Source: own estimates. Raw coffee is not included in the list of products because no trade was reported during the reference year.  
Rows might not add to 100% due to rounding errors. 
 
